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ABSTRACT 
 
Affective reactions to unfair treatment date back to the earliest work on 
organizational justice. Seminal research on inequity identifies anger and guilt as primary 
responses to judgments of low justice. More recently, interpersonal justice has been 
linked to emotions such as anger and hostility. In fact, interpersonal justice is arguably 
the most emotionally charged of all the justice types. Yet, despite the strong theoretical 
support and empirical evidence linking interpersonal justice to negative emotions, we are 
unsure whether dignity and respect from a supervisor may also influence positive 
emotions.  
Justice scholars have also begun to investigate the moderating influence of status 
on to the effects of interpersonal justice. It has been suggested, and empirically 
demonstrated, that people of lower objective status (hierarchical position, race) react 
more strongly to fairness relative to those higher in status. However, we do not yet know 
how the effects of interpersonal justice may be moderated by employees’ perceptions of 
personal status, workgroup status, or supervisor status. Furthermore, scholars have yet to 
examine the moderating influence of status on emotional reactions to interpersonal 
justice.  
In this dissertation, I answer recent calls for further investigation into the 
relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions and between interpersonal 
justice and status. Specifically, I draw from affective events theory and self-enhancement 
theory to develop a model of interpersonal justice, status, and emotions. In this model, I 
 iii 
 
hypothesize a mediating effect of emotions on the relationships between interpersonal 
justice and a number of distal attitudes and behaviors. I further predict a moderating 
influence of justice orientation and three types of status—personal (self) status, 
workgroup status, and supervisor status—on the interpersonal justice to emotions 
relationships. A sample of 427 university-based military cadets provided partial support 
for my model. As expected, interpersonal justice predicted a number of important distal 
outcomes indirectly through both positive and negative emotions. Personal status, 
supervisor status, and justice orientation moderated several of the relationships between 
interpersonal justice and emotions. Implications for practice and theory are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Research Problem 
Organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987) has played an important role in 
organizational research for several decades. People make judgments regarding the 
fairness they receive in the workplace and subsequently react to these judgments in a 
number of meaningful ways. What started with an interest in the equity of important 
outcomes (distributive justice; Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 
1976) soon expanded to include the fairness of the procedures through which these 
outcomes are determined (procedural justice; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975). Justice scholars have also highlighted the importance of interactional justice, or 
the fairness of the social exchange between supervisors and subordinates when 
procedures are executed (Bies & Moag, 1986). Interactional justice has two distinct 
factors—informational justice and interpersonal justice. Informational justice describes 
the extent to which a supervisor’s explanations for important decisions are adequate and 
timely, and interpersonal justice is defined as the dignity, respect, and propriety afforded 
subordinates by their supervisors (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1993a; Colquitt, 
2001). I focus on the fairness of this social exchange in the present research by 
examining interpersonal justice, a construct that has seen a recent increase in scholarly 
attention due to its ability to attenuate the consequences of low distributive and/or 
procedural justice as well as its relatively high practical utility—managers tend to have 
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more discretion over their use of respectful behavior than they do over other sources of 
justice such as organizational rewards and procedures (Greenberg, 2011; Scott, Colquitt, 
& Paddock, 2009).  
 A thorough review of the interpersonal justice literature demonstrates that 
employees place considerable value on being treated with dignity and respect. 
Interpersonal justice influences a number of important outcomes in the workplace (for a 
review, see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). For example, respect, 
dignity, and propriety from a supervisor have been positively associated with several 
favorable employee outcomes such as job performance (Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 
2002), job satisfaction (Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), supervisor 
satisfaction (Liao & Rupp, 2005), trust in management (Kernan & Hanges, 2002), and 
discretionary citizenship behaviors (Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005). 
Interpersonal justice has also been negatively associated with a number of unfavorable 
employee consequences such as stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2004), absenteeism (Gellatly, 
1995), and counter-productive behaviors (Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006).  
 Yet, despite the established relationships between interpersonal justice and both 
attitudes and behaviors, Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, and Grandey (2000: 51), stated 
that “what has not been so clearly demonstrated...is the relationship that organizational 
justice has with the discrete emotions that are experienced in relation to work.” They go 
on to suggest that “a theory of justice that is devoid of emotion is a theory missing what 
is perhaps the most fundamental part of the experience” (p. 62). 
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The study of emotions is a relatively new trend in organizational research and, 
more specifically, in the organizational justice literature (for reviews, see Elfenbein, 
2007; Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). Despite the newness of empirical research 
linking emotions to fairness, theoretical discussions of these relationships date back to 
the earliest work on organizational justice. Homans (1961: 75), in his classic description 
of social behavior, suggested that a person receiving the short end of an unfair reward 
distribution would “display the emotional behavior we call anger.” On the other hand, he 
also suggested that a person benefiting from an inequity may experience feelings of 
guilt. Following this logic, Adams (1965: 283), in his introduction of equity theory, 
suggested that inequity of rewards would result in “an unpleasant emotional state, be it 
anger or guilt”. 
Following this call for action, a handful of justice scholars set out to empirically 
demonstrate the effects of different types of justice perceptions on a variety of discrete 
emotions such as anger and disappointment (De Cremer, 2006), hope and joy (Chebat & 
Slusarczyk, 2005), fury and sadness (van den Bos & van Prooijen, 2001), contentment 
and hostility (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), happiness and pride (Krehbiel & 
Cropanzano, 2000), and envy (Cohen-Charash, Mueller, & Goldman, 2004). Particularly 
relevant to the present work, scholars have demonstrated relationships between 
interpersonal justice and anger (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002), 
hostility (Judge et al., 2006), and composite indices of negative emotions (Barclay, 
Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Stecher & Rosse, 2005).  
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Interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally charged of all the justice 
types (Harlos & Pinder, 2000). Indeed, Bradfield and Aquino (1999: 609) state that 
“violations of interpersonal justice tend to evoke the strongest emotional responses, 
ranging from anger to moral outrage”. For example, the experience of interpersonal 
mistreatment by a supervisor has been linked to psychological distress (Tepper, 2000) 
and likened to a hot, emotionally laden sensation (Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 2002). This 
burning sensation may involve a number of negative emotions such as anger, hostility, 
shame, and guilt (Barclay et al., 2005; Harlos & Pinder, 2000). The important theoretical 
connection between interpersonal justice and emotions inspired Cohen-Charash and 
Byrne (2008: 384), in their recent review of the justice-emotions literature, to note that 
“we need further study on interactional justice and its components: informational and 
interpersonal justice.”  
In the present work, I set out to help answer this call by examining emotional 
reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I examine the negative emotions anger, 
hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety, and embarrassment. Each of these emotions has been 
theoretically linked to fairness in previous work (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris 
et al., in press; Judge et al., 2006). Interestingly, research has yet to empirically 
demonstrate the influence of interpersonal justice on positive emotions (for an exception 
using customer fairness judgments, see Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). This is not overly 
surprising, as scholars have argued that we stand to gain more from the study of (and 
reactions to) low interpersonal justice than from the study of high interpersonal justice 
(Bies, 2001). Indeed, supervisors are expected to treat subordinates with dignity and 
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respect (Folger & Bies, 1989). Thus, meeting this expectation will likely evoke a weaker 
response than violating it (Cahn, 1949). However, research has demonstrated that other 
types of justice influence positive emotions (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). 
Furthermore, interpersonal justice plays a critical role in defining one’s self-concept 
(Bies, 2001; Tyler & Lind, 1992), and self-enhancing events have been linked to positive 
affective responses (Kwang & Swann, 2010). It is therefore likely that interpersonal 
justice will also influence positive emotions. Accordingly, I examine this possibility with 
six positive affective reactions (i.e., joy, happiness, pleasure, delight, pride, and 
contentment), each selected based on its low intensity relative to the negative emotions 
listed above (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O’Connor, 1987). Again, meeting the 
expectation of interpersonal justice should evoke more moderate reactions than the 
violation of this expectation.  
 Another potentially important construct in the experience of interpersonal justice 
is status. Organizational research has recently seen an increase of scholarly interest in 
the influence of status on a number of attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors in the 
workplace (for a review, see Pearce, 2011c). By status, I mean the respect, admiration, 
esteem and prestige given an individual or group by other organizational members 
(Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 1968). Status represents the social component of 
one’s self-concept. That is, status is concerned with people’s perception of how they are 
viewed by others. Thus the more people are respected and admired by others, the higher 
their self-concept.  
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The recent popularity of status in organizational research, of course, is not 
surprising. Status is a highly salient and prevalent construct in organizational settings. 
With structured hierarchies, organizational charts, titles indicative of rank, and an 
unequal distribution of rewards, employees are often well aware of their status in an 
organization. This awareness plays an important role in the sense-making and 
motivational processes of organizational life. That is, status maintains order and 
coordination throughout the ranks and provides incentives for people to expend 
additional effort in order to achieve higher status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).   
Organizational justice scholars have found status to be a particularly useful 
mechanism for explaining a variety of fairness-related phenomena (for a review, see 
Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). Although Greenberg and Ganegoda (2011: 270) noted 
that “connections between justice and status noted in the literature are not fully 
developed”, fairness researchers have made some important strides in linking the two 
fields of study. Specifically, they have identified status as a predictor of fairness 
(Erdogan, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), an outcome of fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988), and a 
moderator of fairness effects (Diekmann, Sondak, & Bearsness, 2007). Scholars have 
specifically found that status moderates the effects of interpersonal justice. A study by 
Aquino, Galperin, and Bennett (2004) suggests that objective status (hierarchical 
position and race) moderates the relationship between interpersonal justice and deviant 
behavior. However, we do not yet know the potential roles that perceived personal 
status, workgroup status, and supervisor status play in moderating the effects of 
interpersonal justice.  
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 Interpersonal justice and status share considerable conceptual similarities. 
Indeed, whereas status “connotes respect and dignity” (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011: 
272), interpersonal justice perceptions capture the extent to which respect and dignity is 
actually given. This seemingly obvious conceptual link led Greenberg and Ganegoda 
(2011: 288) to recently state that “it is curious that research linking status to interactional 
justice has been extremely limited.” As a consequence, in this dissertation, I aim to add 
to the understanding of this relationship by testing the potential moderating influence of 
status on the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions.  
 My decision to integrate emotions and status into the interpersonal justice 
literature was motivated by three theoretical perspectives. First, both status and emotions 
are both likely to play a central role in the experience of interpersonal justice. 
Specifically, self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973) suggests that status is likely to drive 
the need for interpersonal justice from a supervisor, as those who are low in status (i.e.,  
deprived of respect and prestige) should covet respectful supervisor treatment more than 
those of high status. Further, affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) 
suggests that emotions should serve as immediate responses to interpersonal justice 
events.  
Second, the conceptual similarities between interpersonal justice and emotions, 
and between interpersonal justice and status are striking. The emotionally-charged nature 
of interpersonal justice, coupled with its meaningful overlap with the tenets of status, 
make the addition of both constructs to the literature potentially fruitful.  
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Finally, in addition to the apparent connections that these two constructs have 
with interpersonal justice, emotions and status are also theoretically meaningful to each 
other. The intensity of emotional reactions is a function of the importance placed on the 
emotion-triggering event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Because low-status employees 
are more deprived of respect than high-status employees, they are likely to place higher 
value on interpersonal treatment from their supervisors. Thus, the strength of an 
emotional reaction to interpersonal justice is likely to depend on status.  
In my examination of status as a moderating influence on the interpersonal 
justice-emotion relationship, I examine three unique types of perceived status—personal 
status (i.e., status of the self), workgroup status, and supervisor status. It is expected that 
people low in personal status, or who receive low levels of respect, admiration, esteem, 
and prestige from their fellow group members (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 
1968), will have a stronger desire for fair interpersonal treatment from their supervisors 
in order to enhance their self-concept (i.e., status). The extent to which this desire is met 
should trigger a number of emotions. Thus, because they are likely to place greater value 
on interpersonal justice, low-status employees should experience stronger emotional 
reactions to this treatment than high-status employees. The same argument can be made 
for members of low-status workgroups. By workgroup status, I mean the perceived 
respect, admiration, esteem, and prestige that one’s workgroup is given by other 
workgroups in the organization (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 2006; Zelditch, 1968) part of a 
workgroup that, by definition, commands relatively low levels of respect and admiration 
throughout the organization, group members are likely to experience particularly strong 
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desires for respectful treatment from their supervisor in order to enhance their self-
concepts.  
On the other hand, an opposite effect is expected for the perceived status of the 
supervisor. Supervisor status is defined as the perceived respect, admiration, esteem, and 
prestige that one’s supervisor is given by his/her subordinates. High-status supervisors 
are likely to be considered more credible than low-status supervisors. When supervisors 
communicate information about employees’ self-worth via interpersonal treatment 
(Tyler, 1989), this information is more likely to be accepted as a true representation of 
the self when the supervisor is high in status and therefore more credible compared to a 
low-status supervisor. 
 The foundations for these arguments can be found by conjoining the frameworks 
of affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. Affective events theory (Weiss 
& Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that salient workplace events trigger a number of 
emotional reactions, and these emotions serve as mediating mechanisms that explain the 
relationships between the events and a variety of important distal attitudes and 
behaviors. At the center of this phenomenon lies a wide variety of goals, objectives, and 
values (Lazarus, 1991). Employees pursue a number of goals throughout the day. Some 
goals may be performance-related, such as completing specific tasks or performing tasks 
at a targeted level. Others may include the formation and maintenance of positive social 
ties with coworkers and supervisors. Events frequently occur within the workplace that 
may facilitate or obstruct the attainment of these goals. These intervening events have 
the potential to trigger emotions. For example, an event that hinders one’s ability to 
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attain a goal may result in a feeling of anger. Conversely, an event that facilitates this 
same goal may lead to an increase in happiness. 
 One common goal for all employees is to receive dignity and respect from their 
supervisors (Bies, 2001; Folger & Bies, 1989). Thus, each exchange with one’s 
supervisor has the potential to evoke a number of positive and negative emotions. 
Interpersonally fair treatment from the supervisor, for example, would facilitate the goal, 
likely triggering positive emotions. Conversely, low interpersonal fairness would serve 
as an obstruction to the goal, likely triggering negative emotional reactions. Thus, 
interpersonal justice should be positively related to positive emotions and negatively 
related to negative emotions. 
According to affective events theory, it is also likely that the emotions resulting 
from interpersonal fairness will serve as mediators to important distal outcomes (Weiss 
& Cropanzano, 1996). The theory, in addition to explaining the role of salient workplace 
events in the emergence of emotions, also states that these emotions will mediate the 
relationship between the events and a number of attitudes and behaviors. When 
employees form job-related attitudes, they recall their many affective experiences. Thus, 
when determining job satisfaction, employees actively recall the events that triggered a 
variety of emotions, and these recollections are subsequently combined to make an 
evaluation of the job as a whole. For example, positive affect has been positively linked 
to job satisfaction (Fisher, 2000). Furthermore, in much the same way that events 
obstruct or facilitate individual goals to form emotions, these emotions can also obstruct 
or facilitate job-related behaviors. Indeed, positive affect is also positively related to job 
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performance (Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994). Thus, interpersonal justice events are likely 
to influence attitudes and behaviors through the experience of emotions. Indeed, Judge 
and colleagues (2006) found that hostility mediates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and deviant behavior. That is, the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and deviance can be explained by an employee’s level of hostility. 
By examining the potential mediating influences of a variety of emotions, the present 
work potentially adds to our understanding why interpersonal justice influences a 
number of important attitudes and behaviors beyond deviance.  
 According to affective events theory, the intensity of these emotional reactions is 
a function of the importance of the goals impacted by the event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996). Thus, the intensity of emotional reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal fairness 
is positively correlated with the value that the employee places on receiving such 
interpersonal fairness. We know from previous literature that receiving dignity and 
respect is a natural right for all (Folger & Bies, 1989). However, in the present work, I 
argue that some people value respectful treatment more than others. Specifically, I 
predict that those low in status will experience a greater need for interpersonal justice 
than their high-status counterparts. 
I base this prediction on the tenets of self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; 
Shrauger, 1975). The theory states that people have a natural desire to view themselves 
favorably and are therefore motivated to enhance their self-images. This need for self-
enhancement drives reactions to events that inform their self-concepts. Specifically, 
people react positively to self-enhancing information and negatively to information that 
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threatens their self-worth. Because interpersonal treatment from a supervisor positively 
influences employees’ self-views (Ferris, Spence, Brown, & Heller, in press; Tyler, 
1989), self-enhancement theory suggests that employees will react more favorably to 
high interpersonal justice and negatively to low interpersonal justice. Furthermore, the 
theory also suggests that these reactions may not be uniform across all employees. 
People who perceive themselves to be of relatively low worth, and who have relatively 
few status-affirming resources, are likely to be more motivated to enhance their self-
concept and therefore hungrier for fair interpersonal treatment than people of high self-
worth. Thus, according to self-enhancement theory, low-status employees, compared to 
high-status employees, will react more positively to fair interpersonal treatment and 
more negatively to unfair interpersonal treatment. 
Self-enhancement theory has been particularly useful in predicting affective 
responses to self-descriptive information (Shrauger, 1975; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & 
Gaines, 1987), thus adding further relevance to the present research. Specifically, people 
experience positive affect in response to self-enhancing information and experience 
negative affect in response to self-threatening information (for a meta-analytic review, 
see Kwang & Swann, 2010). Given the findings that 1) people respond affectively to 
self-descriptive information,  2) interpersonal justice informs peoples’ self-views, and 3) 
people of low self-worth react more strongly to this self-defining information than do 
people of high self-worth, I hypothesize that status will moderate the relationships 
between interpersonal justice and emotions. Specifically, I predict that these 
relationships will be stronger for people of low status compared to people of high status. 
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Interestingly, an opposite moderating effect is expected for perceptions of 
supervisor status. Self-enhancement theory tells us that people desire to view themselves 
in a positive light and therefore react positively to self-enhancing information (Jones, 
1973). However, it is possible that the impact of self-relevant information varies 
depending on the source of that information. Specifically, self-enhancement theory 
suggests that information from a credible source is more likely to influence the self-
concept than information from a non-credible source (Shrauger, 1975). Research 
suggests that source credibility is positively related to the extent to which people accept 
and react to self-relevant information (Bannister, 1986; Suzuki, 1975). Further, status 
connotes credibility (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 1976; Sigall & Helmreich, 
1969). Thus, I expect that interpersonal justice will matter more when it comes from a 
high-status supervisor, compared to a low-status supervisor. 
Finally, I also expect that emotional reactions to interpersonal justice will depend 
on the employees’ level of justice orientation, or the extent to which they view justice as 
a moral virtue and are cognizant of justice events around them (Rupp, Byrne, & 
Wadlington, 2003). Those who are higher on justice orientation, and therefore more 
sensitive to fairness, should experience stronger emotional responses to interpersonal 
justice than people low on justice orientation.  
1.2 Summary 
 To summarize, the present work provides a number of important contributions. 
First and foremost, I add to our understanding of interpersonal justice by examining its 
relationships with two important and theoretically relevant constructs—emotions and 
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status. Given the theoretical and conceptual relevance of emotions and status to 
interpersonal treatment in the workplace, integrating these two constructs into the 
interpersonal justice literature provides a new direction for justice scholars that is ripe 
with potential. The emotionally laden nature of receiving (or not receiving) respect, 
dignity, and propriety from supervisors has the potential to trigger a myriad of affective 
reactions. Specifically, the present work contributes to the justice and affect literatures 
by examining the potential role that interpersonal justice plays in predicting positive 
affect. Further, like interpersonal justice, emotions also play a critical role in the 
workplace, influencing a robust collection of important outcomes (Ashkanasy, Hartel, & 
Zerbe, 2000; Elfenbein, 2007). Examining emotions as potential mediators to the effects 
of interpersonal justice on distal outcomes not only advances our understanding of the 
experience of justice, but it also contributes to our understanding of why interpersonal 
justice has such a meaningful impact on important job attitudes and behaviors.  
 The present work also identifies certain conditions in which emotional reactions 
to interpersonal justice may be stronger (or weaker). Specifically, I examine potential 
characteristics of the employee (i.e., personal status, workgroup status, justice 
orientation) that may inform researchers and practitioners of which people are more or 
less sensitive to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. Research has demonstrated that 
people of varying levels of self-worth react differently to information that speaks to their 
self-concept. Specifically, people with relatively low self-worth react more strongly to 
self-descriptive information. This suggests that interpersonal fairness, while universally 
important to all employees’ self-concepts, may be more important to some people than it 
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is to others. Specifically, it is expected that low-status employees and members of low-
status workgroups will value interpersonal fairness more than their high-status 
counterparts. Furthermore, I also examine a characteristic of the supervisor (i.e., 
supervisor status) that may potentially help identify the managers who are likely to elicit 
stronger or weaker reactions to interpersonal justice. High-status supervisors are likely to 
be more credible than low-status supervisors, and therefore more likely to influence the 
self-concept. Thus interpersonal justice effects should be stronger when the supervisor 
enacting the justice is high in status. By examining the moderating influence of status, 
the present work, therefore, also contributes to a contingency model of interpersonal 
justice.  
Whereas emotions and status have both received recent increases in scholarly 
attention within the organizational justice domain, our understanding of their respective 
roles in the experience of interpersonal justice is still quite limited. By focusing on these 
constructs in the present research, I answer specific calls for further investigation into 
the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions (Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 
2008) and between interpersonal justice and status (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). 
The second contribution of the present work is the advancement of knowledge 
pertaining to emotions in the workplace. In particular, by examining the influence of 
interpersonal justice on emotional reactions, I highlight an important antecedent to 
negative (Barclay et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2006) and a potential antecedent to positive 
emotionsFurthermore, the inclusion of status as a boundary condition contributes to our 
 16 
 
understanding of when these emotional responses are likely to be strengthened and 
weakened.  
Third, I contribute to the literature on status in the workplace. As previously 
noted, status is quite salient in organizational settings. Furthermore, status connotes a 
certain level of dignity and respect, thus influencing how people think and behave 
around others. However, despite its obvious importance in the workplace, “status has 
occupied a rather minor place in the management and organization literature” (Pearce, 
2011a: 1). The present work examines status in the organizational justice domain by 
investigating the potential moderating influence of status on reactions to interpersonal 
treatment from supervisors. In this examination, I focus on three distinct 
operationalizations of status—personal (self) status, workgroup status, and supervisor 
status. Furthermore, I examine a variety of potential affective experiences resulting from 
the interaction of status and interpersonal justice. This work contributes to the literature 
by answering recent calls by organizational scholars such as Pearce (2011b: 343), who 
suggested that the “the future payoff from making status more central to [management 
and organizations] research holds great promise”. 
Fourth, I integrate two theories—self-enhancement theory and affective events 
theory—that, to this point, have yet to be linked in the organizational justice domain, and 
to my knowledge, have only been linked once recently in scholarly research (Ilies, De 
Pater, & Judge, 2007). The tenets of these two theories are closely related, which 
provides a great deal of potential for each theory to inform the other. Self-enhancement 
theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975) is primarily concerned with the enhancement of 
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one’s self-concept. Affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) explains the 
emotional reactions to events that facilitate or obstruct important goals. Because “there is 
a fundamental human tendency for people to seek positive or self-enhancing feedback” 
(Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989: 782; italics in original), events that facilitate or obstruct 
this pursuit are likely to trigger emotional responses. Indeed, a number of studies have 
demonstrated the ability of self-enhancing motives to predict affective responses (for a 
review, see Kwang & Swann, 2010). I believe that the interplay of these two theories 
will not only contribute to our understanding of the experience of interpersonal justice, 
but will also provide a new outlet for organizational scholars that is rich with potential to 
explain a multitude of phenomena in the workplace. 
In the subsequent chapter, I review relevant research on interpersonal justice, 
status, and emotions. I then discuss in detail the tenets of my two theoretical 
frameworks—affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. In doing so, I 
develop a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status. I hypothesize that 
interpersonal justice will trigger a emotional reactions, and that these emotions will serve 
as mediators, influencing a number of distal attitudes and behaviors. I further argue that 
emotional reactions to interpersonal fairness will be weakened by personal status and 
workgroup status, and strengthened by supervisor status. Finally, I predict that justice 
orientation will strengthen the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 In the subsequent sections, I will review the literatures on my constructs of 
interest and propose a theoretical model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status. I 
will begin with an overview of previous work on interpersonal justice, explaining its 
meaning and value to employees, as well as its origins and relationships with important 
workplace outcomes. Research on interpersonal justice has consistently demonstrated 
the respect, dignity, and propriety afforded subordinates by their supervisors predict a 
large number attitudes and behaviors that are critical to individual and organizational 
effectiveness (for a review, see Colquitt et al., 2001).  
Additionally, and particularly relevant to the present research, this literature 
suggests that interpersonal justice may influence a variety of affective responses. I 
therefore illustrate the central role that emotions play in the experience of justice, paying 
special attention to the theoretical link between emotions and interpersonal justice. 
Research has shown that the level of fairness provided employees by their supervisors 
has a significant influence on both positive and negative affective reactions (for a 
review, see Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). In line with this previous research, I focus 
on both categories by hypothesizing relationships between interpersonal justice and 
positive (i.e., joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment) and negative 
(i.e., anger, hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety, and embarrassment) emotions.  
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I will then explain the salience and importance of status in the workplace, 
highlighting its relationship with organizational justice, again with a special emphasis on 
its theoretical relevance to interpersonal justice. I propose that the experience of 
interpersonal justice is not uniform across all employees, but rather interpersonal justice 
effects depend on perceived status. I hypothesize that personal status, workgroup status, 
and supervisor status will all influence reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I 
argue that personal and workgroup status will weaken these reactions, and supervisor 
status will strengthen them. Finally, I explain the potential role that justice orientation 
plays in the emotional response to interpersonal justice. 
 To develop my proposed model, I draw from two theoretical frameworks—
affective events theory and self-enhancement theory. Affective events theory (Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996) suggests that critical events occurring in the workplace trigger a wide 
variety of emotions responses. Given the emotionally-charged nature of interpersonal 
justice (Bies, 2001), and its impact on an employee’s self-concept (Tyler, 1989; Tyler & 
Lind, 1992), I expect that interpersonal justice from a supervisor will result in affective 
responses. Further, the theory also suggests that emotions will serve as mediators 
explaining the relationships between workplace events and important attitudes and 
behaviors. Following this line of reasoning, I hypothesize that emotions will mediate the 
relationships between interpersonal justice and a number of important workplace 
attitudes and behaviors. 
Drawing on the tenets of self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; Shrauger, 1975) 
I argue that status may influence the strength of emotional reactions to interpersonal 
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justice. Self-enhancement theory “has arguably become one of social psychology’s most 
widely accepted theories” (Kwang & Swann, 2010: 264). The theory posits that people 
have a desire to view themselves in a positive light and therefore seek information that 
enhances their self-worth. This is particularly true among people who have relatively 
low self-concepts, as these individuals have the greatest need for self-enhancement. 
Interpersonal justice communicates information about people’s social self, or view that 
they are valued and respected by their coworkers and supervisors, and this view plays a 
critical role in defining one’s self-concept (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
The more dignity and respect people receive from their supervisors, the higher their 
perceived value. Thus, based on self-enhancement theory, I argue that employees with 
low personal status, or views that they garner low levels of respect, admiration, esteem, 
and prestige from others, have a greater need for information that enhances their social 
self than people of high status. Thus, I expect these individuals to be more sensitive to 
interpersonal justice. Research suggests that interpersonal justice also communicates 
information about the status of workgroups. Fair treatment of a group signals that the 
group is valued within the organization, and this perceived group value contributes to the 
self-concepts of all group members (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 
1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). I therefore make a parallel argument for workgroup status, 
such that members of lower-status workgroups will feel a greater need to enhance their 
self-views via respectful supervisor treatment.  
The status of the supervisor who enacts the interpersonal justice is also expected 
to moderate reactions to the treatment. In their pursuit of self-enhancing information, 
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people actively judge the various sources from which this information is derived. 
Specifically, people are concerned with the credibility of the source (Shrauger, 1975). 
The higher the source credibility, the more likely that people will accept the information 
and react to it (Bannister, 1986; Suzuki, 1978). Because high-status supervisors are 
likely to be perceived as more credible than low-status supervisors (Halperin et al., 
1976), employees should be more accepting of the information communicated by their 
interpersonal treatment. Thus, I expect that employees will be more sensitive to 
interpersonal justice from a high-status supervisor than from a low-status supervisor. 
Although self-enhancement motives have been used effectively to explain a 
myriad of phenomena related to increasing or maintaining a positive self-concept (for a 
review, see Leary, 2007), these motives are especially effective in predicting affective 
responses to self-defining information (Kwang & Swann, 2010; Swann, Griffin, 
Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Thus, by integrating affective events theory and self-
enhancement theory, I make the argument that workplace events such as interpersonal 
justice will trigger emotions, and the strength of these effects will depend on the extent 
to which a person is in need of self-enhancing information and the extent to which this 
information comes from a credible source. Specifically, people of low personal status, 
those belonging to low-status workgroups, and those reporting to high-status supervisors 
are expected to experience stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice than 
those with opposite levels of these attributes. 
 As a final prediction, I expect that people’s emotional reactions to interpersonal 
justice will vary depending on their justice orientation, or the extent to which they 
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perceive justice to be a moral virtue and are cognizant of justice events around them 
(Rupp et al., 2003). Research has demonstrated the moderating influence of justice 
orientation on the relationships between interpersonal justice and a variety of important 
outcomes (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp et al., 2003). I extend these findings to hypothesize 
the moderating influence of justice orientation on the relationships between interpersonal 
justice and emotions. 
In summary, in this chapter I will propose a theoretical model in which 
employees experience a variety of emotions as a result of their supervisor’s interpersonal 
treatment. These emotions are hypothesized to mediate the relationships between 
interpersonal justice and several attitudes and behaviors (job satisfaction, organizational 
citizenship behaviors). Finally, status (personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice 
orientation are expected to moderate the emotional reactions to interpersonal justice.  
2.2 Interpersonal Justice 
 Organizational justice (Greenberg, 1987) research is concerned with employee 
judgments of workplace fairness and the behavioral and attitudinal reactions associated 
with such judgments. In their simplest form, organizational justice judgments are based 
on the extent to which organizations, and supervisors as their acting agents, treat 
employees in a manner consistent with the way they believe they ought to be treated. 
Although the origin of organizational justice is often attributed to the work of Adams 
(1965), its roots can be traced back to the philosophical teachings of Aristotle, Plato, and 
Socrates (Aristotle, 1759; Frost, 1972; Ryan, 1993), each of whom showed an interest in 
the topic of fairness.  
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The modern day study of fairness in organizations began with a focus on 
distributive justice, or the perceived fairness of reward allocation decisions (Deutsch, 
1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976). Largely based on Adams (1965) equity theory, 
distributive justice is determined by input-output ratio comparisons. Employees develop 
perceptions of the extent to which their inputs (e.g., knowledge, skills, abilities, effort) 
align with their rewards (e.g., pay, promotions). They then compare these input-output 
ratios with the ratios of their coworkers to determine the fairness of their own rewards. A 
high level of distributive justice exists when these ratios are relatively equivalent.  
Organizational justice scholars soon realized that, in addition to the fairness of 
reward allocation decisions, employees were also concerned with the procedures used to 
arrive at those decisions. Thibaut and Walker (1975) introduced procedural justice in 
their discussion of the fairness of procedures used to resolve legal disputes. Their work 
focused primarily on the extent to which such procedures provided disputants with 
process control, or influence in determining the outcome of the dispute. Leventhal 
(1980) extended Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) work by identifying a number of 
additional criteria that contribute to the perceived fairness of decision procedures. 
Specifically, Leventhal (1980) suggested that, in addition to process control, judgments 
are also made regarding the extent to which procedures are enacted consistently, 
accurately, ethically, and without bias; represent the interests of those affected; and can 
be corrected in the event that errors occur. 
 Not long after organizational scholars began studying the fairness of procedures, 
Bies and Moag (1986) suggested that there may be an additional social component to 
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workplace fairness judgments. With their introduction of interactional justice, these 
authors highlighted the importance of a fair social exchange between organizational 
authorities and subordinates when outcome decisions are communicated. Specifically, 
interactional justice is concerned with the extent to which an authority’s interpersonal 
communication consists of respect, propriety, truthfulness, and justification (Bies & 
Moag, 1986).  
 One final change to the dimensional structure of organizational justice came 
when Greenberg (1993a) suggested that interactional justice is actually composed of two 
distinct constructs—informational and interpersonal justice. According to Greenberg 
(1993a), informational justice describes the extent to which communications from 
organizational authorities are perceived to be reasonable, timely, and adequate. 
Interpersonal justice is concerned with employee perceptions that authorities treat them 
with dignity, respect, and propriety.  
 Thus, a review of the organizational justice literature suggests that employees 
consciously gauge four distinct factors of workplace fairness—distributive justice, 
procedural justice, informational justice, and interpersonal justice. Following Colquitt’s 
(2001) confirmatory factor analysis, which provided construct validation for his new 
four-factor scale of justice, the popularity of measuring four unique factors of fairness 
quickly accelerated, resulting in a wide acceptance of Colquitt’s scale (Greenberg, 
2011).  
In the present work, I focus on interpersonal justice. It is important to note that 
scholars examining organizational fairness often refer to injustice and low justice 
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interchangeably, despite recent work suggesting that low levels of justice and high levels 
of injustice are distinct constructs (Colquitt, Long, Rodell, & Halvorsen-Ganepola, 
2010). Because an overwhelming majority of justice research has examined justice, and 
because the justice literature has yet to introduce a validated measure of injustice 
(Colquitt et al., 2010), I refer to interpersonal justice in the present work.  
Interpersonal justice was chosen over other justice types for a number of reasons. 
Colquitt and Shaw (2005) noted the importance of carefully selecting dimensions of 
justice that are theoretically appropriate for answering specific research questions. Given 
my interest in the roles that emotions and status play in the experience of fairness, 
interpersonal justice has a great deal of theoretical relevance. First, interpersonal justice 
is arguably the most emotionally-charged of all four fairness judgments (Bradfield & 
Aquino, 1999; Harlos & Pinder, 1999; 2000). Dignity and respect from a supervisor 
enhances employees’ self-concepts by informing them that they are valued members of 
the organization (Ferris et al., in press; Tyler & Blader, 2003), and this self-enhancing 
information triggers positive affective reactions (Swann et al., 1987; Kwang & Swann, 
2010). On the other hand, disrespectful treatment can evoke a variety of negative 
affective reactions. Unfair interpersonal treatment has been likened to “white-hot 
emotions,” with recipients of low justice reporting that they felt “mad, angry, and bitter” 
(Bies & Tripp, 1996: 254). 
Second, status is also highly relevant to the experience of interpersonal justice. 
There is a clear conceptual overlap between the extent to which people receive dignity 
and respect (i.e., interpersonal justice) and the extent to which people command dignity 
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and respect from others (i.e., status) (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). Organizational 
justice research has linked interpersonal justice to status in such a way that receiving 
dignity and respect from a supervisor informs employees of their relative status in an 
organization (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the present work, I am 
interested in the moderating influence of status on interpersonal justice effects. Aquino 
et al. (2004) lend empirical support to this notion by finding that objective status 
influences reactions to interpersonal justice in such a way that low-status employees 
react more strongly to interpersonal justice than high-status employees.  
In light of the theoretical relevance of both emotions and status to the experience 
of interpersonal justice, organizational scholars have recently called for further 
examination of these constructs in the interpersonal justice literature (Cohen-Charash & 
Byrne, 2008; Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). The present work attempts to answer these 
calls by developing a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, and status (see Figure 
2.1). In addition to the potential theoretical implications of examining the interplay of 
these three constructs, this investigation also potentially has a great deal of practical 
utility. Because supervisors tend to have considerable discretion over their interpersonal 
exchanges with subordinates (Scott et al., 2009; Greenberg, 2011), a better 
understanding of these exchanges is likely to be quite beneficial to organizations as they 
hire, train, and evaluate their supervisors. Thus, the potential for theoretical and practical 
contributions, combined with the fact that “the majority of contemporary studies of 
organizational justice focus on interactional justice” (Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011: 
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288), makes the study of interpersonal justice a timely and fruitful avenue for examining 
the roles of emotions and status in the experience of fairness.  
 Employees place a great deal of value on interpersonal justice (Bies & Moag, 
1986). Courtesy from others is considered a natural right to all employees and, therefore, 
a critical responsibility of their supervisors (Folger & Bies, 1989). Rawls (1971: 337) 
noted that all people have “the duty of mutual respect...the duty to show a person the 
respect due to him as a moral being.” According to Bies (2001), violations of this right 
can stem from a wide range of supervisor actions including deception, derogatory 
judgments, invasion of privacy, and disrespectful treatment (e.g., inconsiderate behavior, 
verbal abuse, coercion). Given the considerable value placed on interpersonal treatment, 
it is no surprise that employees are quite sensitive to the dignity and respect they receive 
from their supervisors.  
Respectful interpersonal treatment (and the lack thereof) by a supervisor has been 
linked to a myriad of important organizational outcomes (for a review, see Colquitt et 
al., 2001). For example, judgments of interpersonal justice influence the experience of 
stress (Judge & Colquitt, 2004), satisfaction with both the job (Masterson et al., 2000) 
and the supervisor (Liao & Rupp, 2005), trust in management (Kernan & Huanges, 
2002), and a number of critical workplace behaviors such as performance (Cropanzano 
et al., 2002), discretionary citizenship (Moorman, 1991; Moorman & Byrne, 2005), 
counter-productive acts (Judge et al., 2006), and absenteeism (Gellatly, 1995).  
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FIGURE 2.1 
Hypothesized Model of Interpersonal Justice, Emotions, Status, and Justice Orientation 
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In addition to the myriad of workplace attitudes and behaviors linked to 
interpersonal justice perceptions, scholars have also demonstrated the emergence of 
proximal affective responses that serve to mediate these relationships. In the next 
section, I discuss the influence of justice judgments on emotions in the workplace, with 
special attention paid to emotional reactions resulting from the experience of 
interpersonal justice.  
2.3 Interpersonal Justice and Emotions 
 “Emotion has become one of the most popular—and popularized—areas within 
organizational scholarship” (Elfenbein, 2007: 315). This is certainly not surprising, as 
the workplace serves as an ideal environment for the arousal of a wide array of feeling 
states. Employees are constantly exposed to organizational stimuli that have the potential 
to trigger emotional reactions. From the feelings of joy and anger resulting from 
interpersonal exchanges with supervisors, coworkers and customers, to the distress, 
guilt, and frustration associated with the constant pressure to perform, emotions play an 
integral role in the experience of organizational life (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995). 
Emotions fall under the umbrella term “affect,” which encompasses both emotions and 
moods. Emotions are defined as affective states that are relatively high in intensity, short 
in duration, and resulting from a specific stimulus (Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003). It 
is important to distinguish between the affective experience of emotion and the affective 
experience of mood, which serves as the relative comparison used in the previous 
definition. That is, moods are relatively low in intensity, long in duration, and emerge 
under much more ambiguous circumstances than emotions, often occurring without the 
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person’s knowledge (Barsade et al., 2003). In the present research, I propose a model in 
which interpersonal justice in the workplace influences emotional reactions. I focus on 
emotions, rather than moods, because of their targeted nature. That is, emotions, more so 
than moods, are directed at a specific object or event. Given my interest in interpersonal 
justice events, emotions serve as the logical choice for measuring the affective 
experience following these events. 
 Affective events theory (AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) explains the 
emergence of emotions in the workplace. An infinite number of unique events can occur 
at work. Whether it is an exchange with a supervisor, a personal success or failure on the 
job, or an allocation of rewards, events happen throughout the day, and according to 
AET, these events affect the employees involved. Specifically, they trigger a variety of 
emotional responses.  
 AET is an appraisal theory. People cognitively appraise events and, based on 
these appraisals, emotions emerge. During the appraisal process, people evaluate the 
extent to which the event is personally relevant, how it is relevant (i.e., beneficial vs. 
harmful), and who or what caused the event to occur. The relevance of the event dictates 
the direction (positive vs. negative) and intensity (i.e., strong vs. weak) of the emotions, 
and the cause of the event determines the specific types of emotions (e.g., inward vs. 
outward focused) that emerge. 
 The appraisal of event relevance is made in reference to the personal goals of the 
individual. Some events benefit the individual by facilitating progress toward goals, and 
others harm the individual by impeding this progress (Lazarus, 1991). Events that are 
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consistent with (i.e., facilitate) personal goals will likely trigger positive emotions, and 
those that are inconsistent with (i.e., impede) goals should result in negative emotions. 
Employees possess many goals in their work domain. They could set goals for 
something to happen, for something to not happen, or for maintaining something that is 
currently happening (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993; Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996). Some goals, for example, may pertain to achieving a certain level of performance, 
others to enhancing their self-worth. Simply put, if it is important enough to be 
positioned as a goal, it is important enough to serve as fodder for an emotional appraisal. 
However, not all goals are created equal. Rather, goals are positioned hierarchically, 
with some topping the priority scale and others serving more subordinate roles. AET 
suggests that the more important the goal, the more intense the emotional response to 
events that facilitate or impede progress toward this goal.  
 In addition to determining the direction and intensity of the emotion, the event 
appraisal process also serves to determine which emotions will emerge. The assignment 
of blame to an event has the potential to evoke a number of different emotions. For 
example, if people cognitively determine that an event will result in a negative 
consequence and that this event was someone else’s fault, these appraisals are likely to 
arouse outward negative emotions such as anger or hostility directed at the transgressor. 
If, however, people determine that a negative event was self-induced, this appraisal may 
elicit self-directed emotions such as shame or embarrassment. Similarly, events that are 
likely to lead to positive outcomes should trigger positive emotions toward the persons 
responsible for these events, whether it is the self, another, or perhaps even both. 
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 According to Weiss and Cropanzano (1996: 31), an event is defined as “a change 
in circumstances, a change in what one is currently experiencing. Some, but by no means 
all, events have affective significance in that they generate an emotional reaction or 
mood change in people.” Consistent with AET, judgments of justice serve as cognitive 
appraisals of an event (Weiss et al., 1999). Theoretical linkages between justice and 
emotions date back to the seminal work on organizational fairness. In Homans (1961) 
classic description of social behavior, he suggested that, following an injustice, people 
experience feelings of anger or guilt. Adams (1965), in his introduction to equity theory, 
drew from Homans’ work to suggest that these emotional reactions to inequity translated 
to the workplace. Specifically, people are likely to experience the emotional state of 
anger when they are slighted on important organizational rewards or guilt when they 
receive more rewards than they deserve. Several years later, Adams and Freedman 
(1976: 44) once again highlighted the emotional experience of low justice, describing 
these feelings of anger and guilt as “inequity distress.” Despite the theoretical linkages 
created by Homans (1961) and Adams (1965), Adams and Freeman (1976: 45) pointed 
to the lack of empirical measurement of emotional distress following low justice by 
stating, “Determining empirically the existence and quality of distress is potentially 
fruitful in testing equity theory. Failing to do so would be equivalent to not having 
searched for Pluto after Kepler had hypothesized its existence to account for the orbital 
paths of visible planets.” Cropanzano and Folger (1989) helped answer this call by 
empirically examining the role of emotions in the experience of justice. These authors 
also extended the claims of early justice theorists by suggesting the emotional reactions 
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to inequitable rewards would be maximized in the event that the procedures used to 
arrive at these allocations were also unfair. Specifically, Cropanzano and Folger (1989) 
argued that people would experience heightened levels of resentment when both 
distributive and procedural justice perceptions were low. Their work helped spark a 
steady stream of research examining the relationships between justice and emotions 
(e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Cropanzano & Baron, 1991; Cropanzano & Randall, 1995). 
Yet, this work is still in its infancy, and a more thorough investigation of justice and 
emotions is needed. “Indeed, the experience and emotions of injustice are 
underemphasized and under-appreciated in organizational justice theory” (Bies & Tripp, 
2002: 205). 
Justice scholars have taken heed to these calls by investigating the effects of each 
justice type on a variety of emotions (Bies & Tripp, 2001; De Cremer, 2004; 2006a; 
2006b; Harlos & Pinder, 2000; Judge et al., 2006; for a review, see Cohen-Charash & 
Byrne, 2008). Research has linked overall judgments of justice to affective responses 
such as anger (Mikula, 1986, 1987), disgust, sadness, fear, shame, and guilt (Mikula, 
Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998), and envy (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007). Scholars 
have also examined emotional responses to distributive justice, with the most consistent 
results suggesting that over-rewarded employees experience heightened levels of guilt 
(Brockner, Greenberg, Brockner, Bortz, Davy, & Carter, 1986; Brockner, Davy, & 
Carter, 1985; Hegtvedt, 1990; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). 
Regarding under-rewarded employees, the emotions present following an inequitable 
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reward allocation may include anger, distress, anxiety, and resentment (Austin & 
Walster, 1974a, 1974b; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978).  
Research on the affective effects of procedural justice (Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999) 
and related constructs such as voice (van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002; 
van den Bos & van Prooijen, 2001) and procedural accuracy (Vermunt, Wit, van den 
Bos, & Lind, 1996), detected the emergence of emotions such as anger, irritation, insult, 
fury, hostility, disappointment, and depression. Other scholars found that procedural 
justice judgments interacted with distributive justice judgments to predict affective 
reactions, in such a way that procedural justice strengthened the positive relationships 
between distributive justice and positive emotions (e.g., happiness, pride), and weakened 
the negative relationships between distributive justice and negative emotions (e.g., 
anger, guilt, disappointment) (Cropanzano et al., 2000; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; 
Weiss et al., 1999). 
Finally, justice scholars have linked perceptions of interpersonal fairness to 
emotional responses such as hostility (Judge et al., 2006), negative affect (Stecher & 
Rosse, 2005), and anger (Turillo, et al., 2002). Yet, we are unsure if interpersonal justice 
may also play a role in predicting positive affect. A study by Chebat and Slusarczyk 
(2005) provide preliminary evidence for this relationship. The authors found that 
customer perceptions of interactional justice (i.e., perceptions that employees are honest 
and polite) are positively related to customer feelings of joy. It is plausible that this 
relationship also translates to exchanges between supervisors and subordinates.  
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The experience of unfair interpersonal treatment has been likened to “a feeling of 
being engulfed in white-hot emotions” and of being “inflamed and enraged” (Bies & 
Tripp, 1996: 254). In fact, interpersonal justice is arguably the most emotionally charged 
of all justice types (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Harlos & Pinder, 1999, 2000). As Bies 
and Tripp (2002: 208), stated, “Violations of noncomparable principles like truth, as in 
the case of lies and defamatory statements, or like human dignity, as in the case of public 
beratement or harassment, are often associated with the most negative, intense, and 
enduring emotions.” Bies and Tripp (2002) also suggest that the relative emotional 
strength of low interpersonal justice, compared to low distributive or procedural justice, 
may be due to the inability to compensate for interpersonal violations. That is, compared 
to rewards and procedures that can be corrected after the fact, interpersonal mistreatment 
may not be revocable. Given the relative lack of attention to emotions in the 
interpersonal justice literature, the emotionally charged nature of interpersonal treatment 
from a supervisor, and the calls for further investigation linking interpersonal fairness to 
emotions, the examination of emotional reactions to interpersonal justice promises to be 
an interesting and fruitful extension to the justice literature. 
AET suggests that, following an interpersonal exchange with a supervisor, an 
appraisal ensues. During this appraisal, employees evaluate how they were treated. They 
determine the relevance of the exchange to their personal goals, and given adequate 
relevance, develop emotional responses. The intensity of these responses depends on the 
extent to which the exchange facilitates or obstructs progress toward goals. Considering 
that all people have a goal of enhancing their self-worth (Jones, 1973), and the powerful 
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influence of a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment on an employee’s sense of self (Bies 
& Tripp, 1996, 2002), it stands to reason that interpersonal justice events are relevant 
enough to trigger an emotional reaction. Indeed, in a study inspired by AET, Judge and 
colleagues (2006) hypothesized and empirically supported the influence of interpersonal 
justice events on state hostility. The specific emotions that emerge are determined by 
evaluations of causal attribution (toward the supervisor vs. toward the self). Because the 
treatment being appraised is the action of the supervisor, emotional responses should 
largely be directed at him/her (Watson, 2000). However, it is also conceivable that 
interpersonal treatment from a supervisor can influence a number of inward focused 
emotions such as pride or embarrassment.  
I chose six negative emotions (i.e., anger, hostility, irritability, rage, anxiety and 
embarrassment) that are all theoretically relevant to the experience of  interpersonal 
treatment from a supervisor (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris et al., in press; 
Judge et al., 2006; Kim & Shapiro, 2008; Tepper, 2000). Justice scholars have suggested 
that we stand to gain more from the study of low justice than from the study of high 
justice (Bies, 2001; Judge & Colquitt, 2004). Whereas high justice serves as the standard 
for what people expect to receive, low justice violates this standard and is therefore more 
likely to elicit a response (Cahn, 1949). For example, Bies (2001: 90) stated, “When 
people talk about justice, their narratives are in terms of the injustices they experience 
and, in particular, in terms of mistreatment they receive from another person.” 
I chose anger because of its prevalence in, and relevance to, the justice literature. 
Cohen-Charash and Byrne (2008: 366) stated that “Anger is a universal reaction to 
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injustice and the one most often reported”. The theoretical link between anger and 
fairness can be traced back to the original roots of organizational justice (Adams, 1965; 
Homans, 1961). Further, research has demonstrated that anger is influenced by acts of 
interpersonal justice (Turillo et al., 2002). In fact, the most frequent cause of anger in the 
workplace is interpersonal mistreatment, particularly when the transgressor is the 
individual’s supervisor (Fitness, 2000).  
In their development of an emotional hierarchy, Shaver and colleagues (1987) 
identify anger as one of the most basic (primary) emotions (see also, Fehr & Russell, 
1984), and one that is among the first emotions learned by young children (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982; Bretherton, McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1981). As people age and 
develop a greater level of emotional knowledge, they learn the meaning and usefulness 
of a more nuanced lexicon of feelings, and thus add a number of subordinate emotions to 
their collection (Shaver et al., 1987). Consistent with this reasoning, it is expected that, 
in addition to the primary emotion of anger, a number of subordinate emotions will also 
be aroused following an act of interpersonal justice. I therefore selected three emotions 
from the Shaver et al., (1987) hierarchical cluster analysis of emotions. Specifically, I 
selected hostility, rage, and irritability. Each of these emotions falls into the anger 
cluster, and each emotion has been theoretically linked to interpersonal justice (Barclay 
et al., 2005; Bies, 1987; Ferris et al., in press; Judge et al., 2006). Although three of the 
six negative emotions (i.e., anger, hostility, irritable) have also been empirically linked 
to interpersonal justice (Judge et al., 2006), to my knowledge, no studies have 
empirically linked the other three (i.e., rage, anxiety, and embarrassment) to 
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interpersonal justice. However, acts of low interpersonal justice have been described as 
fairness norm violations that elicit feelings of moral outrage (Bies, 1987). Furthermore, 
Ferris and colleagues (in press) suggested that interpersonal mistreatment can threaten an 
employee’s self-worth and subsequently trigger a feeling of outrage. Consistent with 
these previous claims, I also include rage as a potential affective reaction to 
interpersonal justice. Furthermore, both anxiety and embarrassment have been shown to 
emerge following an interpersonal exchange with a supervisor (Kim & Shapiro, 2008; 
Tepper, 2000).  
Because of the predominant focus on low levels of interpersonal justice, justice 
scholars examining emotional reactions tend to focus on negative emotions (for an 
exception using customer fairness judgments, see Chebat & Slusarczyk, 2005). 
However, considering that fair interpersonal treatment facilitates subordinates’ goals of 
enhancing their self-worth (Tyler & Blader, 2003), and that self-enhancing events trigger 
positive affective reactions (Kwang & Swann, 2010), it seems plausible that the 
experience of high interpersonal justice may also influence a variety of positive 
emotions. To test this possibility, I include six positive emotions in my model (i.e., joy, 
happiness, pleasure, delight, pride, and contentment).  
Like anger, joy is considered a basic (primary) emotion (Fehr & Russell, 1984; 
Shaver et al., 1987) that is learned at a very young age (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; 
Bretherton et al., 1981). Also similar to anger, joy has a number of nuanced emotions at 
a subordinate level. However, relative to anger, joy falls lower on the intensity scale. 
Because fair interpersonal treatment is a normative expectation (Cahn, 1949), meeting 
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this expectation is unlikely to trigger any high-intensity emotions such as love, desire, or 
passion. Rather, I expect that respectful treatment from a supervisor will influence 
relatively low-intensity positive emotions.. Each of the selected positive emotions falls 
under the joy category in the Shaver et al. (1987) cluster analysis of emotions, and unlike 
feelings such as pride and triumph that are directed at the self, each of the selected 
emotions is outward-focused, allowing me to examine its emergence in response to 
supervisor treatment.  
Consistent with affective events theory, the appraisal of an interpersonal justice 
event should trigger emotional reactions. Interpersonal exchanges with a supervisor can 
influence subordinates’ goal of enhancing their self-worth. Fair interpersonal treatment 
facilitates, and unfair interpersonal treatment obstructs, this goal. Following the logic put 
forth by AET, I expect interpersonal justice to be positively related to positive emotions 
and negatively related to negative emotions. I therefore propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1A: Interpersonal justice is negatively related to the negative 
emotions. 
Hypothesis 1B: Interpersonal justice is positively related to the positive 
emotions.  
2.4 Emotions as Mediators 
 According to AET, emotions serve not only as reactions to important 
organizational events but also as mediators between these events and more distal 
attitudes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Work-related attitudes directed at the supervisor, 
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at the organization, and at the job are, at least partially, determined by the recall of 
affective experiences relevant to each target. Following the appraisal process described 
above, emotional responses emerge, and these feelings are then stored in memory. 
Employees draw on their database of affective experiences when deriving relevant 
attitudes (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). For example, one’s level of job satisfaction is 
influenced by the emotions (both positive and negative) one has experienced while on 
the job in such a way that satisfaction is enhanced by the recollection of positive 
emotions and reduced by the recollection of negative emotions. Indeed, Scott and Judge 
(2006) demonstrated that job satisfaction is negatively influenced by emotions such as 
hostility and fatigue and positively influenced by emotions such as joviality and 
attentiveness. Furthermore, a composite of negative emotions including anger, 
frustration, and unhappiness was linked to lower levels of satisfaction with one’s 
supervisor (Fisher, 2000). 
In support of AET, the findings reviewed above demonstrate that emotions 
influence attitudes in the workplace. Indeed, meta-analytic results suggest that state 
positive and negative affect are both related to job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, and turnover intentions (Thoresen, Kaplan, Barsky, Warren, & de 
Chermont, 2003). Thus, workplace events trigger affect, which in turn influence distal 
attitudes.  
Several studies have demonstrated a mediating influence of emotions on justice 
effects (for a review, see Cohen-Charash & Byrne, 2008). For example, Chebat and 
Slusarczyk (2005) found that both positive (i.e., joy, hope) and negative (i.e., anxiety, 
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disgust) emotions mediated the effect of distributive justice on customer loyalty. Further, 
Tepper, Duffy, Henle, and Lambert (2006) demonstrated that procedural justice 
influences perceptions of abusive supervision, and that this relationship is partially 
mediated by depression.  
Research has also examined emotional mediators of the effects of interpersonal 
justice. For example, Rupp and Spencer (2006) found that anger mediates the effect of 
customer-initiated interactional justice (combination of interpersonal and informational 
justice). Specifically, employees are angrier when they are treated unfairly by customers, 
and this anger in turn resulted in greater emotional labor. In another study, Judge and 
colleagues (2006) demonstrated that the relationship between interpersonal justice and 
deviant behavior is mediated by hostility.  
Consistent with these studies and the tenets of affective events theory, I also 
expect emotions to mediate the effects of interpersonal justice on important attitudes. 
Specifically, AET suggests that interpersonal justice events will influence a number of 
important attitudes, through a number of emotional experiences. That is, interpersonal 
justice is expected to influence distal outcomes because of the emotions that are 
triggered in the employees receiving the justice.  
When selecting outcomes for this study, I first identified attitudes that have been 
theoretically and empirically linked to interpersonal justice in previous research. Colquitt 
and colleagues (2001), in their meta-analytic work investigating the effects of 
organizational justice suggest that effects of interpersonal justice, which is enacted by 
the supervisor, are likely to be strongest when they are targeting that supervisor. Thus, I 
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first identified a number of supervisor-directed attitudes (i.e., supervisor satisfaction, 
supervisor trust, and supervisor relationship viability) that are likely to be influenced by 
interpersonal fairness. Furthermore, because the supervisor enacting the fairness is 
serving as an agent to the organization (i.e., the overarching policy making entity), 
outcomes directed at the organization are also affected by interpersonal justice (Colquitt 
et al., 2001). I therefore include organizational commitment and withdrawal intentions in 
my model. Finally, because interpersonal justice influences subordinates’ experience 
while on the job (Masterson et al., 2000), I also expect that interpersonal justice to 
influence job satisfaction. I expect these findings to emerge in the present work.  
In addition to the established relationships each of these outcomes has with 
interpersonal justice, these attitudes are particularly appropriate for the present work 
because they have also been linked to affective experiences in the workplace (Spector & 
Fox, 2002; Fisher, 2000; Thoresen et al., 2003; Staw & Barsade, 1993), therefore 
contributing additional relevance to AET. With this in mind, I present the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2A: The relationships between interpersonal justice and (i) 
supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, 
(iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction are 
mediated by negative emotions. 
Hypothesis 2B: The relationships between interpersonal justice and (i) 
supervisor satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, 
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(iv) organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction are 
mediated by the positive emotions. 
2.5 Moderators of Interpersonal Justice-Emotions Relationships   
In the previous sections, I discussed the importance of emotions in the experience 
of interpersonal justice. Consistent with the tenets of AET, I hypothesized that 
interpersonal justice events trigger emotional responses, and these emotions mediate the 
impact of interpersonal justice on a number of important attitudes in the workplace. 
Research has provided some empirical support for these claims, demonstrating that 
emotions do, in fact, serve as a mediator of interpersonal justice effects (Judge et al., 
2006). However, my discussion to this point has made the assumption that all employees 
react to interpersonal justice in a universally similar manner. I have not addressed the 
possibility that some people may experience stronger (or weaker) emotional responses to 
interpersonal treatment from their supervisors.  
Organizational justice scholars have identified a variety of moderators which 
impose meaningful boundary conditions on justice effects (Gilliland & Steiner, 2001; 
Greenberg, 1993b; Kwong & Leung, 2002; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999; Steiner & 
Gilliland, 1996; Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). In their review of the justice 
literature, Nowakowski and Conlon (2005) identify both contextual and individual 
difference factors that influence the strength of justice relationships. For example, 
Colquitt, Scott, Judge, and Shaw (2006) found that individual differences such as trust 
propensity, risk aversion, and trait morality all moderate behavioral reactions (e.g., 
performance and counter-productivity) to interpersonal justice. Furthermore, in an 
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examination of emotions and fairness, Judge et al., (2006) found that trait hostility 
moderated the influence of interpersonal justice on state hostility. Specifically, people 
high in trait hostility experienced stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice 
compared to people low in trait hostility. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
interpersonal fairness matters more to some people than it does to others, and that these 
differential effects may account for variance in the experience of emotion.  
 In the next section I propose that a person’s self-concept may also play a role in 
determining the strength of emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Specifically, I 
argue that the social component of the self-concept—core self-evaluation and personal 
status—moderates the relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions in such a 
way that the relationships are stronger when status perceptions are low, compared to 
high.  
2.5.1 Personal Status 
Status plays a critical role in organizational life, separating those of high relative 
standing from those positioned lower on the social hierarchy. Employees are structured 
and rewarded in such a way that status remains a perpetually salient concept in the 
workplace. Although the term status can be used to describe the relative standing of 
people on any number of dimensions (e.g., wealth, education, physical attractiveness, 
age, sex, race, expertise, authority; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980), in the present 
work, I adopt the more colloquial meaning of personal status—the respect, admiration, 
esteem, and prestige accorded an employee by peer coworkers (Fiske, 2010; Kemper, 
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2006; Zelditch, 1968). That is, personal status is a self-reflection of how one is viewed 
by others.   
Status was chosen because of its theoretical relevance to interpersonal justice. 
Other constructs such as power are also likely to contribute the experience of 
interpersonal justice. Yet power and status differ in their theoretical association with 
justice judgments. Interpersonal justice and status are related in such a way that 
interpersonal treatment is positively related to one’s status (i.e., self-concept; Tyler & 
Blader, 2003). This relationship is described in further detail below. Self-enhancement 
theory (Jones, 1973) suggests that people with low self-concepts have a greater need for 
self-enhancing information, such as that provided by interpersonal justice, than people 
with high self-concepts. Power, on the other hand, is the control one has over critical 
resources (Blader & Chen, in press). Interpersonal justice does not directly inform 
individuals of their power. An individual’s control over resources does not change with 
the level of treatment he/she receives from a supervisor. Thus, status, rather than power, 
will be examined in the present research.  
Status matters to people in work and in life. It has long been an important topic in 
social psychological research (Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1914), and has also demonstrated 
considerable influence on important outcomes in the field of management (for a review, 
see Pearce, 2011a). Some of the earliest management scholars highlighted the 
importance of status in the workplace (Barnard, 1938). For example, in his classic 
hierarchy of needs, Maslow (1943) posited that one of the most basic human needs is 
that of respect and esteem from others. This early work suggests that status serves as an 
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influential motive; so influential, in fact, that the need for status has even been credited 
for explaining why people are motivated to work (Vroom, 1964). More recently, 
scholars have demonstrated the influence of status on a number of workplace 
phenomena such as role expectations (Sande, Ellard, & Ross, 1986), performance 
evaluations (Humphrey, 1985), and actual performance and attitudes (Eden & Shani, 
1982). Specifically, high-status employees are expected to perform at higher levels, are 
motivated to perform consistently with these expectations (i.e., behavioral confirmation) 
and are subsequently evaluated more positively by those who hold the expectations (i.e., 
expectation confirmation) (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Relative to low-status employees, 
those of high status also reap the benefits of more unsolicited help from others (Van der 
Vegt, Bunderson, & Oosterhof, 2006), disproportionate credit for workgroup successes 
(Merton, 1968), and greater influence over workgroup decision-making processes 
(Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). Finally, status also influences perceptual judgments in such 
a way that high-status people report that they receive greater recognition for their 
performance than those of low status, even when the recognition is constant across 
groups (Pettit & Sivanathan, in press). In sum, a review of the management literature 
suggests that status matters in the workplace.  
Organizational justice scholars have also begun to examine status as an important 
factor influencing the experience of fairness in the workplace (Begley, Lee, Hui, 2006; 
Erdogan et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1988; Greenberg & Ornstein, 1983; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Schminke, Cropanzano, & Rupp, 2002; van Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilde, 
2002a; for a recent review, see Greenberg & Ganegoda, 2011). For example, Fiddick and 
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Cummins (2001) found that status influences fairness perceptions in such a way that 
high-status individuals perceive that they are treated more fairly than their low-status 
counterparts. Regarding the distribution of important organizational resources, high-
status people also tend to receive more rewards in organizational settings (Greenberg, 
1988), believe that they are more entitled to these rewards (Pelham & Hetts, 2001), and 
when given the opportunity, allocate more rewards to themselves, even when their 
contributions equal those of low-status individuals (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1989). 
It has been argued that this inequality of resource allocation serves to establish and 
maintain social order within organizations, providing justification for both high- and 
low-status employees to accept their relative positions (Edelman, 1978).  
Status also plays a role in the perceived fairness of procedures in such a way that 
more status leads to higher perceptions of justice. In a study by Erdogan and colleagues 
(2001), status was measured objectively, via hierarchical position within the 
organization. Results of the study suggest that employees at a higher organizational level 
(a quality that connotes high status) tend to report more procedural fairness than lower-
level employees.  
Finally, scholars have also linked status to judgments of interpersonal fairness. 
Specifically, Aquino and colleagues (2004) examined the moderating role of status in the 
relationship between interpersonal justice and workplace deviance. In addition to 
hierarchical position, these authors also examined the potential role of race in explaining 
differential effects of interpersonal justice. As expected, the authors found that African 
Americans and those in lower formal organizational positions reacted more strongly to 
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interpersonal justice to interpersonal low justice by engaging in more deviant acts than 
their high-status counterparts.  
The literature reviewed above suggests that status plays an important role in the 
experience of organizational life, and in particular, organizational justice. In the present 
work, I examine the potential moderating role of status in relationships between 
interpersonal justice and emotions. Self-verification theory and self-enhancement theory 
are two frameworks that potentially contribute to our understanding of why this 
moderating influence may occur. Both theories are concerned with how people react to 
information that shapes their self-concept, and both predict that people with a high self-
concept will react differently to this information than people with a low self-concept. 
Phenomena related to the self-concept are highly relevant to the experience of 
interpersonal justice, as interpersonal treatment from organizational authorities plays a 
central role in determining the self-concept (Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Ferris et 
al., in press; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Indeed, the causal linkage 
between interpersonal treatment and the self-concept dates back to the early 1900s 
(Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934).  
The self-concept is defined as “a person’s cognitive understanding of whom and 
what he or she is” (Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011: 115). This includes all aspects 
of the self that contribute to one’s view of total self-worth. People derive their self-
concept, at least partially, from their status in valued groups; that is, their personal worth 
is informed by the extent to which they are valued by the group and its authority 
members, with fair treatment signaling high worth and unfair treatment signaling low 
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worth (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, status and the self-concept are 
socially constructed. Blader and Chen (in press: 2) define status as “an index of the 
social worth that others ascribe to an individual or a group”. In the present work, I 
examine the influence of personal status on the relationships between interpersonal 
justice and emotions. The higher people believe they are regarded by others, the higher 
their self-concept. Because interpersonal justice serves as information that contributes to 
people’s perceived status among peers, and therefore influences their self-concept 
(Tyler, 1989), both self-verification and self-enhancement theories suggest that people 
will react differently to this treatment depending on whether they are higher or lower in 
status. Both self-verification and self-enhancement theories suggest that people will react 
differently to self-descriptive information, depending on their self-concept.  However, 
the two theories differ on a fundamental level—they disagree on which group (high vs. 
low self-concept) will react more strongly. Self-verification theory suggests that fair 
treatment is more important to those with high self-concepts, and self-enhancement 
theory argues that those with a low self-concept will be more sensitive to such treatment. 
To help reconcile these seemingly competing hypotheses, I will now summarize both 
theories as they pertain to organizational justice and highlight the primary reasons why 
one of these theories—self-enhancement—is more relevant to the present work than the 
other. 
Self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) suggests that people desire to maintain a 
consistent self-concept. They seek information that confirms, or verifies, the view that 
they hold of themselves. The theory is a rebirth of self-consistency theory, which was 
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introduced by Lecky (1945) and later modified by dissonance scholars (Aronson, 1968; 
Festinger, 1957). Lecky’s original contention held that people are motivated to act in 
such a way that their behaviors and experiences are consistent with their self-concepts. 
For example, self-consistency theory might argue that, compared to people who perceive 
themselves to be relatively unintelligent and unmotivated, those who view themselves as 
highly intelligent and achievement-oriented may be more likely to pursue higher 
education and strive for a respectable job upon graduation. Indeed, successfully earning 
a college degree and acquiring a good job communicates information to intelligent, 
highly driven people that is commensurate with the way they view themselves. Self-
consistency theory appears to have fallen off the scholarly grid upon the introduction of 
the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Dissonance theory reversed the 
prediction of the self-consistency motive by suggesting that, rather than behaving in such 
a way that is consistent with their self-concepts, people cognitively re-evaluate 
themselves, modifying their self-concepts in order to maintain consistency with their 
behaviors.  
 The modern theory of self-verification (Swann, 1983) reverts back to Lecky’s 
(1945) original view that people hold relatively stable self-concepts and therefore seek 
information that is consistent with these conceptions. Self-verifying information allows 
people to maintain their stable self-concepts and provides them with a feeling of 
coherence; a feeling that everything is the way it should be. The theory suggests that 
those who think highly of themselves strive for positive events and information that 
support these views. Perhaps even more interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive, the 
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theory also suggests that those with relatively low self-concepts actually prefer negative 
self-relevant information. For example, a study found that those suffering from 
depression were more likely to seek negative feedback than those not suffering from 
depression (Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Thus, in regards to the present 
study, self-verification theory suggests that people with high self-concepts (i.e., status) 
prefer fair interpersonal justice more than people with low self-concepts, as this 
treatment provides information consistent with their view that they are people who are 
highly respected and admired. 
 Empirical support for self-verification theory in the justice literature can be found 
in research conducted by Brockner, Heuer, Siegel, Wiesenfeld, Martin, Grover, Reed, 
and Bjorgvinsson (1998). In five studies, these authors found that procedural justice (i.e., 
voice) matters more to people with a high self-concept (i.e., self-esteem) than to people 
with a low self-concept. Specifically, voice had stronger effects for high-esteem people 
than for low-esteem people on a variety of outcomes such as organizational 
identification, organizational support, and satisfaction with resource-allocation 
decisions. Another study by Wiesenfield, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007) also lends 
support to self-verification motives. In five studies, these authors found a positive 
influence of procedural justice on organizational commitment among employees with 
high self-esteem, but not among employees with low self-esteem Those with high self-
esteem responded favorably to the fair, self-verifying treatment by increasing their 
commitment to the organization (see also Heuer, et al., 1999). Interestingly, and in direct 
support of self-verification theory, Wiesenfeld and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that 
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the effect of self-esteem on reactions to fairness was only present when the potential to 
self-verify was likely to be salient.  
Further support for self-verification theory was provided by Diekmann, Sondak, 
and Barsness (2007), who found procedural justice was more influential in predicting job 
satisfaction among high-status employees than low-status employees. These authors 
further hypothesized and found that the level of perceived deservingness for procedural 
justice mediated the interactive effect of fairness and status on job satisfaction. That is, 
high-status employees believe they deserve more procedural justice than low-status 
employees, and this perceived deservingness explains why justice varies in importance 
between the two groups. 
Results of the studies reviewed above suggest that people do indeed experience 
self-verification motives. Those with high self-concepts perceive that they deserve fair 
treatment consistent with their high worth and therefore react more strongly to this 
treatment than those with low self-concepts, who perceive that relatively less fair 
treatment is more consistent with their worth. In sum, according to self-verification 
theory, people strive for information that matches their self-concept. Fair treatment is 
therefore more important to people who think highly of themselves. 
 In contrast to self-verification theory, self-enhancement theory (Jones, 1973; 
Shrauger, 1975), suggests that all people strive to view themselves in a positive light and 
therefore seek favorable information that enhances their self-concepts. Self-enhancement 
theory has received an abundance of scholarly attention (for a review, see Leary, 2007); 
so much that “the notion that people are fundamentally motivated to acquire positive 
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evaluations has developed into one of social psychology’s most influential theoretical 
assumptions” (Kwang & Swann, 2010: 263). Indeed, “by far, the greatest amount of 
research on self-motives has involved self-enhancement” (Leary, 2007: 319). Origins of 
the theory can be traced back to Allport (1937), who noted that one of the most vital and 
basic human needs is the need to feel good about oneself—the need to enhance one’s 
self-worth. Self-enhancement theory and self-verification theory are alike in one 
meaningful way. Both theories suggest that people with high self-concepts strive for 
positive, self-validating information. However, regarding those with low self-concepts, 
they make very different predictions. As previously noted, self-verification theory argues 
that people with low self-concepts prefer negative information that confirms their self-
views. Self-enhancement theory, on the other hand, predicts the opposite—those who 
have a low self-concept have the strongest desire for positive, self-enhancing 
information (Shrauger & Lund, 1975). This notion was put forth by Hull (1943), who 
suggested that humans who are the most deprived of a basic need, experience the 
greatest drive to satisfy it. Using the need for sustenance as an example, he argued that 
the people who are the most deprived of food are the hungriest for it. In order to satisfy 
this hunger and sustain themselves, they experience a powerful drive to attain something 
to eat.  
“Self-enhancement, like eating, is a fundamental part of human nature” 
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2008: 102). The need for positive self-validating information, while 
possibly not as critical as the need for food, behaves in much the same way. Those who 
possess a low self-concept are more deprived of the basic need of self-worth than those 
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with a high self-concept and are therefore hungrier for self-validating information. Thus, 
according to self-enhancement theory, low self-concept employees should be more 
sensitive than high self-concept employees to fairness that communicates information 
about their self-worth. People with a low self-concept are therefore expected to react 
more strongly to justice compared to those with a high self-concept.  
 De Cremer (2003) provided empirical support for self-enhancement theory using 
an organizational justice lens. He found that low procedural justice (i.e., leader 
inconsistency) led participants to feel bad about themselves, but this relationship only 
occurred among employees with low social self-esteem. Further evidence was provided 
by Vermunt et al.  (2001). In this study, the relationship between procedural justice and 
outcome fairness judgments was stronger for those low in self-esteem than those high in 
self-esteem. Research has also examined the moderating influence of one’s self-concept 
on reactions to interpersonal justice. De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Dijke, and Bos 
(2004) found that interpersonal justice was more influential in predicting affective 
organizational commitment in low self-esteem employees than in high self-esteem 
employees. Furthermore, as previously noted, Aquino and colleagues (2004) found that 
status moderates the effects of interpersonal justice in such a way that low-status 
employees respond more strongly than high-status employees. 
 The literature reviewed above suggests that aspects of peoples’ self-concepts 
(e.g., self-esteem, status) play a moderating role in their reactions to fairness. People 
react to justice events differently depending on whether they hold high or low views of 
themselves. What is less clear is the specific motive that is driving these differential 
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reactions. Theoretical and empirical support exists for both self-verification and self-
enhancement strivings. Adding further complexity to this issue is the finding that these 
different motives appear to predict opposite effects. This issue is quite perplexing. Why 
in some studies do participants with high self-concepts react stronger to fairness, and in 
other studies stronger reactions are observed among those with low self-concepts? Are 
people concerned with verifying their self-concepts or enhancing them?  
 The answer to these questions can likely be found in the old cliché, “it depends.” 
I take the stance that both motives influence people’s reactions to fairness, but their 
influence depends on a number of other important factors. Each of the studies reviewed 
above differ on several fundamental levels, and these differences may help explain why 
they appear to have produced contradictory results. In reconciling the two theories, I 
point to three critical decisions made by the study authors that may have contributed to 
these differential findings. Specifically, I discuss how differences in the selection of 
moderators and independent variables may help explain these results.  
 I begin with the type of self-evaluation used to moderate the relationship. The 
studies reviewed above all used either procedural or interpersonal fairness as 
independent variables. According to the relational model of justice, this type of 
treatment plays a critical role in the development of one’s self-concept (Tyler & Lind, 
1992). Specifically, the extent to which people are treated fairly (procedurally and 
interpersonally) by an authority figure communicates information about their social self, 
or their value within the group. Thus, according to the relational model, the self is 
socially constructed. Due to the influence of fairness on the social construction of the 
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self, it seems logical that when examining the interplay between justice and the self-
concept, researchers should employ measures that capture the social self rather than 
more global measures (see De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer et al., 2004).  
 Research suggests that in regards to the social self-concept, those who perceive 
that they are socially excluded and unaccepted experience a greater desire for social 
approval than those who view themselves as valued members of the group (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). Thus, it is likely that people with low social self-concepts will strive 
for more self-enhancing information than those with high social self-concepts. Indeed, 
justice studies employing measures of social self-esteem (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer 
et al., 2004; Vermunt et al., 2001) appear to lend support to self-enhancement theory, 
whereas studies focusing on general measures of self-esteem (Brockner et al., 1998; 
Wiesenfeld et al., 2007) seem to support the predictions of self-verification theory. It 
therefore appears that, when focusing on the social self, self-enhancement motives are 
more appropriate than self-verification motives. 
 A second factor likely to play an important role in determining which motives 
influence reactions to fairness is the type of fairness being studied. Again, the research 
reviewed above employed either procedural or interpersonal justice as events which 
informed participants’ self-concepts. Procedural justice considers factors such as voice, 
consistency, and bias, with the voicing of one’s concerns serving as the most popular 
and frequently used measure in justice research (Brockner et al., 1998). Interpersonal 
justice, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the relational aspects of an 
exchange such as respect and dignity. Although both types of fairness influence the self-
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concept, scholars have argued that relational treatment is more appropriate for informing 
the social self than control-based procedures such as voice (De Cremer et al., 2004). 
Indeed, voice might be considered more important to those high in self-efficacy, as those 
with little efficacy would likely have low expectations for the potency of their 
suggestions. Thus, justice studies examining control-based procedures such as voice 
(Brockner et al., 1998) may appear to demonstrate support for self-verification, because 
the fair procedures matter more to people who believe that they have a capable voice 
(i.e., high self-esteem). On the other hand, justice studies focusing on procedures 
considered to be more relational (e.g., procedural consistency; De Cremer, 2003; 
Vermunt et al., 2001) appear to support self-enhancement theory, as consistency matters 
more to those low in self-esteem than those high in self-esteem. Consistent with this 
reasoning, studies that measured the relational concerns of interpersonal justice (Aquino 
et al., 2004; De Cremer et al., 2004) also found that those with low self-concepts reacted 
more strongly to fairness than those with high self-concepts. This research therefore 
suggests that the type of fairness used to inform the self-concept may play a role in 
determining which motive drives reactions to this information. Specifically, it appears 
that the more relational the fairness is, the more relevant it is to self-enhancement 
strivings.  
 In sum, the motives which drive reactions to fairness likely depend on the 
moderators and predictors of interest. Self-enhancement motives are likely more relevant 
evaluations of the social self and relational self-informing events. Self-verification 
motives, on the other hand, appear to be more appropriate for studies examining general 
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self-evaluations, and less relational events. In the present research, I examine the 
moderating influence of status on emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. Given the 
social construction of status (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000), the relational concerns of 
interpersonal justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), and by definition, the affective nature of 
emotions, I base my moderating hypotheses on the tenets of self-enhancement theory.  
As previously noted, affective-events theory posits that the strength of emotional 
reactions is a function of the importance of the emotion-triggering event. Self-
enhancement theory suggests that interpersonal treatment is more important to low-
status employees, who are more deprived of respect and esteem from others and are 
therefore hungrier for these status-affirming resources than are high-status employees. 
Thus, following the combined logic of affective-events theory and self-enhancement 
theory, I expect that low-status employees will experience stronger emotional reactions 
to interpersonal justice than their high-status counterparts. I therefore predict: 
Hypothesis 3A: Personal status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is low rather than 
high. 
Hypothesis 3B: Personal status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is low rather than 
high.  
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2.5.2 Workgroup Status  
 In the previous section, I hypothesized that people’s personal status will 
influence their emotional reactions to interpersonal justice. According to self-
enhancement theory, compared to people high in status, those who are low in status are 
hungrier for information that enhances their self-worth. Interpersonal justice serves as 
self-enhancing information (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, employees 
low in personal status are expected to react more strongly than high-status employees to 
interpersonal justice.  
 It is possible that the status of one’s workgroup also has a similar influence on 
his or her reactions to interpersonal fairness. To the extent that people also derive their 
self-concept from the status of their workgroup, and interpersonal treatment from a 
supervisor also shapes a group’s status, employees in a low-status workgroup should be 
more sensitive than employees in a high-status workgroup to interpersonal fairness.  
 According to the social identity literature, membership in a high-status group 
enhances people’s self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The knowledge that one is part 
of something important contributes to his or her personal feelings of worth. Indeed, the 
group-value model (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 
1992) identifies two unique, yet related, dimensions of status—personal status and group 
status—that serve to influence one’s self-concept. Personal status represents one’s 
perception of how they are regarded within their group, and corresponds to the 
discussion of status in the previous section. Group status, on the other hand, describes 
one’s perceptions of  the extent to which the group is respected and admired by other 
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groups within the organization. Members of high-status workgroups feel more pride than 
those in low-status workgroups. Thus, according to the group-value model, people 
derive their self-worth from their personal status and their workgroup’s status. This 
model also suggests that both types of status are influenced by interpersonal treatment 
from a supervisor. Regarding workgroup status, interpersonal fairness from a supervisor 
toward a group is an indicator that the group is valued and respected. Thus, interpersonal 
treatment toward the group communicates information to group members about their 
self-concept. 
 Consistent with self-enhancement theory, reactions to interpersonal fairness 
should therefore depend on the status of an employee’s workgroup. Because people with 
lower self-concepts have a greater need for self-enhancing information, and people in 
low-status workgroups have lower  self-concepts than those in high-status workgroups, it 
is expected that members of low-status workgroups will be more sensitive to 
interpersonal treatment from a supervisor. In line with affective-events theory, because 
members of low-status workgroups likely place higher value on interpersonal justice, 
they are likely to experience stronger emotions than high-status employees as a result of 
this treatment. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4A: Workgroup status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is low rather than 
high. 
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Hypothesis 4B: Workgroup status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is low rather than 
high.  
2.5.3 Supervisor Status  
 To this point, I have discussed the role that a person’s personal and workgroup 
status play in influencing reactions to interpersonal justice. I have argued that one’s 
status determines his or her need for self-enhancing information, with a low status 
driving a greater need for enhancement than a high status. Thus, interpersonal justice, as 
a source of self-defining information, should matter more to low-status employees and 
members of low-status workgroups. In this section, I present the likelihood that the 
status of the supervisor who enacts the interpersonal treatment may also play a 
moderating role in interpersonal justice effects. 
 Self-enhancement theory states that people care about the way they view 
themselves and therefore react to information that influences their self-concept, 
responding positively to self-enhancing information and negatively to self-threatening 
information. However, it is likely that information varies in its effect on the self. 
Information can come from a number of different sources, and these sources may vary in 
credibility. That is, depending on the source, some information may be more or less 
believable.  According to self-enhancement theory, the credibility of the information 
source serves as a critical determinant of the extent to which the information affects 
people (Shrauger, 1975). The more credible the source, the more likely that the 
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information will be accepted as an accurate representation of the self. Thus, reactions to 
information should depend on the extent to which the source of the information is 
deemed credible. A thorough review of the feedback literature suggests that the 
credibility of the information source may, in fact, be the single greatest predictor of the 
extent to which self-relevant information is accepted (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). 
Indeed, the credibility of the feedback source increases the feedback’s favorability 
(Albright & Levy, 1995), acceptance (Suzuki, 1978), and intention to use (Bannister, 
1986).  
 It seems likely that a supervisor who is high in status—that is, highly respected 
and admired by the employee—would be considered more credible than a low-status 
supervisor. Indeed, Sigall and Helmreich (1969: 72) note that “Differences in prestige, 
status, expertise, etc. each make for differences in credibility” (see also McGuire, 1969). 
Empirical support for this notion is provided by Halperin and colleagues (1976), who 
provided feedback about participants via three information sources, each varying in 
status. The authors found that acceptance of the feedback increased significantly with the 
status of the information source.  
 Although I am unaware of any research that has explicitly examined the potential 
influence of supervisor status on justice effects, a number of studies provide some 
suggestive evidence in support of this notion by demonstrating that supervisors vary in 
their influence on subordinates’ self-concepts (Cornelis, van Hiel, De Cremer, 2006; 
Pierro, Cicero, Bonaiuto, van Knippenberg, & Kruglanski, 2005). For example, Smith, 
Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, and Lind (1998) in a test of the group-value model found that an 
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authority’s treatment quality had a stronger influence on employee respect and self-
esteem when the authority was affiliated with the ingroup than when the authority was 
affiliated with an outgroup. In another study, Lipponen, Koivisto, and Olkkonen (2005) 
found similar results using leader prototypicality, or the extent to which a leader 
embodies the characteristics that define a group (Hogg, 2001). These authors 
demonstrated that the influence of procedural justice on feelings of pride and respect was 
stronger when the leader was considered prototypical.  
Although ingroup affiliation and leader prototypicality differ from supervisor 
status, their influences on reactions to fairness are likely similar. Smith and colleagues 
(1998) argued that treatment from an outgroup authority provided less self-relevant 
information than an ingroup authority, as the ingroup authority’s behavior was 
considered to be more legitimate. Similarly, prototypical leaders, more so than non-
prototypical leaders, are believed to carry the general opinions of the group and therefore 
provide information that is more indicative of an employee’s relative standing in the 
group (Seppala, Lipponen, & Pirttila-Backman, 2012). Based on these arguments, it 
seems logical to conclude that ingroup authority and prototypical leaders provide more 
credible information for defining the self-concept.  
 Taken together, the findings reviewed above suggest that when people receive 
self-relevant information, such as that stemming from justice events, they actively judge 
the source of the information and use this judgment to determine whether or not to 
accept and respond to it. Consistent with self-enhancement theory, information is more 
likely to be accepted and to trigger a response if it originates from a credible source, as 
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credible information is considered more representative of one’s true self (Shrauger, 
1975). Because status is indicative of credibility (Halperin et al., 1976; Sigall & 
Helmreich, 1969), information is more likely to be influential if it comes from a person 
with high status. In the context of the present research, this suggests that interpersonal 
justice will be more important when the supervisor enacting the justice is high-status 
rather than low-status. Thus, following the logic of affective events theory, interpersonal 
justice should result in stronger emotional reactions when the supervisor is high in 
status, compared to when the supervisor is low in status. I therefore predict: 
Hypothesis 5A: Supervisor status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more negatively to these emotions when status is high rather than 
low. 
Hypothesis 5B: Supervisor status moderates the relationship between 
interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more positively to these emotions when status is high rather than 
low.  
2.5.4 Justice Orientation 
 According to deonance theory (Folger, 2001), people have a moral duty to treat 
people fairly. The theory states that fair treatment is a virtue (Cropanzano, Goldman, & 
Folger, 2003; Folger, 1998), and employee reactions to justice events are determined by 
the extent to which a supervisor’s behavior is consistent with (or in violation of) moral 
obligations. However, people differ not only in the extent to which they are cognizant of 
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justice events, but also in the extent to which they hold justice as virtuous. That is, they 
vary in their justice orientation (Rupp et al., 2003).  
 Justice orientation moderates the effects of fairness in such a way that people 
with a high justice orientation are more sensitive to fairness than those with a low justice 
orientation (Rupp et al., 2003). Interpersonal justice is of particular moral relevance 
(Bies, 1987), suggesting that justice orientation should play an important role in 
determining one’s reactions to this type of fairness. Indeed, research has shown that 
justice orientation influences the effects of interpersonal justice on a number of 
important outcomes such as satisfaction and commitment (Liao & Rupp, 2005; Rupp et 
al., 2003). Given the emotional nature of interpersonal justice, and the moral outrage that 
ensues following violations of interpersonal treatment (Bies, 1987), the extent to which 
individuals hold fairness as a moral virtue is likely to also influence the affective 
reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. Thus, I predict: 
Hypothesis 6A: Justice orientation moderates the relationships between 
interpersonal justice and negative emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more negatively to these emotions when justice orientation is high 
rather than low. 
Hypothesis 6B: Justice orientation moderates the relationships between 
interpersonal justice and positive emotions in such a way that interpersonal 
justice relates more positively to these emotions when justice orientation is high 
rather than low.  
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2.5.5 Moderated Mediation 
 In the previous sections, I presented a number of mediating (i.e., the influence of 
interpersonal justice on attitudes through emotions) and moderating (i.e., the influence of 
personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation on the 
relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions) hypotheses. Following the lead 
of previous scholars, I also propose a moderated mediation of these relationships (James 
& Brett, 1984). Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007: 193) note that “moderated 
mediation occurs when the strength of an indirect effect depends on the level of some 
variable, or in other words, when mediation relations are contingent on the level of 
moderator”. In the context of the present work, I expect a first stage (independent 
variable to mediator) moderation. That is, the strength of the indirect effects of 
interpersonal justice on attitudes (through emotions) will depend on the level of status 
(personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice orientation. Specifically, I expect the 
indirect effects to be stronger at lower (versus higher) levels of personal and workgroup 
status and higher (versus lower) levels of supervisor status and justice orientation. 
Consistent with my previous moderation hypotheses, I propose a stage 1 (interpersonal 
justice-to-emotions) moderation. I therefore present the following formal hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7A: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
negative emotions are moderated by personal status in such a way that the 
relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher. 
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Hypothesis 7B: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
positive emotions are moderated by personal status in such a way that the 
relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher. 
Hypothesis 7C: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
negative emotions are moderated by workgroup status in such a way that the 
relationships are stronger when status is lower, rather than higher. 
Hypothesis 7D: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
positive emotions joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment are 
moderated by workgroup status in such a way that the relationships are stronger 
when status is lower, rather than higher. 
Hypothesis 7E: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through the 
negative are moderated by supervisor status in such a way that the relationships 
are stronger when status is higher, rather than lower. 
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Hypothesis 7F: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
positive are moderated by supervisor status in such a way that the relationships 
are stronger when status is higher, rather than lower. 
Hypothesis 7G: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
negative emotions are moderated by justice orientation in such a way that the 
relationships are stronger when justice orientation is higher, rather than lower. 
Hypothesis 7H: The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on (i) supervisor 
satisfaction, (ii) supervisor trust, (iii) supervisor relationship viability, (iv) 
organizational commitment, (v) withdrawal, and (vi) job satisfaction through 
positive emotions are moderated by justice orientation in such a way that the 
relationships are stronger when justice orientation is higher, rather than lower. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
 In Chapter II, I proposed a model of interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and 
justice orientation. Specifically, I proposed that interpersonal justice influences emotions 
(both positive and negative), and that these emotions serve as mediators connecting 
interpersonal justice to a number of important outcomes. I further argued that the effects 
of interpersonal justice on emotions are moderated by status in such a way that they are 
weakened by personal status and workgroup status and strengthened by supervisor 
status. Finally, I also proposed that justice orientation would have a positive moderating 
effect on these relationships. In the present chapter, I describe the methodology used to 
test the hypotheses put forth in my model. I begin with a description of my sample and 
data collection procedures. I then explain which measures (i.e., independent variables, 
mediators, moderators, outcomes, and control variables) I used to capture my constructs 
of interest. Finally, I identify and describe the procedures used to analyze my data and 
ultimately test my model.  
3.2 Sample and Procedures 
3.2.1 Sample  
 Participants in this study were 390 cadets of a university-based military 
organization (i.e., the Corps) affiliated with a large university in the southern United 
States. Participants were recruited via an email which described the study and asked 
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them to click a link to join. Given that everyone in the organization was sent an email 
rather than contacting only randomly selected members, this sample should be labeled as 
an opportunity sample. Because my sampling procedure was not random, it is difficult to 
generalize my findings and make inferences about the population.  However, population 
statistics suggest that my sample is similar to that of the entire organization. For 
example, 11.2 percent of my participants were female, which is not significantly 
different from the 11.5 percent in the entire Corps (z = .14, ns). Likewise, the 23 percent 
Sophomores (z = .63, ns), 29.5 percent Juniors (z = .55, ns), and 22 percent Seniors (z = 
1.59, ns) who participated also did not differ significantly from the population. 
Similarly, the 1.4 percent Black/African American (z = 1.80, ns) and the 2.8 percent 
Asian/Asian American (z = 1.21, ns) were not significantly different than their respective 
percentages in the population. With that said, there were several demographic 
distinctions between my sample and the population. For example, the 23 percent 
Freshmen differed from the population (z = 2.55, p < .05), as did the 61 percent 
White/Caucasian (z = 4.05, p < .001) and the 10.5 percent Latino/Hispanic American (z 
= 4.02, p < .001). The mean age was 20 (S.D. = 1.26; ages ranged from 18 to 25). 
Population data for average age was not available. See Table 3.1 for a comparison of the 
experimental sample demographics, population demographics, and demographics for the 
supplemental analyses (discussed in detail below).  
The organization contains 2,203 cadets. Of the 2,203 emails sent, 950 were 
opened. From the 950 that opened the email invitation, 427 cadets completed the study, 
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providing a response rate of 45 percent. However, 37 were unable to recall a specific 
interpersonal justice event that matched the requested criteria. As this recollection was  
TABLE 3.1 
Demographic Comparisons among Samples and Population 
Demographic 
Experimental  
(N = 390) 
Nonexperimental  
(N = 427) 
Population  
(N = 2,203) 
Female 11 11 12 
White/Caucasian 61 61 71 
Latino/Hispanic 
American 11 11 19 
Asian/Asian American 3 3 4 
Black/African American 1 1 3 
Freshman 23 23 23 
Sophomore 23 30 30 
Junior 30 26 26 
Senior 22 22 22 
Note: Values are rounded to the nearest percent. 
 
 
 
critical to the study’s manipulation (explained in detail below), these participants were 
removed from the dataset. Thus 91 percent of the responses were deemed useable for 
this study.  
 The Corps was selected for a number of theoretically and methodologically 
relevant reasons, largely related to its emphasis on status. First, like most military 
organizations, the Corps classifies its members hierarchically based on rank, making 
status quite salient as members in higher positions enjoy more respect and privilege than 
those in subordinate positions. Specifically, throughout their tenure in the Corps, cadets 
climb four broad levels of seniority, each corresponding to their respective classification 
of freshmen, sophomores, juniors, or seniors. Senior cadets serve as the Corps’ executive 
leaders, establishing policies and rules, planning organizational activities, and 
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overseeing the underclassmen. Junior cadets are responsible for the sophomores, who in 
turn lead the freshman cadets. Freshmen are positioned at the bottom of the 
organizational hierarchy and have no leadership authority. Furthermore, each cadet also 
possesses a formal rank (e.g., Cadet Colonel, Cadet Lieutenant Colonel, Cadet Major, 
Cadet Captain, Sergeant Major, Master Sergeant, Corporal, Private First Class). There 
are seventeen hierarchically structured formal ranks in the Corps. These hierarchical 
classifications contributed to the variance in individual status perceptions, thus allowing 
me to examine the influence of personal status in my model.  
Second, the Corps is also ideal for testing the effects of workgroup status. The 
organization is partitioned into thirty-seven units (i.e., outfits), each with its own unique 
reputation. These reputations stem, in part, from the unique skillsets possessed by the 
members. For example, some outfits are known for their superior athletic abilities, 
representing the Corps in intramural sports and inter-collegiate athletic competitions. 
Other outfits have established themselves as academic leaders, with exemplary aggregate 
grade point averages. Still other outfits are composed entirely of university band 
members. One outfit is exclusive to veterans of military combat. Reputations are also 
influenced by annual recognition for exemplary performance. Each year, a number of 
awards are allocated to the outfits that excel in a variety of criteria identified by 
organizational leadership. The skill diversity existing among the outfits, and the annual 
identification and recognition of top performing units are both likely factors that 
contributed to the variance in group status perceptions, thus allowing me to test my 
hypotheses regarding workgroup status.  
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The third way in which the Corps is relevant to the present study pertains to the 
established structure of individual leaders. In addition to the status granted members 
based on their respective level of seniority, a select few from each class (except the 
freshman class) are selected to serve in formal leadership roles (i.e., leaders are selected 
through an interview process). For example, the Corps Commander serves as the leader 
of the entire Corps. Under the Corps Commander is the Corps Staff, a formal chain of 
command consisting of several high-level leadership positions that oversee the operation 
of the Corps (e.g., Deputy Corps Commander, Corps Sergeant Major, Corps Chief of 
Staff, Plans Sergeant, Inspector General, Scholastics Officer). Several Major Unit Staffs 
also exist. Each Major Unit Staff reports directly to the Corps Staff and is responsible for 
approximately four outfits. The Major Unit Staff is also composed of high-level officers 
(e.g., Major Unit Commander, Major Unit Executive Officer, Major Unit Sergeant 
Major, Inspection Sergeant, Scholastics Sergeant, Operations Sergeant). Finally, each 
outfit also has a number of leaders that oversee the daily operations of the members 
(e.g., Unit Commander, Executive Officer, First Sergeant, Platoon Leader, Platoon 
Sergeant, Squad Leader). The hierarchical structure of the Corps leadership likely 
contributed to variance in subordinates’ perceptions of their leaders’ status, thus 
allowing me to test my supervisor status hypotheses.  
 Furthermore, my model contains a number of complexities (e.g., numerous 
moderators and mediators) that will serve to substantially reduce the degrees of freedom 
when testing my hypotheses. It is therefore necessary to make my sample large enough 
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to provide sufficient power (Cohen, 1988) to detect statistical significance and therefore 
avoid type II errors. The Corps has provided a sufficiently sized sample. 
 Finally, previous justice scholars have found military samples to be an effective 
context for studying organizational justice effects (Brennan & Skarlicki, 2004; Cole, 
Bernerth, Walter, & Holt, 2010; Tepper & Taylor, 2003).  
3.2.2 Procedures  
 Data were collected via two online questionnaires (see Appendix A and 
Appendix B for detailed instructions and all items used in both questionnaires), which 
were completed one week apart. Prior to beginning each questionnaire, participants were 
assured that all responses would be kept strictly confidential, and that results would be 
reported only in aggregate form with no individual identifying information. The first 
questionnaire captured personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice 
orientation. I also measured dispositional control variables (i.e., trait affect, self-esteem) 
and demographics in this questionnaire.  
 In the second questionnaire, I measured the influence of interpersonal justice on 
emotions using the critical incident technique introduced by Flanagan (1954). Research 
investigating both organizational justice (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007; Aquino, 
Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Brockner, Heuer, Magner, Folger, Umphress, van den Bos, 
Vermunt, Magner, & Siegel, 2003; Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg 2009) 
and emotions (Crossley, 2009; Dasborough, 2006; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979) 
have recently found success using this method to recall critical events and their 
subsequent emotional reactions. Particularly relevant to the present research, Barclay et 
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al. (2005) found that participants were able to recall emotions resulting from a previous 
interpersonal justice event.   
Following the lead of Mayer and colleagues (2009), I randomly assigned each 
participant to one of two conditions (i.e., high or low interpersonal justice), thereby 
creating a quasi-experimental study design. In the high interpersonal justice condition, 
participants were asked to recall an event in which their supervisors treated them with 
“particularly high levels of dignity, respect, and politeness”. In the low interpersonal 
justice condition, participants were asked to recall a situation in which their supervisors 
treated them with “particularly low levels of dignity, respect, and politeness”. After 
recalling the event, participants were then asked to briefly write (in a few sentences) a 
description of the event. This procedure was used by Aquino and colleagues (2006), and 
is expected to enhance the accuracy of the recollection. Immediately following the event 
description, participants reported the extent to which the event caused them to feel a 
variety of emotions, including those central to the study as well as several filler emotions 
added to mask my specific hypotheses.  
Participants subsequently answered a series of questions which measure the 
outcomes of interest (i.e., supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor 
relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction). 
Because the strength of emotions has been shown to dissipate over time (Larsen & 
Kasimatis, 1990), participants also reported the length of time that had passed since the 
recalled interpersonal justice event occurred. Finally, to ensure that my manipulation 
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was successful, respondents also rated the supervisor’s level of interpersonal justice 
during the event. 
In exchange for their participation, respondents were entered into a lottery 
drawing to win one of fifteen Apple iPad 4’s. 
3.3 Measures  
3.3.1 Manipulation Check  
To assess the effectiveness of my manipulation, I asked participants to rate their 
supervisors’ interpersonal justice during the recalled event. Respondents completed the 
interpersonal justice scale developed and validated by Colquitt (2001). This 4-item 
measure is widely accepted among organizational justice scholars (see Greenberg, 2011 
for a review). Participants were instructed to refer to their recalled event when 
responding to these items. Specifically, the items asked to what extent, “Did your 
supervisor treat you in a polite manner” “Did your supervisor treat you with dignity” 
“Did your supervisor treat you with respect” “Did your supervisor refrain from improper 
remarks or comments”. Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale. Responses 
ranged from 1 (to a small extent) to 4 (somewhat) to 7 (to a large extent). Cronbach’s 
reliability coefficient for the interpersonal justice manipulation check was .96. 
3.3.2 Emotions  
I used composite indices of discrete emotions to measure my positive emotion 
and negative emotion constructs. Previous literature examining relations between justice 
and emotions have similarly aggregated a number of discrete emotions to create latent 
emotion constructs (Barclay & Kiefer, 2012; Barclay et al., 2005; Judge et al., 2006; 
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Stecher & Rosse, 2005). In creating my emotion constructs, I selected twelve discrete 
emotions from the emotional hierarchy developed by Shaver et al. (1987). Each 
construct consisted of six discrete emotions.  
Shaver et al.’s (1987) cluster analysis revealed five primary emotional clusters—
love, joy, anger, sadness, and fear. Because of the unlikelihood of interpersonal justice 
triggering positive emotions as extreme as love, this cluster was not used in my study. 
Thus, all six positive emotions were pulled from the joy cluster. Specifically, I chose the 
emotions of joy, pleasure, happiness, delight, pride, and contentment. The reliability 
coefficient for positive emotions was .97. Because discussions of negative emotional 
reactions to interpersonal justice tend to describe feelings related to anger (Bies, 2001; 
Bies & Tripp, 1996; Judge et al., 2006), a majority of my negative emotions were 
selected from the anger cluster. Specifically, I chose anger, hostility, irritability, and 
rage. I also chose one emotion—embarrassment—from the sadness cluster and one 
emotion—anxiety—from the fear cluster. The reliability coefficient for negative 
emotions was .92.   
Following previous research examining emotional reactions to justice (Barclay & 
Kiefer, 2012; Barclay et al., 2005), I asked participants to indicate the extent to which 
they experienced each emotion in reaction to the interpersonal justice event. Specifically, 
they were given the following instructions: “please rate the extent to which you 
experienced each of the following emotions in reaction to the interpersonal treatment 
you received from your superior in the situation you just recalled”. In order to reduce the 
demand characteristics for the specific emotions of interest (Weiss et al., 1999), I also 
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included a number of filler emotions borrowed from Shaver et al. (1987). The responses 
for the 7-point Likert scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 4 (somewhat) to 7 (very much).  
3.3.3 Personal Status  
To measure participants’ perceptions of personal status, I used a version of the 
perceived status scale developed by Diekmann et al. (2007), modified to reflect the 
participants’ status within their workgroups (i.e., outfits). Although there are other 
potential groupings that can be examined (i.e., major unit, platoon, squadron), the outfit 
level was selected as a referent because cadets in the same outfit live together, train 
together, and participate in Corps-related activities together. This increased interaction is 
likely to enhance their awareness of personal status, as cadets are regularly afforded 
opportunities to observe how others behave toward them. The Diekmann et al. (2007) 
scale consists of three items including:  “I am very highly regarded in my outfit,” “I have 
a lot of status in my outfit,” and “I have a lot of prestige in my outfit”. Consistent with 
other operationalizations of status (Lount & Pettit, 2011), I also added a fourth item to 
represent the extent to which participants were respected by their group members: “I 
have a lot of respect in my outfit”.  Participants responded to each item using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for personal status was .93. 
3.3.4 Workgroup Status  
I also measured workgroup status at the outfit level. The outfit level was chosen 
for a number of reasons. First, it is at this level that organizational awards are given, thus 
separating some outfits from others in terms of prestige. Second, people tend to join 
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outfits based on common interests and strengths (e.g., athletics, academics, band), which 
enhances outfit homogeneity and likely leads to more status variance between outfits 
than within outfits. Finally, it is the outfit level to which cadets refer when describing 
different groups in the Corps, thus making status-based reputations the most salient at 
this level. The items used to measure workgroup status were the same four items used to 
capture personal status (Diekmann et al., 2007). However, each item will be modified to 
reflect the change in referent from the self to the workgroup. Items included, “My outfit 
is very highly regarded in the Corps,” “My outfit has a lot of status in the Corps,” “My 
outfit has a lot of prestige in the Corps,” and “My outfit has a lot of respect in the 
Corps.” Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The 
reliability coefficient for workgroup status was .95. 
3.3.5 Supervisor Status  
To measure supervisor status, participants were asked to rate the status of the 
supervisor who enacted the interpersonal justice in the recalled event. Supervisor status 
was measured with the same four items used to measure personal and workgroup status 
(Diekmann et al., 2007), modified to reflect the supervisor as the referent. Sample items 
included: “My superior is very highly regarded by the members of my outfit,” “My 
superior has a lot of status among the members of my outfit,” “My superior has a lot of 
prestige among the members of my outfit,” and “My superior has a lot of respect among 
the members of my outfit”. Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert 
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scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). The reliability coefficient for supervisor status was .96. 
3.3.6 Justice Orientation  
Justice orientation was measured with the 16-item scale developed by Rupp and 
colleagues (2003) and later employed by Liao and Rupp (2005). Sample items included, 
“I hurt for people who are treated unfairly, whether I know them or not,” “I am prone to 
notice people being treated unfairly in public,” “No one is free as long as one person is 
oppressed,” and “All of us need to take responsibility when others are treated unfairly.” 
Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability 
coefficient for justice orientation was .88. 
3.3.7 Supervisor Satisfaction  
Supervisor satisfaction was measured with a 5-item version of Brayfield and 
Rothe’s (1951) Overall Job Satisfaction Scale (i.e., OJS). This 5-item scale has been 
used by other organizational researchers to assess satisfaction (Ilies & Judge, 2002). The 
items were modified to reflect the supervisor as the referent. This scale was selected 
because of its superior ability to capture affective-based satisfaction, relative to other 
scales (Schleicher, Watt, & Greguras, 2004). Items referenced the supervisor who 
enacted the recalled interpersonal justice event. Sample items included: “At this very 
moment, I am enthusiastic about working with my superior,” “Right now, I am fairly 
satisfied with my superior,” “At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my 
superior”, and “Right now, I consider my superior rather unpleasant” (reverse-scored). 
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Each item was rated on a 7-point Likert scale with a response range of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability 
coefficient for supervisor satisfaction was .94. 
3.3.8 Supervisor Trust  
I measured supervisor trust with the nine items developed by Cook and Wall 
(1980) to capture interpersonal trust toward management. Sample items included, “My 
superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view,” “My superior can be 
trusted to make sensible decisions for my future,” “My superior seems to do an efficient 
job,” and “I have a poor future unless I have a better superior” (reverse scored). 
Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale. The responses ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The 
reliability coefficient for supervisor trust was .96.  
3.3.9 Supervisor Relationship Viability  
The perceived viability of the supervisor relationship was measured with a 
shortened 5-item version of Evans and Jarvis’s (1986) Group Attitude Scale. Items were 
tailored in such a way that they reference the supervisor. Sample items included: “I want 
to remain with my superior,” “I don’t care what happens to my superior” (reverse 
scored), “I wish it were possible to stop reporting to my superior now,” and “If it were 
possible to move to another superior at this time, I would” (reverse scored). Participants 
responded to each item on a 7-point Likert scale with a response range of 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability 
coefficient for supervisor relationship viability was  .97. 
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3.3.10 Organizational Commitment  
Given my interest in attitudes likely to be influenced by emotional responses, I 
measured organizational commitment using the affective commitment scale developed 
by Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) and later revised by Vandenberghe, Bentein, and 
Stinglhamber (2004). Affective organizational commitment captures participants’ 
emotional attachment to the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1984). The scale contains six 
items, and sample items included: “I enjoy discussing the Corps with people outside it,” 
“I really feel as if the Corps’ problems are my own,” “I would be very happy to spend 
the rest of my college career with the Corps,” and “I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ 
to the Corps” (reverse-scored). Participants responded to each item using a 7-point 
Likert scale. The responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for organizational commitment 
was .94. 
3.3.11 Withdrawal  
I measured withdrawal with the 4-item turnover intent scale developed by 
Kelloway, Gottlieb, and Barham (1999) to capture the likelihood that participants will 
leave the organization in the future. Colquitt and colleagues (2001) identified turnover 
intent as a common type of withdrawal used in the organizational justice literature. Items 
included: “I am thinking about leaving the Corps,” “I am planning to look for something 
to do with my time other than the Corps,” “I intend to ask people about new 
opportunities outside the Corps,” and “I don’t plan to complete my four years in the 
Corps.”  Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale. The potential 
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responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree nor disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for withdrawal was .76. 
3.3.12 Job Satisfaction  
I measured job satisfaction with the Overall Job Satisfaction Scale (Brayfield & 
Rothe, 1951). The OJS consists of 18 items that assess participants’ feelings toward their 
jobs. The OJS was selected because it is more affectively based than other job 
satisfaction scales (Schleicher et al., 2004), thus making it relevant for examining 
attitudes reflective of emotions. As each cadet is assigned a specific position in the 
Corps (e.g., Finance Corporal, Scholastics Sergeant, Public Relations Corporal, 
Recruiting Officer, Discipline Sergeant), participants were informed that each item 
pertained to that particular position. Sample items included: “I feel fairly well satisfied 
in my present position,” “My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from 
getting bored,” “I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets,” and “I 
like my position better than the average cadet does.” I used a 7-point Likert scale for 
each item. The potential responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree 
nor disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reliability coefficient for job satisfaction was 
.94.  
3.3.13 Control Variables  
I included a number of control variables in order to rule out alternative 
explanations for my findings. Specifically, in my regression and mediator analyses, I 
controlled for trait positive and negative affect, and the length of time since the recalled 
interpersonal justice event. It is possible that participants’ emotional reactions to 
 84 
 
interpersonal justice may be influenced by their dispositional tendencies to experience 
affect. For example, some people may tend to experience more anger or more joy than 
others. Likewise, meta-analytic research suggests that trait positive affect (PA) and trait 
negative affect (NA) influence perceptions of justice (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007). To 
eliminate this possible confounding influence, I controlled for the extent to which 
participants experience, in general, PA and NA. To do so I used the 20-item Positive 
Affect Negative Affect Scale (i.e., PANAS) developed by Watson, Clark, & Tellegen 
(1988). The scale is divided into two distinct factors: PA and NA. The PA scale consists 
of the following ten items: interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, 
determined, attentive, and active. The reliability coefficient for PA was .90. The NA 
scale consists of the following ten items: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, 
irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid. The reliability coefficient for NA was .86. 
Second, the emotions literature has demonstrated the potential for emotional strength to 
dissipate over time (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990). Further, the accuracy of emotional 
recollections may be reduced as a function of time (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Thus, to 
rule out any potential recency bias, I controlled for the time since the event occurred. 
Specifically, I asked participants, “Approximately how long ago did this event occur?” 
Finally, in addition to trait PA, trait NA, and event proximity, I also controlled for social 
self-esteem in my moderated regression analyses. Research has shown that self-esteem 
moderates the relationships between justice and a variety of outcomes (De Cremer, 
2003; De Cremer et al., 2004; Vermunt et al., 2001) in such a way that people of low 
self-esteem react more strongly to judgments of fairness. This is particularly true for the 
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social aspect of self-esteem, which captures people’s perceived social competence. Thus, 
I control for social self-esteem with the 7-items that make up the social dimension of 
Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) self-esteem scale. Sample items included: “I feel self-
conscious,” “I feel displeased with myself,” “I am worried about whether I am regarded 
as a success or failure,” “I am worried about looking foolish” (all reverse-scored). The 
reliability coefficient for social self-esteem was .85.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter describes in detail the statistical procedures employed to test my 
hypotheses. I also report the results of each analysis, including supplemental procedures. 
Table 4.1 presents the means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and 
intercorrelations among all study variables. The manipulation of interpersonal justice 
was significantly related to both negative emotions (r = -.72, p < .01) and positive 
emotions (r = .78, p < .01) in the hypothesized directions. Interpersonal justice was also 
positively and significantly related to the distal supervisor-directed outcomes of 
supervisor satisfaction (r = .48, p < .01), supervisor trust (r = .42, p < .01), and 
supervisor relationship viability (r = .36, p < .01). However, interpersonal justice was 
not related to the distal outcomes of organizational commitment (r = .05, ns), withdrawal 
(r = .00, ns), and job satisfaction (r = .02, ns). Negative emotions correlated with each 
distal outcome as follows: supervisor satisfaction (r = -.69, p < .01), supervisor trust (r = 
-.67, p < .01), supervisor relationship viability (r = -.61, p < .01), organizational 
commitment (r = -.17, p < .05), withdrawal (r = .14, p < .01). Finally, positive emotions 
demonstrated significant relationships with each supervisor-directed outcome: supervisor 
satisfaction (r = .57, p < .01), supervisor trust (r = .53, p < .01), and supervisor 
relationship viability (r = .45, p < .01). However, positive emotions were not related to  
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TABLE 4.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study Variables – Experimental Data 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. Event Proximity 10.63 26.73
2. Trait Negative Affect 5.29 1.04 -.05 (.86)
3. Trait Positive Affect 3.31 1.15 -.10 -.23
**
(.90)
4. Social Self Esteem 4.22 1.35  .05 -.50
**
 .08 (.85)
5. Interpersonal Justice 0.53 0.50 -.11
*
-.03 -.00 -.02
6. Negative Emotions 2.92 1.84  .09  .19
** -.12* -.07 -.72
**
(.92)
7. Positive Emotions 3.60 2.13 -.06 -.03  .07 -.00  .78
** -.75** (.97)
8. Supervisor Satisfaction 4.84 1.87 -.05 -.16
**  .23**  .05  .48
** -.69**  .57** (.94)
9. Supervisor Trust 5.31 1.63 -.08 -.17
**  .28**  .03  .42
** -.67**  .53**  .89** (.96)
10. Supervisor Relationship 
Viability 5.51 1.82 -.09 -.18
**  .26**  .03  .36
** -.61**  .45**  .82**  .90** (.97)
11. Organizational 
Commitment 5.41 1.49 -.04 -.21
**  .59**  .04  .05 -.17
**
 .05  .22
**  .29**  .29** (.94)
12. Withdrawal 2.87 1.33  .04  .21
** -.38** -.09  .00  .14
**
-.00 -.16
** -.19** -.23** -.58** (.76)
13. Job Satisfaction 4.80 1.21  .12
* -.36**  .34**  .21**  .02 -.12
*
 .06  .19
**  .19**  .20**  .40** -.38** (.94)
14. Personal Status 4.71 1.65  .15
** -.35**  .24**  .31**  .02 -.08  .05  .16
**  .15**  .15**  .25** -.25**  .61** (.93)
15. Workgroup Status 5.12 1.47 -.06 -.07  .28
**
 .03 -.06  .02 -.06  .05  .14
**  .13**  .18** -.05  .02 -.08 (.95)
16. Supervisor Status 5.53 1.54 -.05 -.11  .29
**
-.04  .21
** -.37**  .28**  .62**  .65**  .70**  .25** -.21**  .23**  .19**  .24** (.96)
17. Justice Orientation 4.79 0.88 -.12
*  .18**  .13*  .26** -.09  .16
**
-.06 -.13
* -.12* -.13*  .04  .06 -.07 -.13
*
 .07  .01 (.88)  
  Note. n = 390. Reliability coefficients are reported along the diagonal. Event proximity was reported in number of weeks. Interpersonal    
         justice manipulation was coded such that 1 = high justice and 0 = low justice. * p < .05, ** p < .01.  
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organizational commitment (r = .05, ns), withdrawal (r = .00, ns), or job satisfaction (r = 
.06, ns).  
4.2 Analyses 
 To assess the factor structure of my study variables, I employed a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). I then employed an analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test my 
first set of hypotheses, which predicted that interpersonal justice would influence both 
negative (H1a) and positive (H1b) emotions. Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted that 
negative and positive emotions both mediate the relationships between interpersonal 
justice and each of the following distal outcomes including: supervisor satisfaction, 
supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, 
withdrawal, and job satisfaction. To test the hypothesized indirect effects, I employed 
the Mplus procedures recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) for models 
containing multiple mediators. This method utilizes the bootstrapping technique, which 
repeatedly resamples the data and tests for significance of the indirect effects in each 
sample (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). It has been argued that bootstrapping is superior to 
the traditional multivariate product-of-coefficient approach to detecting indirect effects 
in models with multiple mediators (Briggs, 2006; Williams, 2004; Williams & 
MacKinnon, 2008). Traditional methods assume a normal sampling distribution, thereby 
producing confidence intervals (CIs) with forced symmetry. Scholars have noted that 
assuming a normal distribution may result in inaccurate estimations, increased Type I 
errors, and power issues during hypothesis testing (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). 
Bootstrapping makes no such assumption. Rather, the CIs produced by the bootstrapping 
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technique are based on empirical estimations of the indirect effects and are free to take 
asymmetric form when the data are skewed. The presence of significant indirect effects 
will lend support to my mediation hypotheses. Hypotheses 3a-6b predicted that the 
relationships between interpersonal justice and emotions are moderated by status 
(personal, workgroup, and supervisor) and justice orientation. I used OLS moderated 
regression in SPSS to test these hypotheses. Finally, hypotheses 7a-7h predicted that the 
indirect effects of interpersonal justice on each of the distal outcomes through emotions 
is conditioned (i.e., moderated) by each of the status variables and justice orientation. To 
test these moderated mediation hypotheses, I used an SPSS macro developed by 
Preacher and colleagues (2007), which was designed to detect conditional indirect 
effects. I specifically employed the Model 2 procedures, which test for stage 1 
moderation. This method allowed me to use the recommended bootstrapping technique 
to examine the significance of the indirect effects at three different levels of my 
moderator (i.e., mean, one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard 
deviation below the mean). The Preacher et al. technique has been used in recent 
organizational research (Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011) to uncover conditional indirect 
effects in the workplace.  
4.3 Results  
 To assess the effectiveness of my manipulation, I compared the mean 
interpersonal justice ratings (Colquitt, 2001) of participants in the low interpersonal 
justice (unfair) condition to the ratings of those in the high interpersonal justice (fair) 
condition. ANOVA results suggest that participants in the high justice condition reported 
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that their supervisor exhibited higher levels of interpersonal justice (M = 6.54) than 
participants in the low justice condition (M = 3.03), and that this difference was 
significant (F = 706.48, p < .001). These results suggest that my manipulation was a 
success. 
 Table 4.2 presents the results of my CFAs, including the following fit statistics: 
chi-square, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), 
and comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990).  Although the chi-square statistic (χ2) 
does not demonstrate the actual fit of a model, it is considered an effective metric for fit 
comparison among multiple nested models. RMSEA values below .05 are generally 
considered indicative of good fit, values below .08 are believed to represent reasonable 
fit, and any models with RMSEA values above .10 are generally perceived to fit the data 
poorly (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). CFI values above .90 represent models with good fit 
(Mathieu, Gilson, & Ruddy, 2006; Medsker, Williams, & Holahan, 1994).  My 
measurement model consisted of twelve factors: my moderators—personal status, 
workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation; my mediators—negative 
emotions and positive emotions; and my outcome variables—supervisor satisfaction, 
supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, 
withdrawal, and job satisfaction. This twelve-factor model fit the data relatively well 
(χ2[3,588] = 7,022, p < .001; CFI = .90, RMSEA = .05). I further tested the fit of 
alternative models, which were developed by combining variables with high correlations 
or theoretical overlap. For example, in one model, I collapsed each of my supervisor-
directed attitudes. In another, I combined each of my status variables. My hypothesized 
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model demonstrated superior fit to each alternative model, thus lending support for the 
discriminant validity of my constructs.  
TABLE 4.2 
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses – Experimental Data 
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf CFI RMSEA
Twelve factors: Hypothesized 
model 7022 3588 - - 0.90 0.05
Eleven factors: Supervisor 
satisfaction and supervisor trust 
combined 7604 3599 582* 11 0.88 0.05
Eleven factors: Personal status 
and job satisfaction combined 36550 3741 29528* 153 0.86 0.06
Eleven factors: Personal and 
workgroup status combined 8659 3741 1637* 153 0.85 0.06
Eleven factors: Organizational 
commitment and withdrawal 
combined 36550 3741 29528* 153 0.89 0.05
Ten factors: Supervisor 
satisfaction, supervisor trust, 
and supervisor relationship 
viability combined 8457 3609 1435 21 0.85 0.05
Ten factors: Personal status, 
workgroup status, supervisor 
status combined 10070 3609 3048* 21 0.80 0.07
Eight factors: All status 
variables combined and all 
supervisor-related variables 
combined 11498 3626 4476* 38 0.76 0.08
Note: CFI = Confirmatory Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of  
         Approximation. * p < .001.  
 
 
 
 With regard to hypotheses 1a and 1b, MANOVA results suggest that 
interpersonal justice has a direct effect on both negative and positive emotions. First, 
after finding significance in my multivariate test (F = 347.20, p < .001), I proceeded to 
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examine the univariate effects. Participants in the high interpersonal justice (fair) 
condition experienced lower levels of negative emotions (M = 1.68, SD = 1.02) than did 
participants in the low interpersonal justice (unfair) condition (M = 4.32, SD = 1.54), and 
this difference was significant (F = 405.57, p < .001). Likewise, participants in the high 
interpersonal justice condition experienced higher levels of positive emotions (M = 5.15, 
SD = 1.46) than did participants in the low interpersonal justice condition (M = 1.85, SD 
= 1.21), and this difference was also significant (F = 583.12, p < .001). Thus, hypotheses 
1a and 1b are both supported. 
 Before testing the mediating effects of emotions, I first assessed the fit of my 
structural model. My model (seen in Figure 4.1) displayed adequate fit with the data 
(χ2[1,835] = 4,443, p < .001; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .06). I then examined the significance 
of the paths between my mediators and my distal outcomes, a requisite of mediating 
relationships. SEM results suggest that both positive and negative emotions exhibited 
significant relationships with distal outcomes. Negative emotions were negatively 
related to supervisor satisfaction (b = -.49, p < .001), supervisor trust (b = -.51, p < .001), 
supervisor relationship viability (b = -.56, p < .001), and organizational commitment (b 
= -.23, p < .01). Further, negative emotions also displayed a significant positive 
relationship with withdrawal (b = .17, p < .05). Negative emotions did not influence job 
satisfaction (b = .04, ns). Positive emotions also displayed a significant relationship with 
supervisor satisfaction (b = .23, p < .001) and organizational commitment (b = -.18, p < 
.05), although the path to organizational commitment was in the opposite direction of 
what was expected. Further, the paths between positive emotions and supervisor trust (b 
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= .12, p < .10) and withdrawal (b = .15, p < .10) were both approaching significance, 
with the effect on withdrawal in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. 
Positive emotions were unrelated to supervisor relationship viability (b = -.01, ns) and 
job satisfaction (b = .09, ns).   
 At the request of a committee member, I also analyzed the effects of emotions on 
my dependent variables separately for participants in the high interpersonal justice and 
low interpersonal justice conditions. In the high interpersonal justice (fair) condition, 
negative emotions predicted supervisor satisfaction (b = -.67, p < .001), supervisor trust 
(b = -.63, p < .001), supervisor relationship viability (b = -.62, p < .001), withdrawal (b = 
.20, p < .05), and job satisfaction (b = -.20, p < .05). Negative emotions did not predict 
organizational commitment (b = -.14, ns) in the fair condition. Positive emotions in the 
fair condition predicted supervisor satisfaction (b = .34, p < .001), supervisor trust (b = 
.33, p < .001), and supervisor relationship viability (b = .30, p < .001). Positive emotions 
did not predict organizational commitment (b = .01, ns), withdrawal (b = -.02, ns), or job 
satisfaction (b = .09, ns). 
 In the low interpersonal justice (unfair) condition, negative emotions predicted 
supervisor satisfaction (b = -.74, p < .001), supervisor trust (b = -.69, p < .001), 
supervisor relationship viability (b = -.77, p < .001), organizational commitment (b = -
.26, p < .001), withdrawal (b = .21, p < .01), and demonstrated a marginally significant 
relationship with job satisfaction (b = .11, p = .08). Positive emotions in the unfair 
condition predicted supervisor satisfaction (b = .61, p < .001), supervisor trust (b = .48, p 
< .001), and supervisor relationship viability (b = .49, p < .001). Positive emotions were 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Structural Equation Modeling Results for Experimental Data 
 
 
Note: Standardized coefficients provided. Nonsignificant results are dashed.  
n = 390. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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not related to organizational commitment (b = .06, ns), withdrawal (b = .03, ns), job 
satisfaction (b = .03, ns).  
Once I established significant paths from my independent variable (i.e., 
interpersonal justice) to both mediators (i.e., negative emotions and positive emotions), 
and significant paths from these mediators to several distal outcomes, I then examined 
the significance of the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on my outcomes through 
negative and positive emotions. In order to do so, I conducted a test of indirect effects in 
Mplus. Following the recommendation of Preacher and Hayes (2008), I employed a 
bootstrapping procedure that resampled my data 5,000 times and tested the indirect 
effects in each sample.  
 My mediation model fit the data relatively well (χ2[1,847] = 4,656, p < .001; CFI 
= .89, RMSEA = .06). Although the CFI fell slightly below the cutoff of .90, previous 
research suggests that CFI is better suited for smaller samples and for studies with 
exploratory pursuits, whereas RMSEA is the more appropriate fit index for larger 
samples and those used for confirmatory analyses (Rigdon, 1996). My RMSEA suggests 
that my model demonstrates reasonable fit. Results of the mediation analyses can be 
found in Table 4.3. Interpersonal justice displayed significant indirect effects, through 
negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction (b = 1.92, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.49, 2.50]), 
supervisor trust (b = 1.77, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.31, 2.26]), supervisor relationship 
viability (b = 2.04, p < .001, 95% CI = [1.51, 2.67]), organizational commitment (b = 
.73, p < .001, 95% CI = [.37, 1.02]), and withdrawal (b = -.67, p < .01, 95% CI = [-1.13, 
-.29]). Interpersonal justice also demonstrated significant indirect effects, through 
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positive emotions, on supervisor satisfaction (b = 1.05, p < .001, 95% CI = [.53, 1.42]) 
and supervisor trust (b = .68, p < .01, 95% CI = [.32, .99]). The indirect effects of 
interpersonal justice on job satisfaction through negative emotions (b = .14, ns, 95% CI 
= [.00, .35]) and positive emotions (b = .15, ns, 95% CI = [-.07, .32]) both failed to reach 
significance. Furthermore, the indirect effects of interpersonal justice, through positive 
emotions, on supervisor relationship viability (b = .37, ns, 95% CI = [-.17, .71]), 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice, through Negative and 
Positive Emotions, on Distal Outcomes – Experimental Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Note. N = 390. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Outcomes Estimate s.e. 95% C. I.
Negatitive Emotions
Supervisor Satisfaction  1.92*** 0.30 [1.49, 2.50]
Supervisor Trust  1.77*** 0.30 [1.31, 2.26]
Supervisor Relationship 
Viability  2.04*** 0.31 [1.51, 2.67]
Organizational 
Commitment  0.73*** 0.21 [0.37, 1.02]
Withdrawal -0.67* -0.24 [-1.13, -0.29]
Job Satisfaction  0.14 0.15 [-0.09, 0.14]
Positive Emotions
Supervisor Satisfaction  1.05*** 0.26 [0.67, 1.52]
Supervisor Trust  0.68** 0.21 [0.37, 1.07]
Supervisor Relationship 
Viability  0.37 0.25 [-0.01, 0.80]
Organizational 
Commitment -0.24 0.19 [-0.56, 0.05]
Withdrawal  0.27 0.23 [-0.11, 0.66]
Job Satisfaction  0.15 0.13 [-0.06, 0.37]
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organizational commitment (b = -.24, ns, 95% CI = [-.53, .03]), and withdrawal (b = .26, 
ns, 95% CI = [-.13, .62]) also failed to reach significance. Taken together, these results 
suggest that emotions do tend to mediate the effects of interpersonal justice on distal 
outcomes. Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b were both partially supported.  
 Prior to examining my hypothesized moderating effects, I conducted an omnibus 
test for multiple interactions, as recommended by Aguinis (2004). I first assessed the 
incremental variance in negative emotions explained by the addition of all higher order 
constructs. Results suggest that the higher-order constructs explained a significant 
amount of variance beyond that explained by the first-order constructs (controls and 
interpersonal justice manipulation) alone (ΔR2 = .06, p < .001). Similarly, adding the 
higher-order constructs to the model predicting positive emotions also resulted in 
incremental variance explained (ΔR2 = .03, p = .05). According to Aguinis (2004), 
significant omnibus tests, such as these, warrant the examination of each two-way 
interaction separately. I therefore proceeded to test each moderation hypothesis.  
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that the relationships between interpersonal justice 
and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, would be conditioned on the 
subordinate’s personal status, such that the relationships are stronger when status is low 
(vs. high). To test these hypotheses, I used moderated regression analyses to compare the 
relationship at one standard deviation below the mean status level to the same 
relationship at one standard deviation above the mean status level. I included trait 
negative affect, trait positive affect, proximity of the interpersonal justice event, and 
social self-esteem as control variables in the analyses. Prior to analyzing the data, I 
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centered my moderator around the mean to improve interpretability and eliminate 
nonessential multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The same 
procedures were used when examining the potential moderating roles of personal status, 
workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. Results of the moderation 
regression analyses1 (See Table 4.4) suggest that the effect of interpersonal justice on 
negative emotions was not significantly different between low status individuals and 
high status individuals (b = .04, ns). Likewise, as shown in Table 4.5, the relationship 
between interpersonal justice and positive emotions also demonstrated no significant 
difference based on personal status (b = -.02, ns). Hypotheses 3a and 3b, therefore, were 
not supported.  
 In hypotheses 4a and 4b, I predicted that the relationship between interpersonal 
justice and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, would be moderated by 
the status of one’s workgroup, such that the relationship is stronger when status is low 
(vs. high). Results of the moderated regression analysis (See Table 4.6) suggest that the 
influence of interpersonal justice on negative emotions did not differ significantly 
between high-status and low-status workgroups (b = -.10, ns). As demonstrated in Table 
4.7, workgroup status also failed to demonstrate a significant moderating role in the 
relationship between interpersonal justice and positive emotions (b = .00, ns). Thus, 
hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported.  
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b posited that the status of the supervisor moderated the 
                                                             
1 Based on the recommendation of a committee member, I also controlled for objective status, (i.e., 
classification—freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior). The addition of objective status as a control 
variable resulted in no substantive changes for the interactive effects of interpersonal justice and personal 
status on either emotions variable. It was therefore removed from the analysis.  
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TABLE 4.4 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on 
Negative Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.25 0.11 0.16    2.30* 0.22 0.08 0.14      2.90** 0.22 0.08 0.14      2.88**
Positive Affect -0.16 0.10 -0.09 -1.53 -0.17 0.07 -0.10    -2.38* -0.17 0.07 -0.10    -2.37*
Social Self Esteem 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.02    -0.45 -0.03 0.06 -0.02    -0.45
Event Proximity 0.01 0.01 0.08 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.02     0.45 0.00 0.00 0.02     0.47
IPJ -2.69 0.15 -0.71 -18.12*** -2.69 0.15 -0.72 -18.08***
Personal Status 0.02 0.05 0.02     0.48 0.01 0.07 0.01    0.09
IPJ x Personal Status 0.04 0.09 0.02    0.42
F  3.40 168.18 168.35
F change  3.40* 164.77***     0.18
R2  0.04     0.55     0.55
R2 change  0.04     0.50     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.5 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on 
Positive Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.04   0.98 0.08 0.08 0.04   0.99
Positive Affect 0.14 0.12 0.07 1.16 0.15 0.08 0.07   1.87 0.15 0.08 0.07   1.86
Social Self Esteem 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.02   0.54 0.04 0.07 0.02   0.54
Event Proximity -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.93 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.20 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.19
IPJ 3.37 0.16 0.78 21.36*** 3.38 0.16 0.78 21.30***
Personal Status 0.04 0.07 0.03   0.56
IPJ x Personal Status -0.02 0.10 -0.01 -0.23
F 0.57 231.76 231.82
F change 0.57 231.20***     0.05
R2 0.01     0.61     0.61
R2 change 0.01     0.61     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.6 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on 
Negative Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.31 0.10 0.19   3.08** 0.24 0.07 0.15      3.52*** 0.25 0.07 0.16      3.62***
Positive Affect -0.11 0.10 -0.06 -1.15 -0.15 0.07 -0.09    -2.20* -0.15 0.07 -0.09    -2.23*
Social Self Esteem 0.03 0.08 0.03  0.41 0.00 0.06 0.00    -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00     0.01
Event Proximity 0.01 0.00 0.09  1.69† 0.00 0.00 0.02     0.55 0.00 0.00 0.02     0.61
IPJ -2.65 0.14 -0.71 -19.52*** -2.64 0.14 -0.71 -19.41***
WG Status 0.02 0.05 0.02     0.49 0.09 0.07 307.00    1.19
IPJ x WG Status -0.11 0.09 -0.07   -1.15
F 4.44 197.96 199.29
F change 4.44** 193.52***     1.33
R2 0.05     0.55     0.55
R2 change 0.05     0.50     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup. 
              †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.7 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on 
Positive Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.08 0.12 -0.04  -0.70 0.00 0.07 0.00   0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00   0.02
Positive Affect 0.12 0.11 0.06   1.1 0.18 0.07 0.09   2.51* 0.18 0.07 0.09   2.50*
Social Self Esteem -0.04 0.10 -0.30 -0.44 0.01 0.06 0.00   0.10 0.01 0.06 0.00   0.10
Event Proximity -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -1.25 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.26 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.26
IPJ 3.35 0.15 0.78 23.14*** 3.35 0.15 0.78 23.06***
WG Status -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.98 -0.05 0.08 -0.04  -0.65
IPJ x WG Status 0.00 0.10 0.00   0.02
F 0.96 274.27 274.27
F change 0.96 273.32***     0.00
R2 0.01 0.62     0.62
R2 change 0.01 0.61     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup. 
              †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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relationships between interpersonal justice and both negative and positive emotions, 
respectively, such that the relationships are stronger when supervisor status is high than  
when it is low. In military settings, not unlike many traditional workplaces, personnel 
concurrently report to multiple supervisors. When asked to recall a specific interpersonal  
justice event in this study, a large number of participants described events that were 
enacted by supervisors that were different from those for whom they provided status 
ratings on the previous survey. Specifically, of the 390 participants, 146 participants 
recalled an interpersonal justice event enacted by a supervisor for whom no status rating 
was given. The sample for examining the potential moderating influence of supervisor 
status (n = 244) represents only those participants who rated the same supervisor in both 
the first and second surveys. 
Results of the analysis (See Table 4.8) suggest that there was no significant 
difference in the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions (b = 
.15, ns) for people reporting to high-status supervisors versus people reporting to low-
status supervisors. Likewise, the results displayed in Table 4.9 suggest that there was no 
significant interaction between interpersonal justice and supervisor status in predicting 
positive emotions (b = -.00, ns). Hypotheses 5a and 5b, therefore, were not supported.  
 In hypotheses 6a and 6b, I predicted that justice orientation would interact with 
interpersonal justice to influence negative and positive emotions, such that justice 
orientation would strengthen these relationships. Regression results (See Table 4.10) 
suggest that the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is 
conditioned on the individual’s level of justice orientation (b = -.33, p < .05). To further  
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TABLE 4.8 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Supervisor Status on 
Negative Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.33 0.12 0.22 0.29** 0.22 0.08 0.14      2.75** 0.21 0.08 0.14   2.70**
Positive Affect -0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.86 0.00 0.08 0.00    -0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.05
Social Self Esteem 0.14 0.10 0.11 1.45 0.04 0.07 0.03     0.59 0.03 0.07 0.03  0.49
Event Proximity 0.01 0.01 0.09 1.38 0.00 0.00 0.06     1.28 0.00 0.00 0.05  1.26
IPJ -2.42 0.16 -0.66 -15.08*** -3.26 0.59 -0.89 -5.53***
Sup. Status -0.25 0.05 -0.21   -4.59*** -0.32 0.07 -0.27 -4.42***
IPJ x Sup. Status 0.15 0.10 0.26  1.48
F 3.15 148.57 150.76
F change 3.15* 145.41***     2.19
R2 0.05    0.57     0.58
R2 change 0.05    0.52     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 244. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.9 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Supervisor Status on 
Positive Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.14 0.14 -0.08  -0.99 0.00 0.09 0.00     0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00   0.02
Positive Affect 0.15 0.13 0.08   1.15 0.09 0.09 0.04     0.99 0.09 0.09 0.04   0.99
Social Self Esteem -0.13 0.12 -0.08 -1.11 -0.01 0.07 0.00   -0.09 -0.01 0.07 0.00   0.09
Event Proximity 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.51 0.00 0.00 0.01    0.23 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.23
IPJ 3.19 0.18 0.74 17.71*** 3.20 0.67 0.74   4.81***
Sup. Status 0.17 0.06 0.12   2.86** 0.17 0.08 0.13   2.14*
IPJ x Sup. Status 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.01
F 0.89 180.70 180.70
F change 0.89 179.81***     0.00
R2 0.02 0.61     0.61
R2 change 0.02 0.59     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 244. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.10 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on 
Negative Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.35 0.10 0.22   3.50** 0.25 0.07 0.16    3.70*** 0.25 0.07 0.16    3.63***
Positive Affect -0.11 0.10 -0.07 -1.20 -0.17 0.07 -0.10   -2.53* -0.16 0.07 -0.09   -2.39*
Social Self Esteem 0.07 0.08 0.05  0.86 0.04 0.06 0.03    0.60 0.04 0.06 0.03    0.71
Event Proximity 0.01 0.00 0.10  1.82† 0.00 0.00 0.03    0.77 0.00 0.00 0.03    0.94
IPJ -2.58 0.14 -0.70 -18.83*** -2.56 0.14 -0.69 -18.80***
JO 0.17 0.08 0.08    2.12* 0.36 0.12 0.17    3.01**
IPJ x JO -0.33 0.15 -0.12   -2.13*
F 5.18 195.85 199.72
F change 5.18*** 190.01***     4.53*
R2 0.06    0.56     0.56
R2 change 0.06    0.50     0.01
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. JO = Justice Orientation. 
              †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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probe the nature of the interaction, I conducted simple slope analyses for both high and 
low levels of justice orientation. As expected, results of these analyses suggest that the 
relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is stronger for people 
with high justice orientation (b = -2.85, p < .001) than for those with low justice 
orientation (b = -2.27, p < .001). A visual representation of this interaction can be found 
in Figure 4.2. Justice orientation did not interact with interpersonal justice to influence 
positive emotions (b = -.04, ns). Results of the moderated regression analysis can be 
found in Table 4.11. Thus, hypothesis 6a was supported, whereas hypothesis 6b was not.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2  
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation 
on Negative Emotions 
 
Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
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TABLE 4.11 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on 
Positive Emotions – Experimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.11 0.12 -0.06 -0.94 -0.01 0.07 -0.01  -0.13 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.14
Positive Affect 0.13 0.11 0.06  1.11 0.16 0.07 0.08   2.22* 0.16 0.07 0.08 2.23*
Social Self Esteem -0.07 0.10 -0.04 -0.67 0.02 0.06 0.01   0.26 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.27
Event Proximity -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -1.30 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.30
IPJ 3.37 0.15 0.78 22.91*** 3.37 0.15 0.89 22.86***
JO 0.04 0.09 0.02   0.43 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.47
IPJ x JO -0.04 0.17 -0.01 -0.24
F 1.13 268.27 268.33
F change 1.13  267.14***     0.06
R2 0.01      0.62     0.62
R2 change 0.01      0.60     0.00
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 390. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. JO = Justice Orientation. 
         *p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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 Hypotheses 7a through 7h each posited moderated mediation. Specifically, I 
hypothesized that the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on each outcome, through 
both negative and positive emotions, would be conditioned on each of my proposed 
moderators—personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, and justice orientation. 
A significant interaction between interpersonal justice and a proposed moderator is a 
necessary condition for moderated mediation. Because personal status, workgroup 
status, and supervisor status did not interact with interpersonal justice to predict 
emotions, their corresponding hypotheses—7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 7e, 7f, and 7h—were not 
supported. However, because justice orientation interacted with interpersonal justice to 
predict negative emotions, I proceeded to examine the potential that this interaction 
moderates the indirect effect of interpersonal justice, through negative emotions, on my 
hypothesized distal outcomes. My moderated mediation analyses followed the 
procedures outlined by Preacher and colleagues (2007) for stage 1 moderation. These 
procedures employ bootstrapping to examine the hypothesized indirect relationship at 
three levels of the proposed moderator (i.e., the centered mean [.01], one standard 
deviation below the mean [-.88], and one standard deviation above the mean [.90]). As 
shown in Table 4.12, results suggest that the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on 
supervisor satisfaction, through negative emotions, strengthened with increasing levels 
of justice orientation. The relationship was weakest at low levels of justice orientation (b 
= 1.55, p < .001), was stronger at the mean (b = 1.76, p < .001), and was strongest at one 
standard deviation above the mean (b = 1.97, p < .001). These results lend support to the 
hypothesized moderated mediation relationship. A similar pattern emerged when  
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TABLE 4.12 
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on 
Outcome Variables, through Negative Emotions, at Different Levels of Justice 
Orientation – Experimental Data 
Outcome Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot Z Boot p
Conditional indirect effect at 
JO = M, M ± 1 SD
Supervisor 
Satisfaction
-1 SD 1.55 0.19 8.08 0.0000
Mean 1.76 0.18 9.75 0.0000
+1 SD 1.98 0.22 9.11 0.0000
Supervisor Trust
-1 SD 1.44 0.17 8.36 0.0000
Mean 1.65 0.16 10.33 0.0000
+1 SD 1.86 0.19 9.60 0.0000
Supervisor 
Relationship Viability
-1 SD 1.54 0.20 7.87 0.0000
Mean 1.76 0.19 9.34 0.0000
+1 SD 2.00 0.23 8.83 0.0000
Organizational 
Commitment
-1 SD 0.18 0.12 1.46 0.1440
Mean 0.20 0.14 1.47 0.1410
+1 SD 0.23 0.15 1.47 0.1420
Withdrawal
-1 SD -0.26 0.13 -2.06 0.0394
Mean -0.29 0.14 -2.09 0.0370
+1 SD -0.32 0.16 -2.08 0.0378
Job Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.06 0.11 0.52 0.6027
Mean 0.06 0.12 0.52 0.6015
+1 SD 0.07 0.14 0.52 0.6019  
       Note: N = 390. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. JO = Justice Orientation.  
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predicting supervisor trust. The relationship was weakest at one standard deviation 
below the mean (b = 1.44, p < .001), stronger at the mean (b = 1.65, p < .001), and 
strongest at one standard deviation above the mean (b = 1.86, p < .001). The indirect 
relationship between interpersonal justice and supervisor relationship viability, through 
negative emotions, also strengthened with higher levels of justice orientation. The effect 
was weakest at low levels of justice orientation (b = 1.54, p < .001), stronger at the mean  
(b = 1.77, p < .001), and strongest at high levels (b = 2.00, p < .001). The indirect effects 
on withdrawal were also conditioned on justice orientation, with the weakest effects 
found at low levels of justice orientation (b = -.26, p < .05), stronger effects at the mean 
(b = -.29, p < .05), and the strongest effects at high levels of justice orientation (b = -.32, 
p < .001). The indirect effects of interpersonal justice on organizational commitment 
were not significant at any of the three levels of justice orientation: one standard 
deviation below (b = .18, ns), mean (b = .20, ns), and one standard deviation above the 
mean (b = .23, ns). Likewise, the indirect effects of interpersonal justice on job 
satisfaction, through negative emotions, also failed to reach significance: one standard 
deviation below the mean (b = .06, ns), mean (b = .06, ns), and one standard deviation 
above the mean (b = .07, ns). Thus, hypothesis 7g was partially supported.  
4.4 Supplemental Analyses  
 In designing my study, I noted the possibility that asking participants to recall 
events in which their supervisors engaged in particularly high or low levels of 
interpersonal justice would likely result in the recollection of extreme justice events. For 
example, participants in the low interpersonal justice condition likely recalled the most 
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disrespectful exchanges they had with their supervisors, as these events should be the 
most salient in their minds. Similarly, participants in the high interpersonal justice 
condition likely recalled the one situation in which their supervisors treated them with 
the highest level of dignity and respect. It is plausible that these events were extreme  
enough to trigger strong emotional reactions in all participants, regardless of their 
personal status, or the status of their workgroups or supervisors. This universally strong 
reaction to my independent variable (i.e., little variance across groups) would enhance 
the difficulty of detecting significant interactions.  
 This possibility led me to design an alternative method for testing my 
hypotheses. In the alternate design, I did not manipulate interpersonal justice, but rather 
captured interpersonal justice via a non-experimental measure (Colquitt, 2001). The 
items from this scale were the same items used in my manipulation check. However, the 
instructions for this scale differed from those used in the manipulation check. 
Specifically, rather than asking about the interpersonal justice of a single recalled event, 
participants were instructed to complete this scale by thinking about all of the 
interactions they have had with their supervisor from the beginning of their supervisor-
subordinate relationship until the time of the survey. This measure, more so than the 
manipulation, captured a range of interpersonal exchanges, each likely varying in their 
levels of fairness. It was my hope that this would provide more potential for variance 
across the conditions created by my status moderators. The alpha coefficient of 
reliability for this scale was .95. 
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 In addition to broadening the interpersonal justice measure, I also altered the 
instructions for reporting emotions. Rather than asking participants to report the 
emotions resulting from one particular incident, I instead requested that they report the 
extent to which they experienced each emotion in reaction to the interpersonal treatment 
they have received from their supervisor since the beginning of the supervisor-
subordinate relationship. This method was based on the work of Barclay and Kiefer 
(2012), who broadly asked participants to rate the extent to which they experienced 
“emotions with respect to [their] job/work over the last six months”. I modified these 
instructions slightly to focus the participants’ attention toward the interpersonal 
exchanges they have had with their supervisors. Finally, in the supplemental analyses, 
whereas interpersonal justice and emotions were both measured at Time 2, the outcome 
variables were measured at Time 3 (approximately one week later), thereby reducing the 
likelihood of common method bias. I used the same moderator variables (collected at 
Time 1) that were used in my previous analyses. See Appendix C for the Time 3 survey. 
After adding the 37 individuals from the experimental design who were unable to 
recall an interpersonal justice event, the new sample consisted of 427 participants. 
Means, standard deviations, reliabilities and correlations of the study variables can be 
found in Table 4.13. Interpersonal justice was significantly related to both negative 
emotions (r = -.70, p < .01) and positive emotions (r = .66, p < .01) in the hypothesized 
directions. Interpersonal justice was also positively and significantly related to the distal 
outcomes of supervisor satisfaction (r = .71, p < .01), supervisor relationship viability (r 
= .67, p < .01), organizational commitment (r = .23, p < .01), withdrawal (r = -.15, p < 
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TABLE 4.13 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study Variables – Nonexperimental Data 
  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Trait Negative Affect 3.28 1.16 (.86)
2. Trait Positive Affect 5.28 1.04 -.24** (.91)
3. Social Self Esteem 4.21 1.35 -.51**  .08 (.87)
4. Interpersonal Justice 5.62 1.60 -.21**  .19**  .07 (.95)
5. Negative Emotions 2.59 1.41  .35** -.14** -.16** -.70** (.89)
6. Positive Emotions 4.40 1.52 -.15**  .19**  .07  .66** -.55** (.94)
7. Supervisor Satisfaction 5.06 1.50 -.15**  .17**  .06  .71** -.63**  .64** (.94)
8. Supervisor Relationship 
Viability 5.46 1.51 -.13**  .18**  .02  .67** -.59**  .60**  .87** (.96)
9. Organizational 
Commitment 5.39 1.42 -.16**  .52**  .01  .23** -.19**  .19**  .27**  .31** (.94)
10. Withdrawal 2.88 1.29  .20** -.26** -.08 -.15**  .14**  .13* -.17** -.22** -.52** (.76)
11. Job Satisfaction 4.80 1.16 -.37**  .34**  .24**  .29** -.34**  .36**  .30**  .28**  .40** -.35** (.94)
12. Personal Status 4.70 1.65 -.36**  .25**  .31**  .31** -.28**  .30  .20**  .18**  .16** -.23**  .54** (.97)
13. Workgroup Status 5.12 1.47 -.05  .25**  .04  .10 -.04  .09  .18**  .18**  .17** -.06  .07 -.10 (.95)
14. Supervisor Status 5.24 1.50 -.08  .11*  .01  .46** -.40**  .53**  .58**  .60**  .09 -.02  .13*  .16**  .18** (.96)
15. Justice Orientation 4.80 0.90  .16**  .14** -.25** -.07  .11* -.01 -.01 -.06  .01  .12*  .01 -.11*  .06 -.02 (.88)  
  Note. n = 390. Reliability coefficients are reported along the diagonal. Event proximity was reported in number of weeks.  
          * p < .05, ** p < .01.  
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.01), and job satisfaction (r = .29, p < .01). Negative emotions correlated with each 
distal outcome as follows: supervisor satisfaction (r = -.63, p < .01), supervisor 
relationship viability (r = -.59, p < .01), organizational commitment (r = -.19, p < .01), 
withdrawal (r = .14, p < .01), and job satisfaction (r = -.34, p < .01). Finally, positive 
emotions also demonstrated significant relationships with each outcome as follows: 
supervisor satisfaction (r = .64, p < .01), supervisor relationship viability (r = .60, p < 
.01), organizational commitment (r = .19, p < .01), withdrawal (r = -.13, p < .01), and 
job satisfaction (r = .36, p < .01).  
 Before testing my hypotheses, I first examined the factor structure of my model. 
Results of my CFA suggested that one of my outcome variables—supervisor trust—was 
too highly correlated with the other two supervisor-directed attitudes—supervisor 
satisfaction and supervisor relationship viability. I therefore removed supervisor trust 
from my model, which resulted in twelve latent factors (interpersonal justice, negative 
emotions, positive emotions, personal status, workgroup status, supervisor status, justice 
orientation, supervisor satisfaction, supervisor relationship viability, organizational 
commitment, withdrawal, job satisfaction). The Chi-squared statistic for the model was 
8,861 (df = 3,173). The CFI (.81) for my model was lower than what is generally 
considered good fit (< .90; Mathieu et al., 2006; Medsker et al., 1994). Yet, the RMSEA 
(.065), a more appropriate gauge of fit for large-sample, confirmatory models (Rigdon, 
1996), suggests that my factor structure demonstrated reasonable fit with the data. 
Furthermore, the fit of my factor structure was superior to that of several alternative 
models (See Table 4.14).  
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TABLE 4.14 
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses – Nonexperimental Data 
Model χ2 df Δχ2 Δdf CFI RMSEA
Twelve factors: 
Hypothesized model 
(excluding supervisor 
trust) 8861 3173 - - 0.81 0.065
Eleven factors: 
Supervisor satisfaction 
and supervisor 
relationship viability 
combined 9720 3184 859* 11 0.78 0.069
Eleven factors: Personal 
status and job 
satisfaction combined 32933 3321 24072* 148 0.66 0.086
Eleven factors: 
Organizational 
commitment and 
withdrawal combined 11582 3203 2721 30 0.72 0.078
Eleven factors: Personal 
and workgroup status 
combined 10698 3184 1837* 11 0.75 0.074
Ten factors: 
Interpersonal justice, 
negative emotions, 
positive emotions 
combined 11519 3194 2658* 21 0.72 0.078
Ten factors: Personal 
status, workgroup status, 
supervisor status 
combined 12381 3194 3520* 21 0.69 0.082
Nine factors: All status 
variables combined and 
both supervisor-related 
variables combined 13237 3203 4376* 30 0.66 0.086  
Note: CFI = Confirmatory Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of        
         Approximation. * p < .001. 
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FIGURE 4.3 
 Structural Equation Modeling Results for Nonexperimental Data 
 
Note: Standardized coefficients provided. Nonsignificant results are dashed. 
           n = 427. ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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 My structural model also fit the data reasonably well (χ2[1,975] = 5,031.03, p < 
.001, CFI = .89; RMSEA = .06). SEM results (See Figure 4.3) suggest that interpersonal 
justice had a significant negative relationship with negative emotions (b = -.72, p <  
.001), and a significant positive relationship with positive emotions (b = .68, p < .001). 
Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.  
 Negative emotions subsequently related negatively to supervisor satisfaction (b = 
-.21, p < .001), supervisor relationship viability (b = -.28, p < .001), and job satisfaction 
(b = -.23, p < .01). Negative emotions were not related to organizational commitment (b 
= -.01, ns) or withdrawal (b = -.02, ns). Likewise, positive emotions were positively 
linked to supervisor satisfaction (b = .32, p < .001), supervisor relationship viability (b = 
.21, p < .001), and job satisfaction (b = .28, p < .001). Positive emotions also did not 
relate significantly to organizational commitment (b = .05, ns) or withdrawal (b = -.02, 
ns). 
 I next set out to examine the significance of the indirect effects of interpersonal 
justice, through emotions, on supervisor satisfaction, supervisor relationship viability, 
and job satisfaction. To do so, I once again employed the procedures recommended by 
Preacher and Hayes (2008), with 5,000 iterations of bootstrapping. Results of these 
analyses can be found in Table 4.15. My mediation model fit the data reasonably well  
 (χ2[1,451] = 3,867.09, p < .001; CFI = .89; RMSEA = .06). Results of the mediation 
analysis suggest that interpersonal justice has a significant indirect effect, through 
negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction (b = .14, p < .01, CI = [.08, .25]), 
supervisor relationship viability (b = .19, p < .001, CI = [.09, .26]), and job satisfaction 
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(b = .10, p < .01, CI = [.03, .16]). Interpersonal justice also displayed significant indirect 
effects through positive emotions on supervisor satisfaction (b = .20, p < .001, CI = [.12, 
.27]), supervisor relationship viability (b = .14, p < .01, CI = [.08, .23]), and job 
satisfaction (b = .11, p < .001, CI = [.05, .15]). Because neither negative emotions nor 
positive emotions were significantly related to organizational commitment and  
 
 
 
TABLE 4.15 
Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice, through Negative and 
Positive Emotions, on Distal Outcomes – Nonexperimental Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Note. N = 427. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Outcomes Estimate s.e. 95% C. I.
Negatitive Emotions
Supervisor Satisfaction 0.14** 0.05 [0.08, 0.25]
Supervisor Relationship 
Viability 0.19*** 0.05 [0.09, 0.26]
Organizational 
Commitment 0.01 0.05 [-0.08, 0.07]
Withdrawal 0.02 0.05 [-0.07, 0.10]
Job Satisfaction 0.10** 0.04 [0.03, 0.16]
Positive Emotions
Supervisor Satisfaction  0.20** 0.04 [0.12, 0.27]
Supervisor Relationship 
Viability  0.14** 0.04 [0.08, 0.23]
Organizational 
Commitment  0.03 0.04 [-0.03, 0.11]
Withdrawal -0.01 0.05 [-0.08, 0.08]
Job Satisfaction  0.11*** 0.03 [0.03, 0.16]
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withdrawal, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on these outcomes did not meet 
the necessary prerequisites for significant mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Thus, 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b were partially supported.   
 Again, in accordance with the recommendations of Aguinis (2004), I conducted 
an omnibus test of my two-way interactions. Moving from first-order effects to higher-
order effects in my model resulted in a significant level of incremental variance  
explained for both negative emotions (ΔR2 = .02, p < .05) and for positive emotions (ΔR2 
= .10, p < .001). Thus, I proceeded to independently test the significance of each two-
way interaction.  
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b posited that the relationships between interpersonal justice 
and both negative and positive emotions, respectively, are conditioned on the 
subordinate’s personal status. I again tested these hypotheses using moderated regression 
analyses, controlling for trait positive affect, trait negative affect, and social self-esteem. 
Results, shown in Table 4.16, suggest that a significant interaction does indeed exist 
between interpersonal justice and personal status when predicting negative emotions (b = 
-.04, p < .05). Contrary to expectations, results of the simple slope analyses suggest that 
the relationship between interpersonal justice and negative emotions was stronger when 
personal status was high (b = -.68, p < .001) than when personal status was low (b = -
.54, p < .001). Figure 4.4 illustrates the interaction. As demonstrated in Table 4.17, 
interpersonal justice also interacted with personal status to predict positive emotions (b = 
.05, p < .05). A visual representation of this interaction can be found in Figure 4.5. 
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TABLE 4.16 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on 
Negative Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.37 0.07 0.31    5.09*** 0.24 0.06 0.20    4.38*** 0.23 0.06 0.20    4.26***
Positive Affect -0.11 0.07 -0.08   -1.55 0.04 0.05 0.03    0.80 0.04 0.05 0.03    0.79
Social Self Esteem 0.00 0.06 0.00    0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.02   -0.44 -0.02 0.05 -0.02   -0.49
IPJ -0.59 0.04 -0.67 -16.78*** -0.61 0.04 -0.69 -16.99***
Personal Status 0.02 0.04 0.02    0.44 0.00 0.04 0.01    0.11
IPJ x Personal Status -0.04 0.02 -0.08   -2.15*
F 15.06 163.78 168.39
F change 15.06*** 148.72***     4.62*
R2 0.12    0.53     0.54
R2 change 0.12     0.41     0.01
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
         *p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.17 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal Status on 
Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.17 0.08 -0.13 -2.09* 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00   0.09
Positive Affect 0.21 0.08 0.14  2.61** 0.03 0.06 0.02   0.40 0.03 0.06 0.02   0.42
Social Self Esteem -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.27 -0.02 0.05 -0.02  -0.43 -0.02 0.05 -0.02  -0.38
IPJ 0.59 0.04 0.62 14.22*** 0.60 0.04 0.64 14.54***
Personal Status 0.10 0.04 0.11   2.28* 0.12 0.04 0.12   2.64**
IPJ x Personal Status 0.05 0.02 0.10   2.48*
F 5.44 125.37 131.50
F change 5.44** 119.93***    6.13*
R2 0.05    0.44    0.45
R2 change 0.05    0.45    0.01
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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FIGURE 4.4 
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal  
Status on Negative Emotions 
 
Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
FIGURE 4.5 
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Personal  
Status on Positive Emotions 
 
Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
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TABLE 4.18 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on 
Negative Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.40 0.07 0.33  5.81*** 0.26 0.05 0.21    5.11*** 0.26 0.05 0.21   5.10***
Positive Affect -0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.89 0.06 0.05 0.04    1.17 0.06 0.05 0.04   1.17
Social Self Esteem 0.02 0.06 0.02  0.43 -0.01 0.04 -0.01   -0.22 -0.01 0.04 -0.01  -0.24
IPJ -0.60 0.03 -0.67 -18.89*** -0.60 0.03 -0.67 18.68***
WG Status 0.03 0.03 0.03    0.87 0.03 0.03 0.03   0.87
IPJ x WG Status 0.00 0.02 0.07   0.21
F 16.06 194.60 194.64
F change 16.06 178.54    0.05
R2  0.11    0.53    0.53
R2 change  0.11    0.42    0.00
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup. 
         *p < .05, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.19 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Workgroup Status on 
Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.15 0.08 -0.11  -1.96† -0.01 0.06 0.00  -0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00  -0.02
Positive Affect 0.22 0.07 0.15   3.03** 0.08 0.06 0.06   1.37 0.08 0.06 0.06   1.40
Social Self Esteem -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.52 0.00 0.05 0.00  -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.01  -0.18
IPJ 0.62 0.04 0.65 16.75*** 0.63 0.04 0.66 16.83***
WG Status 0.03 0.04 0.03   0.77 0.03 0.04 0.03   0.78
IPJ x WG Status 0.04 0.02 0.06   1.54
F 5.81 147.69 150.06
F change 5.81*** 141.87***    2.37
R2 0.04    0.44    0.45
R2 change 0.04    0.40    0.00
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. WG = Workgroup. 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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Again, the relationship was stronger when personal status was high (b = .70, p < .001) 
than when personal status was low (b = .52, p < .001).  
 Hypotheses 4a and 4b posited that the relationship between interpersonal justice 
and emotions would be stronger for individuals in low-status workgroups than those in 
high-status workgroups. Moderated regression results suggest that workgroup status 
does not interact with interpersonal justice in predicting either negative emotions (b = 
.00, ns; Table 4.18) or positive emotions (b = .04, ns, Table 4.19). Thus, no support was 
found for hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that supervisor status would interact with 
interpersonal justice to predict emotions. Results of the moderated regression analysis 
(See Table 4.20) suggest that no significant interaction exists between interpersonal 
justice and supervisor status when predicting negative emotions (b = .02, ns). However, 
an interactive effect between interpersonal justice and supervisor status did emerge when 
predicting positive emotions (b = .05, p < .05; Table 4.21). I plotted the interaction in 
Figure 4.6. Simple slope analyses suggest that the relationship between interpersonal 
justice and positive emotions is significant for both levels of supervisor status. 
Consistent with expectations, the relationship is stronger for those reporting to high-
status supervisors (b = .57, p < .001) than those reporting to low-status supervisors (b = 
.42, p < .001). Hypothesis 5a was therefore not supported, whereas Hypothesis 5b was.  
 Hypotheses 6a and 6b posited that justice orientation would also moderate the 
interpersonal justice-emotions relationships. Moderated regression results (See Tables 
4.22 and 4.23) suggest that justice orientation did not interact with interpersonal justice  
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TABLE 4.20 
Moderated regression analysis examining the interactive effect of interpersonal justice and supervisor status on 
negative emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.45 0.07 0.37  6.00*** 0.27 0.05 0.23    5.07*** 0.27 0.05 0.23    5.08***
Positive Affect -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.69 0.08 0.05 0.06    1.59 0.08 0.05 0.06    1.54
Social Self Esteem 0.02 0.06 0.02  0.39 -0.01 0.04 -0.01   -0.32 -0.02 0.04 -0.02   -0.43
IPJ -0.55 0.04 -0.61 -14.14*** -0.53 0.04 -0.60 -12.78***
Sup Status -0.11 0.04 -0.12   -2.81** -0.10 0.04 -0.11   -2.46*
IPJ x Sup Status 0.02 0.02 0.05    1.11
F 17.49 176.68 177.91
F change 17.49*** 159.19***    1.23
R2   0.14    0.57    0.57
R2 change   0.14    0.43    0.00
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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Table 4.21 
Moderated regression analysis examining the interactive effect of interpersonal justice and supervisor status on positive 
emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.21 0.08 -0.16 -2.47* -0.04 0.06 -0.03   -0.65 -0.04 0.06 -0.03  -0.63
Positive Affect 0.17 0.08 0.12  2.11* 0.03 0.06 0.02   0.49 0.02 0.06 0.02   0.40
Social Self Esteem -0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.42 0.01 0.05 0.01   0.20 0.00 0.05 0.00  -0.03
IPJ 0.46 0.04 0.48 10.31*** 0.50 0.05 0.52 10.49***
Sup Status 0.31 0.05 0.31   6.88*** 0.34 0.05 0.34   7.26***
IPJ x Sup Status 0.05 0.02 0.11   2.25*
F 5.28 148.87 153.93
F change 5.28** 143.59***    5.06*
R2 0.05    0.50    0.50
R2 change 0.05    0.45    0.01
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. Sup = Supervisor. 
         *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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FIGURE 4.6 
Plot of Two-way Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Supervisor  
Status on Positive Emotions 
 
Note: IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. 
 
 
 
to predict either negative emotions (b = -.03, ns) or positive emotions (b = .02, ns). Thus, 
Hypotheses 6a and 6b were not supported.  
 I once again employed the procedures of Preacher and colleagues (2007) to test 
my moderated mediation hypotheses. As demonstrated in Table 4.24, the indirect effect 
of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through negative emotions, was 
weakest at low levels of personal status (b = .19, p < .001), stronger at the mean level of 
personal status (b = .22, p < .001), and strongest at high levels of personal status (b = 
.25, p < .001). The indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor relationship 
viability was also weakest for low-status individuals (b = .18, p < .001), stronger for 
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TABLE 4.22 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on 
Negative Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect 0.39 0.07 0.32  5.66*** 0.26 0.05 0.22     5.04*** 0.25 0.05 0.21    4.97***
Positive Affect -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.62 0.07 0.05 0.06     1.47 0.07 0.05 0.05    1.41
Social Self Esteem 0.01 0.06 0.01  0.18 -0.01 0.04 -0.01   -0.32 -0.02 0.04 -0.02   -0.39
IPJ -0.60 0.03 -0.66 -18.21*** -0.58 0.03 -0.65 -17.63***
JO 0.02 0.06 0.01    0.33 0.02 0.06 0.01    0.29
IPJ x JO -0.03 0.03 0.04   -1.05
F 15.65 183.17 184.28
F change 15.65*** 167.52***    1.11
R2   0.11    0.52    0.52
R2 change   0.11    0.41    0.00
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. JO = Justice Orientation. 
         ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.23 
Moderated Regression Analysis Examining the Interactive Effect of Interpersonal Justice and Justice Orientation on 
Positive Emotions – Nonexperimental Data 
Variable b SE β t b SE β t b SE β t
Negative Affect -0.13 0.08 -0.10 -1.64 0.01 0.06 0.00   0.09 0.01 0.06 0.01   0.12
Positive Affect 0.21 0.07 0.15  2.90** 0.08 0.06 0.05   1.30 0.08 0.06 0.05   1.33
Social Self Esteem 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03   0.72 0.04 0.05 0.03   0.75
IPJ 0.63 0.04 0.65 16.59*** 0.63 0.04 0.65 16.14***
JO 0.09 0.07 0.05   1.30 0.09 0.07 0.05   1.31
IPJ x JO 0.02 0.04 0.02   0.47
F 5.15 142.77*** 142.99
F change 5.15** 137.63    0.22
R2 0.04 0.44    0.44
R2 change 0.04 0.40    0.00
Step 2 Step 3Step 1
Note. N = 427. IPJ = Interpersonal Justice. JO = Justice Orientation. 
         **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4.24 
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on 
Outcome Variables, through Negative Emotions, at Different Levels of Personal 
Status – Nonexperimental Data 
Outcome Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot Z Boot p
Conditional indirect effect at 
Pers. Status = M, M ± 1 SD
Supervisor 
Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.19 0.04 5.12 0.0000
Mean 0.22 0.04 5.31 0.0000
+1 SD 0.25 0.05 5.14 0.0000
Supervisor 
Relationship Viability
-1 SD 0.18 0.04 4.69 0.0000
Mean 0.21 0.04 4.83 0.0000
+1 SD 0.24 0.05 4.71 0.0000
Organizational 
Commitment
-1 SD 0.03 0.04 0.60 0.5460
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.60 0.5454
+1 SD 0.03 0.05 0.60 0.5460
Withdrawal
-1 SD 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.9579
Mean 0.00 0.05 -0.05 0.9579
+1 SD 0.00 6.00 -0.05 0.9579
Job Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.08 0.03 2.31 0.0206
Mean 0.09 0.04 2.33 0.0196
+1 SD 0.10 0.04 2.32 0.0205  
     Note: N = 427. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. Pers. = Personal.  
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TABLE 4.25 
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on 
Outcome Variables, through Positive Emotions, at Different Levels of Personal 
Status – Nonexperimental Data 
Outcome Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot Z Boot p
Conditional indirect effect at 
Pers. Status = M, M ± 1 SD
Supervisor 
Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.17 0.03 5.59 0.0000
Mean 0.21 0.03 6.11 0.0000
+1 SD 0.24 0.04 5.76 0.0000
Supervisor 
Relationship Viability
-1 SD 0.16 0.03 5.04 0.0000
Mean 0.19 0.03 5.42 0.0000
+1 SD 0.22 0.04 5.18 0.0000
Organizational 
Commitment
-1 SD 0.02 0.03 0.70 0.4864
Mean 0.03 0.04 0.70 0.4848
+1 SD 0.03 0.04 0.70 0.4860
Withdrawal
-1 SD 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.9523
Mean 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.9522
+1 SD 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.9522
Job Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.07 0.02 2.88 0.0040
Mean 0.09 0.03 2.96 0.0031
+1 SD 0.10 0.03 2.92 0.0035  
Note: N = 427. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. Pers. = Personal.  
 
 
 
= .23, p < .001). A similar pattern was displayed for the indirect effect of interpersonal 
justice on job satisfaction, although these relationships were only marginally significant. 
The weakest effects were found in individuals with low-status (b = .022, p < .10), 
 134 
 
stronger effects were found in individuals with status at the mean level (b = .025, p < 
.10), and the strongest effects were found at in high-status individuals (b = .028, p < .10).  
The indirect effect of interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through positive 
emotions, also followed a similar pattern (See Table 4.25), with the weakest effects 
found in low-status individuals (b = .17, p < .001), stronger effects at the mean-level of 
status (b = .21, p < .001), and the strongest effects found in high-status individuals (b = 
24, p < .001). The indirect effect on supervisor relationship viability was also weakest 
for low-status individuals (b = .16, p < .001), stronger for moderate-status individuals (b 
= .19, p < .001), and strongest for high-status individuals (b = .22, p < .001). Likewise, 
the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction, through positive emotions, 
was weakest at low status levels (b = .026, p < .01), stronger at the mean level of status 
(b = .032, p < .01), and strongest at high levels of status (b = .038, p < .01).  
 Supervisor status also played a moderating role on the indirect effects of 
interpersonal justice through positive emotions. Results of the moderated mediation 
analyses can be found in Table 4.26. As expected, the relationships were stronger when 
the supervisors had high status than when their status was low. The indirect effect of 
interpersonal justice on supervisor satisfaction, through positive emotions, was weakest 
for individuals reporting to supervisors with average status (b = .13, p < .001), and 
strongest for individuals reporting to high-status supervisors (b = .15, p < .001). 
Similarly, the indirect effect on supervisor relationship viability was weakest when the 
supervisor had low status (b = .07, p < .01), stronger when the supervisor had moderate 
status (b = .09, p < .01), and strongest when the supervisor had high status (b = .11, p < 
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.01). Likewise, the indirect effect of interpersonal justice on job satisfaction was weakest 
at low status levels (b = .028, p < .01), stronger at the mean status level (b = .033, p < 
.01), and strongest at high status levels (b = .039, p < .01).  
 Because no significant interactions emerged between interpersonal justice and 
supervisor satisfaction when predicting negative emotions, the necessary prerequisites 
for moderated mediation were not met. Likewise this prerequisite was also not met for 
the moderating roles of either workgroup status or justice orientation on either of the 
interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships.  
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TABLE 4.26 
Regression Results for Conditional Indirect Effects of Interpersonal Justice on 
Outcome Variables, through Positive Emotions, at Different Levels of Supervisor 
Status – Nonexperimental Data 
Outcome Boot indirect effect Boot SE Boot Z Boot p
Conditional indirect effect at 
Sup. Status = M, M ± 1 SD
Supervisor 
Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.11 0.03 4.17 0.0000
Mean 0.13 0.03 1.41 0.0000
+1 SD 0.15 0.04 4.22 0.0000
Supervisor 
Relationship Viability
-1 SD 0.07 0.02 3.16 0.0016
Mean 0.09 0.03 3.27 0.0011
+1 SD 0.11 0.03 3.19 0.0014
Organizational 
Commitment
-1 SD 0.03 0.03 1.05 0.2944
Mean 0.03 0.03 1.06 0.2910
+1 SD 0.04 0.04 1.05 0.2933
Withdrawal
-1 SD -0.02 0.03 -0.63 0.5294
Mean -0.02 0.03 -0.63 0.5276
+1 SD -0.03 0.04 -0.63 0.5289
Job Satisfaction
-1 SD 0.08 0.02 3.19 0.0014
Mean 0.09 0.03 3.30 0.0010
+1 SD 0.11 0.03 3.20 0.0014  
Note: N = 427. Bootstrap sample size = 5,000. Sup. = Supervisor.  
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
 In the preceding chapters, I proposed and empirically examined a model of 
interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and justice orientation. In the present chapter, I 
highlight the key contributions of this research. I begin with a general discussion of my 
findings, noting the emergence of both significant and non-significant relationships. 
Second, I offer several implications with regard to both theory and practice, along with 
potential directions for future scholars to extend the present work. I then point to a 
number of limitations in the methods used to test my theoretical model, and I conclude 
with general comments. 
5.2 General Discussion 
 People place a great deal of value on the dignity and respect they receive from 
their supervisors. Fair interpersonal treatment is considered one of the most fundamental 
human rights (Folger & Bies, 1989; Miller, 2001; Rawls, 1971). It is not surprising, then, 
that interpersonal justice influences a number of critical workplace outcomes such as 
supervisor evaluations (Kernan & Hanges, 2002; Liao & Rupp, 2005), job satisfaction 
(Masterson et al., 2000), performance (Cropanzano et al., 2002) and absenteeism 
(Gellatly, 1995). Interpersonal justice has also been shown to have affective power, 
influencing a number of negative emotions in employees (Judge et al., 2006; Stecher & 
Rosse, 2005). In fact, scholars have claimed that interpersonal justice may be the most 
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emotion evoking of all the dimensions of justice (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Harlos & 
Pinder, 1999, 2000). 
 Previous research investigating the influence of interpersonal justice on emotions 
has been informative. Yet, this research has, to this point, focused exclusively on 
negative emotional reactions to a supervisor’s interpersonal treatment. It has yet to 
uncover the potential positive affective reactions that may be triggered. Furthermore, this 
research has generally assumed a common relationship between interpersonal justice and 
emotions across all employees (for one exception using trait hostility as a moderator, see 
Judge et al., 2006). Scholars have yet to theorize potential differences in the strength of 
these relationships across groups of employees varying in status and justice orientation. 
The present work attempts to fill these voids, thereby enhancing our understanding of 
the nuances of interpersonal justice. 
 This study aims to develop theory for (1) why interpersonal justice may influence 
both negative and positive emotions, (2) why both negative and positive emotions serve 
as explanatory mediating mechanisms linking interpersonal justice to important distal 
outcomes, and (3) why the strength of the relationships between interpersonal justice and 
emotions may vary across groups of employees. To do so, I hypothesized that emotions 
(both positive and negative) explained the effects of interpersonal justice on supervisor 
satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational 
commitment, withdrawal, and job satisfaction. I also identified four potential stage 1 
moderators. Specifically, I proposed that personal status, workgroup status, supervisor 
status, and justice orientation would all condition the effects of interpersonal justice on 
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emotions. I then tested my model using a university-based military sample in which both 
interpersonal treatment and status are highly salient. 
 The combination of original (i.e., using experimental data) and supplemental 
(i.e., using non-experimental data) analyses resulted in several interesting findings. First, 
both sets of analyses demonstrated strong effects of interpersonal justice on both 
negative and positive emotions. Participants experienced strong emotional reactions both 
to a single critical incident of interpersonal justice and to a broader judgment of their 
supervisors’ interpersonal justice across time. Second, in both sets of analyses, positive 
and negative emotions mediated effects of interpersonal justice on a number of distal 
outcomes. Specifically, evidence emerged for the significant indirect effects of 
interpersonal justice, through negative emotions, on supervisor satisfaction, supervisor 
trust, supervisor relationship viability, organizational commitment, withdrawal, and job 
satisfaction. Significant indirect effects also occurred from interpersonal justice, through 
positive emotions, to supervisor satisfaction, supervisor trust, supervisor relationship 
viability, and job satisfaction. It therefore appears that interpersonal justice influences 
distal attitudes toward the supervisor, the organization, and the job by first triggering 
both negative and positive proximal emotions, which subsequently impact such 
outcomes.  
 Finally, results also lend support for the notion that, when predicting emotions, 
interpersonal justice significantly interacts with three of the four hypothesized 
moderators. Specifically, results from the original analyses suggest that the relationship 
between interpersonal justice and negative emotions is conditioned by justice orientation 
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in such a way that justice orientation strengthens the negative effect. Although none of 
the status variables demonstrated significant interactive effects in the original analyses, 
both personal and supervisor status moderated the effects on both positive and negative 
emotions in the supplemental analyses. Personal status moderated the effects on both 
positive and negative emotions, and supervisor status moderated the effect on positive 
emotions. The nature of the interactions suggests that both status moderators 
strengthened the effects of interpersonal justice. Participants therefore experienced 
stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal treatment with increases in personal status, 
supervisor status, and justice orientation.  
 As previously noted, it is believed that the overall lack of significant moderation 
in the original analyses was due to the extreme nature of the recalled critical incidents. 
When asked to think about one single interpersonal event, those in the unfair condition 
likely recalled the one situation in which their supervisors treated them with the lowest 
levels of dignity and respect, as these events should be the most salient. Conversely, 
those in the fair condition likely recalled the one incident in which their supervisors 
treated them with the highest levels of dignity and respect. This view is supported by the 
large difference in manipulation check ratings between the unfair (M = 3.03) and fair (M 
= 6.54) conditions. If my logic is correct, then the extremity of the recalled events was 
sufficient to influence strong emotional reactions for all participants, regardless of status, 
thereby making it difficult to detect moderating effects.  
 Workgroup status did not moderate the effects of interpersonal justice on either 
negative or positive emotions. Despite research in both the group identification (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1986) and group value model (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, et al., 1996; Tyler & 
Lind, 1992) literatures noting that people identify with their groups to the extent that 
these groups become a part of their self-concepts, perhaps participants did not internalize 
their outfit’s status to a great enough extent to sufficiently influence emotional reactions 
to interpersonal justice. Or, at the very least, perhaps this internalization was not as 
strong as that of their perceived personal status, making it comparatively more difficult 
to detect moderation. It is also possible that the outfits were too large (n ~ 60) to truly 
identify with all the other members and the group as a whole. For example, group size 
has been shown to have a significant influence on group cohesion, with smaller groups 
reporting more cohesiveness than large groups (Carron & Spink, 1995; Widmeyer, 
Brawley, & Carron, 1990). If this is the case, it is quite possible that a lower-level 
grouping (e.g., platoon, team) may be more appropriate to test the moderating effects of 
group status on the interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships. 
 Taken together, my results suggest that interpersonal justice triggers emotional 
responses (both negative and positive), that these emotions subsequently influence 
important attitudes directed at the supervisor, the organization, and the job, and that the 
effects of interpersonal justice on emotions are conditioned by personal status, 
supervisor status, and justice orientation. I now highlight a number of theoretical 
implications of these findings and offer potential avenues for scholars to extend these 
findings in future research. 
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5.3 Theoretical Implications 
 In this dissertation, I contribute theoretically to the management literature in 
three primary ways. First, the primary contribution of the present work is the extension 
of organizational justice theory. Cohen-Charash and Byrne (2008) recently noted the 
need for further investigation into the role emotions play in the experience of 
interpersonal justice. Although research has linked interpersonal justice to a small 
number of negative emotions (Judge et al., 2006; Turillo et al., 2002), a relationship 
between interpersonal justice and positive emotions has yet to emerge in the literature. 
This paucity of research on positive emotions in the organizational justice literature, and 
interpersonal justice literature in particular, reflects the broader study of emotions across 
all fields, which has largely been dominated by the examination of negative emotions 
(Fredrickson, 2004). Of course, this is not overly surprising, as psychologists have 
traditionally been more fascinated by the study of psychological problems and their 
associated dangers to society than with the study of positive attributes (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The study of interpersonal justice has been no different. 
Scholars have argued that we have more to gain by examining unfair treatment than fair 
treatment (Bies, 2001). Indeed, low justice marks a violation of a generally accepted 
standard and therefore is more likely to trigger a response than high justice, which 
merely marks the presence of a met expectation (Cahn, 1949). Support for this notion 
can be found in a study by Miner, Glomb, and Hulin (2005). Although, they measured 
mood rather than emotions, these authors found that the impact of negative events on 
employee affect was five times stronger than the impact of positive events.  
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 Yet, despite the reasoning that negative effects of fairness judgments may be 
more compelling, the examination of positive emotions may also prove beneficial to 
justice researchers. Indeed, positive affect has been linked to a wide variety of desirable 
outcomes including: creativity (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), job performance 
(Staw et al., 1994), job satisfaction (Fisher, 2000), and both psychological and physical 
well-being (Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004) to name a few. Thus, the benefits of 
identifying additional antecedents to positive affect are far-reaching. Furthermore, recent 
justice scholars have called for the simultaneous examination of both negative and 
positive reactions to fairness judgments, as doing so may help detect differential effects 
of such emotions on distal outcomes (Barclay & Kiefer, 2012). Results of the present 
study suggest that, in addition to influencing negative emotions, interpersonal justice 
also triggers positive emotions in a strong way. Further, both positive and negative 
emotions served mediating roles in relationships between interpersonal justice and a 
number of important distal outcomes. Thus, in addition to identifying interpersonal 
justice as an antecedent to positive affect in the workplace, the present work also uses 
emotions to help explain why interpersonal justice has such a profound impact on distal 
attitudes toward the supervisor, job, and organization.   
 The literature on interpersonal justice suggests that it may be more interesting to 
study the dark side of interpersonal justice (Bies, 2001) than it is to study the bright side. 
Support for this contention can be found in the present study, as negative emotions 
explained more interpersonal justice effects than did positive emotions. Furthermore, 
results of a post-hoc analysis, in which I separately viewed the correlations between 
 144 
 
emotions and my dependent variables in both high and low interpersonal justice 
conditions, suggest that emotions have a stronger relationship with distal outcomes in the 
following a negative event than following a positive event. For example, negative 
emotions were related to supervisor evaluations (average effect size of supervisor 
satisfaction, supervisor trust, and supervisor relationship viability) to a greater extent in 
the unfair condition ( r  = .59), following a negative event, than in the fair condition ( r  = 
.50), following a positive event. With regard to positive emotions, the relationship with 
supervisor evaluations was only slightly weaker in the unfair condition ( r  = .34) than in 
the fair condition ( r  = .36). These findings support previous research suggesting that 
people are better able to recall negative events, and these negative events further have a 
stronger impact on them than events that are deemed positive (Dasborough, 2006). It 
therefore seems likely that the negative emotions stemming from negative events may be 
more readily available than positive emotions when deriving attitudes such as supervisor 
evaluations (cf. Miner et al., 2005).  
 Yet, despite the findings that negative events have stronger effects than positive 
events, results of the present study demonstrate that fair interpersonal treatment may also 
be meaningful to one’s workplace experience. Indeed, interpersonal justice was 
positively related to positive emotions, which subsequently influenced important distal 
outcomes. Thus, although negative events may trigger stronger emotional reactions, and 
have a greater distal effect on workplace outcomes than positive events, the study of 
high interpersonal justice also appears to have substantial merit, as fair interpersonal 
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treatment has implications for positive emotional experiences and important workplace 
attitudes. 
 Furthermore, the study of positive emotions also informs the literature on 
motivation. The traditional views of motivation (e.g., Herzberg, 1966) would suggest 
that supervisory practices act as hygiene factors that are extrinsic to the subordinate 
rather than serving as intrinsic motivators. Yet, the present work suggests that a 
supervisor’s behavior, namely his or her interpersonal treatment toward a subordinate, 
has a positive intrinsic influence on the subordinate through the activation of positive 
emotions. This finding aligns well with views of supervisors as transformational leaders 
(Bass, 1985; 1996) that trigger internal feelings of trust, admiration, and respect toward 
the supervisors. These feelings subsequently motivate subordinates to do more than they 
otherwise would without the influence of the supervisor. Future scholars should 
explicitly examine the influence of interpersonal justice on a subordinate’s level of 
intrinsic emotions. 
 Emotions are critical components to the experience of justice, and scholars have 
made important steps toward understanding exactly what roles they play (Cohen-
Charash & Byrne, 2008). Yet, there is a great deal of opportunity for further extension, 
particularly with regard to interpersonal justice. The present work examined the effects 
of interpersonal justice on a small handful of emotions. Future scholars may find it 
beneficial to investigate the potential effects of interpersonal justice on a much wider 
collection of emotions. Similarly, a more diverse set of distal outcomes may also 
generate interesting results. With the exception of withdrawal, which captured 
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behavioral intent, all other outcome variables used in this dissertation were attitudes. 
Scholars should also examine emotions as potential mediators of interpersonal justice 
effects on actual behaviors. To this point, this avenue has been relatively untapped in the 
literature (for one exception using hostility to link interpersonal justice to deviant 
behavior, see Judge et al., 2006). It would also be interesting to isolate the effects on 
each discrete emotion, rather than aggregating them together, as has typically been done 
in the justice literature. Weiss and colleagues (1999: 787) propose that “ignoring discrete 
emotions in favor of general positive or negative affective states can reduce the ability to 
predict specific behaviors”.  
 The present study also draws from the status literature to extend our 
understanding of interpersonal justice. In doing so, I answer recent calls for further 
examination of the roles of status both within the broad field of management (Pearce, 
2011a) and, more specifically, within the realm of organizational justice (Greenberg & 
Ganegoda, 2010). Results suggest that status interacts with interpersonal justice to 
predict both positive and negative emotions. Moreover, two distinct types of status—
personal status and supervisor status—moderated these relationships.  
 Of particular interest in the present study is the use of perceptual status variables. 
Research has found that objective status (i.e., hierarchical position and race) moderates 
the effects of interpersonal justice on deviant behavior (Aquino et al., 2004). Yet, to this 
point, no interpersonal justice studies have tapped into the cognitive components of 
status. Without this knowledge, we can only speculate as to why people in particular 
positions of status react to stimuli in different ways. This dissertation attempts to shine 
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some light on the issue by asking participants to rate the extent to which they are given 
status, regard, prestige, and respect from their colleagues. Results of the present research 
suggest that interpersonal justice influences emotions to a stronger degree in participants 
who perceive that they are given high status by others than in participants who perceive 
that they are given low status. Results also demonstrate that the perceived status of the 
supervisor, as the deliverer of the interpersonal justice, also impacts the effect of that 
treatment on emotions. Specifically, the relationship is stronger when the subordinate 
perceives that the supervisor is afforded high levels of status, regard, prestige, and 
respect by the group than when the supervisor is perceived to have low levels. This 
finding corresponds to a well-established notion in sociology known as ‘the Thomas 
theorem’, which states that “if men define situations as real, they are real in 
consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: 572). In other words, perception is reality. 
Thus, according to the theorem, if people perceive that they (or their supervisors) have 
high status, they are likely to think and behave in a manner that reflects this perception. 
In support of the Thomas theorem, research has demonstrated that people are generally 
quite accurate in perceiving their status, as their perceptions correlate highly with the 
perceptions others have of them (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 
2006). These findings lend further support to the utilization of perceived status.  
 Status presents a wealth of opportunities for future extensions within the 
interpersonal justice literature. First, although I examined status as a moderator of 
interpersonal justice effects in this study, status may also play a causal role in the 
generation of interpersonal justice judgments. According to Van Prooijen and colleagues 
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(2002: 1355), “people have mental representations of the concepts of status and fairness 
and that there is a cognitive link, or mental association between these representations, 
such that representations of status affect representations of fairness”. Although there 
have, to this point, been no studies examining the influence of status on interpersonal 
justice judgments, Fiddick and Cummins (2001) provide preliminary evidence that such 
effects may exist. In an experimental study that manipulated status, these authors found 
that high-status individuals perceive that they were treated more fairly by other 
participants than did their low-status counterparts. It, therefore, seems plausible that 
high-status employees may rate their supervisors significantly higher on interpersonal 
justice than would their low-status counterparts. Second, status may also serve as an 
outcome to interpersonal justice. As suggested by the relational model of justice, 
interpersonal treatment by a supervisor influences employees’ perceptions of how they 
are viewed by others in the group (Ferris et al., in press; Tyler, 1989). Thus, it is likely 
that status plays a much more complicated role in the experience of interpersonal justice 
than what has been uncovered in this dissertation. It may be that (1) interpersonal justice 
influences one’s perceived standing in a group, (2) this standing reciprocally influences 
one’s perceptions of interpersonal justice, and (3) the strength of one’s reactions to 
interpersonal justice will further be influenced by this standing. Future scholars are 
invited to test these possibilities simultaneously in a more complex model of 
interpersonal justice and status.  
  This dissertation also contributes to the literatures on status and emotions by 
integrating the two. The power-status theory of emotions (Kemper, 2006) suggests that 
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many emotions emerge as a result of people’s status relative to that of their social 
exchange partners. People can view their relative status as adequate, excessive, or 
insufficient. When status is adequate, people are likely to experience positive emotions 
such as contentment or happiness. Perceptions that status is excessive may trigger 
feelings of guilt or embarrassment. When status is insufficient, people may feel angry or 
sad. According to the theory, perceived status can fluctuate following social exchanges. 
If, for example, an individual is mistreated by his/her exchange partner, the individual’s 
perceived status may decrease, potentially triggering a number of negative emotions. 
Conversely, if the same individual receives a compliment from his/her exchange partner, 
the individual’s perceived status may increase. This increase is likely to result in 
emotions such as happiness, if the increase in status was warranted, or potentially even 
embarrassment if the individual feels unworthy of the compliment. The power-status 
theory of emotions therefore predicts that interpersonal justice has the potential to 
increase or decrease a subordinate’s perceived status and subsequently trigger emotions 
based on whether the new level of status is adequate, excessive, or insufficient. Future 
scholars may find it fruitful to test a longitudinal model of interpersonal justice, status, 
and emotions to determine if interpersonal justice does indeed influence status over time, 
and whether the emotional responses are a result of one’s perception of the adequacy of 
the changed status.  
 Perhaps the most compelling finding of this dissertation was the moderating 
influences of personal status on interpersonal justice-to-emotions relationships. Although 
a significant interaction between interpersonal justice and personal status did emerge, the 
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nature of the moderation was in the opposite direction to what I hypothesized. Despite 
my theoretical framework, which was grounded in self-enhancement theory (Jones, 
1973), this finding directly supports self-verification theory (Swann, 1983). As 
previously discussed, the tenets of self-verification theory make predictions that directly 
conflict with those of self-enhancement theory. According to self-enhancement theory, 
low-status employees should react more strongly to interpersonal justice, because they 
are in greater need of self-enhancing information than high-status employees. 
Conversely, self-verification theory proposes that high-status employees will react more 
strongly, because they feel they deserve more respectful treatment to verify their already 
high self-worth, relative to low-status employees. Even more perplexing is the strong 
empirical support for both theories. Within the field of organizational justice, scholars 
have found that both high-status employees (Weisenfeld et al., 2007) and low-status 
employees (Aquino et al., 2004, De Cremer, 2003) have reacted significantly more 
strongly to fairness judgments in different studies. In the present study, high-status 
participants reacted more strongly than low-status participants, supporting self-
verification theory. Further, participants reporting to high-status supervisors experienced 
significantly stronger emotional responses to interpersonal justice than those reporting to 
low-status supervisors. This may lend support to self-enhancement theory, as a more 
credible supervisor is likely to provide more self-enhancing information from the 
interpersonal treatment than a less credible supervisor. Yet, this finding may also support 
self-verification theory, as participants reporting to high-status supervisors may feel a 
greater sense of deservingness than those reporting to low-status supervisors. Although 
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there is still a great deal of uncertainty regarding which motives are driving reactions to 
interpersonal justice, what is clear is that the self-concept plays a central role in these 
responses. Future scholars can help clarify these issues by measuring the psychological 
processes involved. Explicitly examining the competing motives of self-enhancement 
and self-verification motives would likely be very informative for the justice literature.  
 Finally, the present study also extends the literature on justice orientation. 
Results suggest that justice orientation demonstrated a significant interaction with 
interpersonal justice. Whereas research has demonstrated the interactive effects of these 
two variables on outcomes such as organizational satisfaction and commitment (Liao & 
Rupp, 2005; Rupp et al., 2003), this is the first study that has examined its ability to 
predict emotions. Participants who rated themselves as high on justice orientation 
experienced significantly stronger emotional reactions to interpersonal justice than those 
who rated themselves as low on justice orientation. Although no significant interaction 
emerged when predicting positive emotions, the interactive effect on negative emotions 
suggests that justice orientation may be useful in investigating outcomes that are more 
proximal than the distal attitudes examined in previous studies.  
5.4 Practical Implications 
 Practically, results of the present research suggest that organizations concerned 
with improving attitudes directed at the supervisor, organization, and job may benefit 
from increasing the level of positive emotions, and decreasing the level of negative 
emotions, in their employees. According to AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), this may 
be accomplished by focusing on the events which trigger such emotions. In particular, 
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the results suggest that increasing the positive (and decreasing the negative) emotions 
experienced by a company’s workforce may be as simple as treating employees with 
heightened levels of dignity and respect. Given the critical role played by supervisors in 
such treatment, corporations may be wise to enhance sensitivity training for employees 
with direct reports. It may also be beneficial to place an increased emphasis on 
employees’ previous record of interpersonal exchanges with others before selecting them 
for promotion to a supervisory level.  
 Results also suggest that interpersonal justice, while important to all employees, 
may be even more critical to those who possess high levels of perceived status. Thus, 
whereas supervisors should certainly treat all employees with dignity and respect, they 
may be wise to take extra care when communicating with their high-status subordinates. 
The greatest challenge, of course, is identifying those employees who possess high 
levels of perceived status. As noted by Simmel (1908), “the first condition of having to 
deal with somebody at all is to know with whom one has to deal” (quoted from Wolff, 
1950: 307). One option supervisors have for identifying differences in status is noting 
characteristics that are indicative of status. According to status characteristics theory 
(Anderson, Berger, Cohen, Zelditch, 1966), status is influenced by any number of 
characteristics, including, but not limited to, gender, race, and attractiveness. In the 
workplace, additional characteristics such as organizational tenure, educational 
attainment, title, salary, quality/location of office/cubicle/desk may influence how an 
employee is viewed by others. Furthermore, those employees who consistently perform 
at high levels may also enjoy high status in the organization (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). 
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Thus, by simply observing the characteristics (both demographic and professional) that 
symbolize status, supervisors may be able to detect those employees who require 
heightened levels of interpersonal justice.  
 The same can be said about identifying high-status supervisors. Results suggest 
that interpersonal treatment may be more meaningful if it is delivered by high-status 
supervisors, relative to treatment delivered by low-status supervisors. Again, whereas all 
supervisors should be trained to deliver high levels of dignity and respect to their 
subordinates, organizations may benefit from providing additional sensitivity training to 
those supervisors who enjoy high status in the organization. Companies may find 
success in noting the aforementioned status characteristics when selecting supervisors 
for this additional training.  
 In addition to basing status ratings on demographic and professional 
characteristics, organizations may also choose to simply ask employees about their 
social standing in the company. Because the present study found that interpersonal 
justice effects differed based on perceived status, organizations may benefit from 
surveying their employees with regard to how they are viewed by others. Furthermore, 
while inquiring about the perceived status of their employees, companies should also 
include a measure of justice orientation in the survey, as the present results suggest that 
the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions is strengthened by the awareness of 
justice events and the belief that justice is a moral virtue. 
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5.5 Limitations 
 As is the case for all scientific research, the present study is not without 
limitations. Perhaps most notable is my inability to conclude that self-reflective motives 
serve as the driving mechanism for my moderation results. Although my findings do 
align well with both self-verification and self-enhancement theories, I did not explicitly 
measure either self-reflective motive. It is therefore possible that these findings were 
driven by other factors. For example, ratings of perceived personal status were highly 
correlated with participants’ academic classifications (i.e., freshman, sophomore, junior, 
senior; r = .55, p < .01). Thus, participants who hold the highest perceived personal 
status tend to be the most senior cadets in the Corps. It is possible that longer tenure in 
the Corps caused participants to gradually become ‘fed up’ with their superiors’ 
interpersonal treatment over time, thereby strengthening their reactions to such 
treatment. Future scholars should not only empirically capture the self-reflective motives 
that make up the foundation of the present study’s theoretical framework, but they 
should also rule out a number of other potential competing factors that may be driving 
the results.   
 Next, the sample from which my data were collected was a university-based 
military organization. The generalizability of my findings can only be supported with 
future research examining my model in more traditional work settings. Indeed, military 
institutions possess clear distinctions from what might be considered a typical 
workplace. For example, the Corps places a great deal of time and effort into physical 
training and the study of military tactics, two aspects that are not of focal importance in 
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most non-military jobs. Further, the demographic composition of the Corps also differs 
from the general population. For instance, the 49% minorities and 11% females are 
substantially different from the national averages of 36% and 50.8%, respectively (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). Given that prior justice research has used both race and gender as 
proxies for status (Aquino et al., 2004), it would be quite interesting to see a replication 
of this study in a more demographically diverse sample. Despite these distinctions, 
military organizations also possess important similarities to business organizations. For 
example, a highly structured hierarchy of authority is a military staple. Supervisor-
subordinate relationships are quite salient and meaningful, and cadets are well aware of 
their social standing, thereby enhancing the saliency of status. Also, it is important to 
note that military settings have been effective contexts for studying justice effects in 
previous research (Brennan & Skarlicki, 2004; Cole et al., 2010; Tepper & Taylor, 
2003).  
 Another potential limitation is the possibility of nonessential multicollinearity 
among some of my study variables. Multicollinearity generally refers to the high 
correlation among independent variables (Cohen et al., 2003). However, in mediation 
models, multicollinearity can also occur when the correlation between an independent 
variable and a mediator is excessively high (Baron & Kenny, 1986). When 
multicollinearity exists, regression coefficients possess very little unique information 
(i.e., enlarged standard errors), resulting in unreliable estimates. Based on the high 
intercorrelations between interpersonal justice and both emotion mediators, 
multicollinearity may be a potential concern in my data. For instance, in my 
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experimental data (Table 4.1), interpersonal justice had a correlation of -.72 with 
negative emotions and .78 with positive emotions. In my nonexperimental data (Table 
4.13), these correlations dropped to -.70 and .66 respectively. It is clear that 
multicollinearity exists. In fact, according to Kenny (2013), “multicollinearity is to be 
expected in a mediational analysis and it cannot be avoided.” The question, then, is 
whether or not this multicollinearity is excessive. As the path from the independent 
variable and mediator (path a) strengthens, the power to detect significance in the path 
between the mediator and dependent variable (path b) is reduced (Kenny, 2013). At the 
extreme, if perfect collinearity existed between the independent variable and mediator 
(i.e., r = 1.0), there would be no unique variance for the mediator to predict the 
dependent variable, making it impossible for a significant indirect effect to exist. My 
results suggest that significant indirect relationships do exist between interpersonal 
justice and several outcome variables, through both positive and negative emotions. The 
estimate for path a was therefore not sufficiently large to eliminate the significance of 
path b, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a major concern in my data. To lend 
further support for this claim, I conducted a CFA for my nonexperimental data, in which 
I combined all three latent variables (i.e., interpersonal justice, negative emotions, and 
positive emotions) into one factor. Collapsing these three variables resulted in a 
reduction of fit (χ2[3,194] = 11,519 p < .001; CFI = .72, RMSEA = .08), suggesting that 
these three variables are distinct constructs. 
 Additionally, all data were collected via self-report measures, thus presenting the 
potential for common-method bias. Despite this possibility, my CFA results suggest that 
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discriminant validity exists among study variables. I also provided temporal separation 
between variables, as recommended by Podsakoff and colleagues (2003). For example, 
at Time 1, I collected only my moderators and control variables. In my experimental 
design, I collected my mediators and dependent variables cross-sectionally immediately 
following my Time 2 manipulation. Yet, many of these experimental results were 
replicated in my nonexperimental design, in which I provided temporal separation by 
capturing all outcome variables at Time 3.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I theoretically developed and empirically tested a model of 
interpersonal justice, emotions, status, and justice orientation. Although not every 
hypothesis in my model received support, many interesting findings emerged. For 
example, I found that, in addition to its ability to predict negative emotions, 
interpersonal justice can also trigger positive feelings in subordinates. Perhaps, then, 
high levels of interpersonal justice does more than simply meet expectations, as such 
behavior is unlikely to result in the strong positive emotional responses demonstrated in 
this study. Furthermore, I found that the effects of interpersonal justice on emotions are 
conditioned by a number of moderators, including personal status, supervisor status, and 
justice orientation.  
 The hypotheses in my model were guided by two well-established theoretical 
frameworks: affective events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) and self-enhancement 
theory (Jones, 1973). My results demonstrated strong support for the tenets of AET. 
Interpersonal justice triggered emotions, which subsequently influenced a number of 
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important attitudinal outcomes. However, the self-enhancement hypotheses received 
mixed results. Most notably was the interaction of personal status and interpersonal 
justice, which resulted in effects that were in the opposite direction of what I 
hypothesized. Interestingly, this finding appears to align well with a theory that directly 
conflicts with self-enhancement—self-verification theory (Swann, 1983).  
  Overall, the present work extends organizational justice theory by integrating 
literature on emotions, status, justice orientation, and the self-concept. It is my hope that 
this research will spark future studies linking these variables (and others) with a variety 
of phenomena pertinent to fairness in the workplace.  
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY #1 
(Scale titles and citations were not visible to participants) 
Consent Document 
 
[organization name] Attitudes & Perceptions Study 
  
You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by [organization name] 
and a team of researchers from the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. 
The information in this form is provided to help you decide whether or not to take part. 
If you decide you do not want to participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you 
will not lose any benefits you normally would have. 
  
Why Is This Study Being Done? 
The purpose of this study is to understand the perceptions and attitudes of individuals in 
[organization name]. 
  
Why Am I Being Asked To Be In This Study? 
You are being asked to be in this study because you are a member of [organization 
name].  
  
How Many People Will Be Asked To Be In This Study? 
Approximately 2,300 cadets will be invited to participate in this study locally. 
  
What Are the Alternatives to being in this study? 
No, the alternative to being in the study is not to participate. 
  
What Will I Be Asked To Do In This Study? 
You will be asked to complete three 30-minute online surveys over the course of the 
next few weeks. 
  
Are There Any Risks To Me? 
The things that you will be doing are no more risks than you would come across in 
everyday life. Although the researchers have tried to avoid risks, you may feel that some 
questions that are asked of you will be stressful or upsetting. You do not have to answer 
anything you do not want to.  
  
Will There Be Any Costs To Me? 
Aside from your time, there are no costs for taking part in the study. 
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Will I Be Paid To Be In This Study? 
Upon completion of all three surveys, your name will be entered into a lottery to win one 
of fifteen new iPad 4’s (each valued at $499).  
  
Will Information From This Study Be Kept Private? 
The records of this study will be kept private. No identifiers linking you to this study 
will be included in any sort of report that might be published. Research records will be 
stored securely and only the Mays Business School research team will have access to 
them. 
  
Information about you will be stored in computer files protected with a password. 
  
Information about you will be kept confidential to the extent permitted or required by 
law. People who have access to your information include the Principal Investigator and 
research study personnel. Representatives of regulatory agencies such as the Office of 
Human Research Protections (OHRP) and entities such as the Texas A&M University 
Human Subjects Protection Program may access your records to make sure the study is 
being run correctly and that information is collected properly. 
  
Who may I Contact for More Information? 
You may contact the Principal Investigator, Adam Stoverink, to tell him about any 
concern or complaint about this research at 979-845-4851 or 
mgmtresearch@mays.tamu.edu. 
  
For questions about your rights as a research participant; or if you have questions, 
complaints, or concerns about the research, you may call the Texas A&M University 
Human Subjects Protection Program office at (979) 458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu. 
  
What if I Change My Mind About Participating? 
This research is voluntary and you have the choice whether or not to be in this research 
study.  You may decide to not begin or to stop participating at any time.   If you choose 
not to be in this study or stop being in the study, there will be no effect on your student 
status or your relationships with either Texas A&M University or the [organization 
name]. 
  
By completing the surveys, you are giving permission for the investigator to use your 
information for research purposes. 
  
Thank you 
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Introduction Page 
Welcome to the [organization name] Attitudes & Perceptions Study! 
  
This research is highly important to Texas A&M University, [organization name], and 
Mays Business School. We appreciate your careful attention to each question and your 
thoroughness in responding. 
 
All parts of this questionnaire are important. Please read every question carefully and 
provide your response. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.  
 
To make sure you read everything carefully, the system records time spent on questions, 
sections, and the overall completion time. It also has a number of features to detect 
random or careless responding. If the system determines that questions were not read 
carefully, your responses will be discarded and you will not be eligible for the iPad 4 
drawing. 
 
Also, please make sure you complete the entire questionnaire. You will need to reach the 
last screen with the following message "We thank you for your time spent taking this 
survey. Your response has been recorded." 
 
As a final point, you will notice that several questions that are very similar are asked 
numerous times. While we recognize that this can be frustrating, please understand that 
it is necessary to achieve the objectives of the study. 
 
Thank you for your participation! Again, your help is greatly appreciated! 
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Perceived status (Diekmann et al., 2007) 
On the next few pages we will ask you questions about yourself. In particular, we are 
interested in how you are viewed by the other cadets in your outfit. 
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am very highly regarded in my platoon. 
2. I have a lot of status in my platoon. 
3. I have a lot of prestige in my platoon. 
4. I have a lot of respect in my platoon. 
 
Perceived workgroup status (Diekmann et al., 2007) 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements regarding how your outfit is viewed by other outfits in the Corps.  
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1.  My outfit is very highly regarded in the Corps. 
2. My outfit has a lot of status in the Corps. 
3. My outfit has a lot of prestige in the Corps. 
4. My outfit has a lot of respect in the Corps. 
 
Perceived supervisor status (Diekmann et al., 2007) 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements regarding how your immediate superior is viewed by the cadets in your outfit. 
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. My platoon leader is very highly regarded by my platoon. 
2. My platoon leader has a lot of status in my platoon. 
3. My platoon leader has a lot of prestige in my platoon. 
4. My platoon leader has a lot of respect in my platoon. 
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Justice Orientation (Rupp et al., 2003) 
Please read the statements below and rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
each statement about yourself. 
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I wish I could make amends for every single injustice I have ever committed. 
2. I rarely notice people being treated unfairly.  
3. I hurt for people who are treated unfairly, whether I know them or not. 
4. I have been in public situations where I have noticed strangers being treated 
unfairly. 
5. When I observe or hear about people being treated unfairly, I tend to think about it 
for a long time.  
6. Our nation needs to care less about success and more about justice. 
7. People should care less about getting ahead and more about being fair. 
8. I am prone to notice people being treated unfairly in public. 
9. I think in terms of justice and fairness.  
10. I see people treating each other unfairly all of the time.  
11. No one is free as long as one person is oppressed. 
12. I am conscious of issues of justice around me. 
13. People are happier when they are fair to others. 
14. I tend to notice even the smallest injustice. 
15. It makes me sick to think about all of the injustice in the world. 
16. All of us need to take responsibility when others are treated unfairly. 
 
PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Read each item and then indicate to what extent you typically feel this way in general, 
that is, on average.   
 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
1. Interested 
2. Distressed  
3. Excited 
4. Upset  
5. Strong  
6. Guilty  
7. Scared  
8. Hostile  
9. Enthusiastic 
10. Proud 
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11. Irritable  
12. Alert 
13. Ashamed  
14. Inspired 
15. Nervous  
16. Determined 
17. Attentive 
18. Jittery  
19. Active 
20. Afraid  
 
Social self-esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) 
We are interested in how you typically feel about yourself. Please respond to the 
following items about how you feel in general, that is on average, as a member of the 
Corps of Cadets.  
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. 
2. I feel self-conscious. 
3. I feel displeased with myself. 
4. I am worried about what other people think of me. 
5. I feel inferior to others at this moment. 
6. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. 
7. I am worried about looking foolish. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY #2 
Introduction Page 
In this survey, we are interested in better understanding the interpersonal exchanges 
between cadets and their leaders. We will therefore ask you about the interpersonal 
treatment you receive from your various leaders. Specifically, we will ask you about 
your immediate superior you identified in Survey #1. 
 
As always, your responses will be completely anonymous. All responses will be 
summarized, and your personal information will be wiped from the database before any 
summary reports are created. Furthermore, your superiors' names will also be removed 
prior to creating the summary reports. We only ask for the superiors' names to allow us 
to link your ratings in this survey to your ratings in the previous survey. It's important 
that we ensure the same superiors are being rated across surveys. 
  
As always, we ask that you please rate your superiors with complete honesty. 
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We would first like you to rate the interpersonal treatment you receive from 
your immediate superior (the person to whom you report directly). This should be the 
same person you listed as your immediate superior in Survey #1.  
 
What is the name of your immediate superior? Please enter his/her First and Last names. 
(This name will only be used to link these ratings with your previous ratings. After 
linking the ratings, your superior's name will be removed from the database along with 
yours.) 
 
Immediate Superior Interpersonal Justice (Colquitt, 2001) 
 
The following items refer to your immediate superior (the person to whom you directly 
report). 
 
Think about all of your interactions with your immediate superior since you arrived on 
campus in August.  
 
In that time, to what extent... 
 
(1 = to a small extent, 7 = to a large extent) 
 
1. ...has your immediate superior treated you in a polite manner? 
2. ...has your immediate superior treated you with dignity? 
3. ...has your immediate superior treated you with respect? 
4. ...has your immediate superior refrained from improper remarks or comments? 
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Now we are interested in understanding how the interpersonal treatment you have 
received from your immediate superior has made you feel emotionally. On the next five 
pages, we list a series of emotions. Please indicate the extent to which you have felt each 
emotion in reaction to the interpersonal treatment you have received from 
your immediate superior since you arrived on campus in August. 
 
Emotions 
Please indicate the extent to which you have experienced each of the following 
emotions in reaction to the interpersonal treatment you have received from 
your immediate superior since arriving on campus in August. 
  
(Please read carefully, as some emotions are positive and some are negative.) 
Angry 
Irritated 
Anxiety 
Rage 
Joy 
Pleased 
Happiness 
Delight 
Pride 
Content 
Aggravated 
Agitated 
Hostility 
Agreeable 
Bitter 
Embarrassed 
Deserving 
Despair 
Disappointed 
Depressed 
Disgusted 
 
 
Fearful 
Hope 
Envious 
Anger 
Frustrated 
Furious 
Grateful 
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Happy 
Contentment 
Helpless 
Hopeless 
Pleasure 
Infuriation 
Insulted 
Jealous 
Joyful 
Outraged 
 
 
Delighted 
Enraged 
Pissed 
Resentful 
Sad 
Satisfied 
Mad 
Shamed 
Stressed 
Displeased 
Surprised 
Sympathetic 
At ease 
Annoyed 
Bored 
Calm 
Elated 
Gloomy 
Anxious 
Cheerful 
 
 
Confused 
Discouraged 
Energetic 
Ecstatic 
Frightened 
Fatigued 
Intimidated 
Miserable 
Relaxed 
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Interested 
Distressed  
Excited 
Upset  
Strong  
Guilty  
Scared  
Hostile  
Enthusiastic 
Proud 
Irritable  
Alert 
Ashamed  
Inspired 
Nervous  
Determined 
Attentive 
Jittery  
Active 
Afraid 
 
Interpersonal Justice Manipulation 
In order to better understand the interpersonal interactions between cadets and their 
superiors, we would now like you to recall one particular incident in which your superior 
treated you with particularly HIGH/LOW levels of dignity, respect, and politeness.  
 
Specifically, we are referring to the superior to whom you believe you can best rate on 
leadership skills & behaviors. For some of you, this is your immediate superior. For 
others, it is your 'alternate' superior. If you have trouble recalling a situation that meets 
this criteria perfectly, please just think of an incident that BEST meets this criteria. 
 
Again, please be completely honest. Your name, and the name of your superior, will be 
wiped from the database prior to creating any summary reports. 
 
Please enter the First and Last name of the superior to which you are referring. 
 
Please take a minute to really think about the specific situation in which your superior 
treated you with particularly HIGH/LOW levels of dignity, respect, and politeness.  
 
Once you have a specific situation in mind that meets these criteria, please use the space 
below to briefly describe the situation in a few sentences (e.g., What happened? How did 
you feel? etc.).  
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Proximity to Interpersonal Justice Event 
Approximately how long ago did this situation occur? Please be as specific as possible 
(e.g., 2 weeks and 4 days ago). 
 
Manipulation Check (Interpersonal Justice; Colquitt, 2001) 
 
Please rate the treatment you received from your superior in the situation you just 
recalled: 
 
In the situation you just recalled, to what extent... 
 
(1 = to a small extent, 7 = to a large extent) 
 
1. ...did your superior treat you in a polite manner? 
2. ...did your superior treat you with dignity? 
3. ...did your superior treat you with respect? 
4. ...did your superior refrain from improper remarks or comments? 
 
Emotions (PANAS and Hypothesized emotions) 
 
Once again we would like you to rate your emotional experiences. This time, we are 
interested in the extent to which you experienced each emotion in reaction to the 
treatment you received from your superior during the situation you just recalled. 
 
 
Angry 
Irritated 
Anxiety 
Rage 
Joy 
Pleased 
Happiness 
Delight 
Pride 
Content 
Aggravated 
Agitated 
Hostility 
Agreeable 
Bitter 
Embarrassed 
Deserving 
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Despair 
Disappointed 
Depressed 
Disgusted 
 
 
Fearful 
Hope 
Envious 
Anger 
Frustrated 
Furious 
Grateful 
Happy 
Contentment 
Helpless 
Hopeless 
Pleasure 
Infuriation 
Insulted 
Jealous 
Joyful 
Outraged 
 
 
Delighted 
Enraged 
Pissed 
Resentful 
Sad 
Satisfied 
Mad 
Shamed 
Stressed 
Displeased 
Surprised 
Sympathetic 
At ease 
Annoyed 
Bored 
Calm 
Elated 
Gloomy 
Anxious 
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Cheerful 
 
 
Confused 
Discouraged 
Energetic 
Ecstatic 
Frightened 
Fatigued 
Intimidated 
Miserable 
Relaxed 
 
Interested 
Distressed  
Excited 
Upset  
Strong  
Guilty  
Scared  
Hostile  
Enthusiastic 
Proud 
Irritable  
Alert 
Ashamed  
Inspired 
Nervous  
Determined 
Attentive 
Jittery  
Active 
Afraid 
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Superior Satisfaction (scenario; Brayfield & Rothe, 1951) 
 
The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just 
recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements.  
 
      (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
 
At this very moment, I am enthusiastic about my superior. 
Right now, I feel fairly satisfied with my superior. 
At present, each minute with my superior seems like it will never end. 
At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my superior. 
Right now, I consider my superior rather unpleasant. 
 
Superior Trust (scenario; Cook & Wall, 1980) 
 
The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just 
recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements.  
 
1. My superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view. 
2. I have a poor future unless I have a better superior. 
3. If I got into difficulties in the Corps, I know my superior would try and help me 
out. 
4. My superior can be trusted to make sensible decisions for my future. 
5. I can trust my superior to lend me a hand if I needed it. 
6. My superior seems to do an efficient job. 
7. I feel quite confident that my superior will always treat me fairly. 
8. My superior can be relied upon to do as he/she says he/she will do. 
9. My superior would be quite prepared to gain advantage by deceiving me. 
 
Superior Relationship Viability (Evans & Jarvis, 1986) 
 
The following items are in reference to your superior in the situation you just 
recalled. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements.  
 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
 
1. I want to remain with my superior. 
2. I don't care what happens to my superior. 
3. If I could stop working with my superior now, I would. 
4. I wish it were possible to stop working with my superior now. 
5. If it were possible to move to another superior at this time, I would. 
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Job Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951) 
 
What is your position in the Corps? If you have multiple positions, please choose the 
one with which you identify most (i.e., the position that is most important to you.) If 
you are a fish, please enter "fish".  
 
___________________________________ 
 
The following statements are in reference to the position you entered above.  
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements. 
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. My position seems like a hobby to me. 
2. My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored. 
3. It seems that other cadets would be more interested in their positions. 
4. I consider my position rather unpleasant. 
5. I enjoy my position more than my leisure time. 
6. I am often bored with my position. 
7. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present position. 
8. Most of the time, I have to force myself to do the tasks related to my position. 
9. I am satisfied with my position for the time being. 
10. I feel that my position is no more interesting than other cadets could get. 
11. I definitely dislike my position. 
12. I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets. 
13. Most days I am enthusiastic about my position. 
14. Each day in my position seems like it will never end. 
15. I like my position better than the average cadet does. 
16. My position is pretty uninteresting. 
17. I find real enjoyment in my position. 
18. I am disappointed that I have this position. 
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Organizational Commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Vandenberghe et al., 2004) 
 
The following items are in reference to the Corps. Please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the Corps. 
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. I really feel a sense of belonging to the Corps. 
2. I feel proud to be a cadet in the Corps. 
3. The Corps means a lot to me. 
4. I do NOT feel emotionally attached to the Corps. 
5. I do NOT feel like “part of the family” in the Corps. 
6. I do NOT feel a strong sense of belonging to the Corps. 
 
Withdrawal (Kelloway et al., 1999) 
 
The following items are in reference to the Corps. Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (If you are on 
the Corps Staff or a Major Unit Staff, you can skip the outfit-related items at the 
bottom) 
 
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am thinking about leaving the Corps. 
2. I am planning to look for something to do with my time other than the Corps. 
3. I intend to ask people about new opportunities outside the Corps. 
4. I don’t plan to complete my four years in the Corps. 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY #3 
On the next few pages, we will ask you to rate your immediate superior (the person to 
whom you report directly). Your superior's name will only be used to link these ratings 
with ratings from your previous surveys. Names will be wiped from the database prior to 
creating our summary reports.   
 
What is the first and last name of your immediate superior? 
 
Immediate Superior Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951) 
The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom 
you directly report). Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements.  
 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
 
1. At this very moment, I am enthusiastic about my immediate superior. 
2. Right now, I feel fairly satisfied with my immediate superior. 
3. At present, each minute with my immediate superior seems like it will never end. 
4. At this moment, I find real enjoyment working with my immediate superior. 
5. Right now, I consider my immediate superior rather unpleasant. 
 
Immediate Superior Trust (Cook & Wall, 1980) 
 
The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom 
you directly report). 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
 
1. My immediate superior is sincere in his/her attempt to meet my point of view. 
2. I have a poor future unless I have a better immediate superior. 
3. If I got into difficulties in the Corps, I know my immediate superior would try and 
help me out. 
4. My immediate superior can be trusted to make sensible decisions for my future. 
5. I can trust my immediate superior to lend me a hand if I needed it. 
6. My immediate superior seems to do an efficient job. 
7. I feel quite confident that my immediate superior will always treat me fairly. 
8. My immediate superior can be relied upon to do as he/she says he/she will do. 
9. My immediate superior would be quite prepared to gain advantage by deceiving 
me. 
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Immediate Superior Relationship Viability (Evans & Jarvis, 1986) 
The following items are in reference to your immediate superior (the person to whom 
you directly report). 
 
 (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
 
1. I want to remain with my immediate superior. 
2. I don't care what happens to my immediate superior. 
3. If I could stop working with my immediate superior now, I would. 
4. I wish it were possible to stop working with my immediate superior now. 
5. If it were possible to move to another superior at this time, I would.  
 
 
Job Satisfaction (Brayfield & Rothe, 1951) 
What is your position in the Corps? If you have multiple positions, please choose the 
one with which you identify most (i.e., the position that is most important to you.) If 
you are a fish, please enter "fish".  
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
The following statements are in reference to the position you entered above.  
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements. 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. My position seems like a hobby to me. 
2. My position is usually interesting enough to keep me from getting bored. 
3. It seems that other cadets would be more interested in their positions. 
4. I consider my position rather unpleasant. 
5. I enjoy my position more than my leisure time. 
6. I am often bored with my position. 
7. I feel fairly well satisfied with my present position. 
8. Most of the time, I have to force myself to do the tasks related to my position. 
9. I am satisfied with my position for the time being. 
10. I feel that my position is no more interesting than other cadets could get. 
11. I definitely dislike my position. 
12. I feel that I am happier in my position than most other cadets. 
13. Most days I am enthusiastic about my position. 
14. Each day in my position seems like it will never end. 
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15. I like my position better than the average cadet does. 
16. My position is pretty uninteresting. 
17. I find real enjoyment in my position. 
18. I am disappointed that I have this position. 
 
Organizational Commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1984; Vandenberghe et al., 2004) 
 
The following items are in reference to the Corps.  
 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. I really feel a sense of belonging to the Corps. 
2. I feel proud to be a cadet in the Corps. 
3. The Corps means a lot to me. 
4. I do NOT feel emotionally attached to the Corps. 
5. I do NOT feel like “part of the family” in the Corps. 
6. I do NOT feel a strong sense of belonging to the Corps. 
 
 
Withdrawal (Kelloway et al., 1999) 
 
The following items are in reference to the Corps. (If you are on the Corps Staff 
or a Major Unit Staff, you can skip the outfit-related items at the bottom) 
 
 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am thinking about leaving the Corps. 
2. I am planning to look for something to do with my time other than the Corps. 
3. I intend to ask people about new opportunities outside the Corps. 
4. I don’t plan to complete my four years in the Corps. 
 
